| Benetech, Inc. v Omni Fin. Group, Inc. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02480 [116 AD3d 1190] |
| April 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Benetech, Inc., Appellant, v Omni FinancialGroup, Inc., Respondent. |
—[*1] Akerman Senterfitt, LLP, New York City (Martin Domb of counsel),respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered July 6,2012 in Rensselaer County, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff and defendant are competitors engaged in the business of providingadministration services for tax-deferred retirement plans governed by Internal RevenueCode (26 USC) § 403 (b) and available to, among others, public school employees.Specifically, plaintiff and defendant act as third-party intermediaries between the schooldistricts, as the sponsors of the plans, and the financial firms (or service providers) thatoffer the financial products in which the individual employees may choose to invest. Inearly 2011, defendant advised its school district clients of its plan to implement a"Preferred Provider Program" (hereinafter P3) that could potentially reduce theadministrative costs incurred in connection therewith. Prior to P3's scheduled launchdate, plaintiff commenced this action alleging that defendant, in touting the advantagesof P3, failed to conspicuously disclose the minimum eligibility requirements forparticipation therein—specifically, that in order to be designated as a "preferred"service provider, the provider in question had to pay defendant $36 per year for eachaccount it maintained under the plan administered by defendant. Defendant successfullymoved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), prompting thisappeal by plaintiff.
We affirm. "A cause of action to recover damages pursuant to General Business Law§ 349 has three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice wasconsumer-oriented; second, [*2]that it was misleading ina material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act"(Beneficial Homeowner Serv.Corp. v Williams, 113 AD3d 713, 714 [2014] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]; see State ofN.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd. v 26-28 Maple Ave., Inc., 80 AD3d 1135,1136 [2011]; Elacqua vPhysicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886, 888 [2008]). "The thresholdrequirement of consumer-oriented conduct is met by a showing that 'the acts or practiceshave a broader impact on consumers at large' in that they are 'directed to consumers' or'potentially affect similarly situated consumers' " (Cruz v NYNEX Info.Resources, 263 AD2d 285, 290 [2000], quoting Oswego Laborers' Local 214Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 25, 27 [1995]; see Kaufman v Medical Liab. Mut.Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 1057, 1058 [2012]; State of N.Y. Workers' CompensationBd. v 26-28 Maple Ave., Inc., 80 AD3d at 1136). "[C]onsumers," in turn, generallyare defined as "those who purchase goods and services for personal, family or householduse" (Medical Socy. of State ofN.Y. v Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 15 AD3d 206, 207 [2005] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]; see Cruz v NYNEX Info. Resources, 263 AD2d at289). An act or practice will be deemed to be deceptive where it "is likely to mislead areasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances" (David v #1 Mktg. Serv., Inc.,113 AD3d 810, 812 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see 84 Lbr. Co., L.P. vBarringer, 110 AD3d 1224, 1227 [2013]; State of N.Y. Workers'Compensation Bd. v 26-28 Maple Ave., Inc., 80 AD3d at 1137).
Applying these principles to the matter before us, it is readily apparent that SupremeCourt properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss. As a starting point, the underlyingcomplaint fails to sufficiently allege that defendant's purportedly "deceptive practices[were] aimed at the general public" (84 Lbr. Co., L.P. v Barringer, 110 AD3d at1227). In this regard, it is undisputed that defendant contracted with the plan sponsors,i.e., the relevant school districts, and not the districts' individual employees, the latter ofwhom selected their particular investment options from the list of service providerschosen by their employers. School districts, as business-like entities, cannot properly beviewed as consumers for purposes of General Business Law § 349 (seegenerally Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 15 AD3d at207) and, therefore, defendant's conduct in promoting and describing its administrativeservices relative to Internal Revenue Code (26 USC) § 403 (b) plans cannot besaid to be "directed at the consuming public" (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 94 NY2d 330, 343 [1999]) or to have "broad, consumer-oriented ramifications"(U.W. Marx, Inc. v BondedConcrete, Inc., 7 AD3d 856, 858 [2004]; see Oswego Laborers' Local 214Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d at 25). Thus, even affording thecomplaint a liberal construction, accepting the allegations contained therein as true andaffording plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Vectron Intl., Inc. v CorningOak Holding, Inc., 106 AD3d 1164, 1165 [2013]), plaintiff failed to state acause of action under General Business Law § 349 and, therefore, Supreme Courtproperly dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to Supreme Court's alternative ground fordismissal. Dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is appropriate "where thedocumentary evidence utterly refutes [the] plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusivelyestablishing a defense as a matter of law" (State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Main Bros. Oil Co., 101 AD3d1575, 1576-1577 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Althoughplaintiff alleged that defendant failed to conspicuously disclose that any service providerparticipating in P3 had to pay certain administration fees in order to be designated as a"preferred" provider, such allegation is plainly refuted by the documentary evidencecontained in [*3]the record, including the very materialstendered by plaintiff.[FN1]Without belaboring the point, the record reflects that by reviewing the contents ofdefendant's website and following the hyperlinks contained therein (as illustrated byplaintiff's exhibits H, I, K and L in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss), anyonewith Internet service would have been able to access defendant's "Evaluation Matrix,"which described the precise weight to be accorded to the various qualifications used indetermining which service providers would be allowed to participate in P3. Notably, thisscoring matrix plainly indicated that a potential service provider's willingness to offsetthe employer's administrative fee accounted for 50% of the provider's overall score. Suchproof, coupled with the additional materials tendered by defendant, including a transcriptof a webinar conducted in December 2011,[FN2]more than supports Supreme Court's finding that defendant "extensively andconspicuously" disclosed the payment structure of P3 to its clients, thereby refuting anyassertion that defendant engaged in deceptive practices (see Sands vTicketmaster-N.Y., Inc., 207 AD2d 687, 687 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 904[1995]; Lewis v Hertz Corp., 181 AD2d 493, 494 [1992], lv dismissed80 NY2d 893 [1992]).[FN3]Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss thecomplaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1).
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote 1: Both exhibits D and Fto plaintiff's complaint (the former being a letter sent to defendant's clients in latesummer or early fall 2011 and the latter being an overview of P3 that was published ondefendant's website) indicate that one of the stated objectives/criteria for selecting serviceproviders for P3 was the applicant's willingness "to assist employers . . .with plan administrative fees" or "to assume costs associated with plan administration."
Footnote 2: In response to aquestion regarding the costs to a school district that elects to enroll in P3, defendant'spresident replied, "It is a requirement of P3 that P3 service providers pay the cost ofadministration as a normal cost of doing business, just like they would [pay] their electricbill, lease rents, advertising, sales promotion[s], et cetera, et cetera."
Footnote 3: Although plaintiff nowasserts that portions of defendant's website were updated following the commencementof this action, we need note only that plaintiff expressly relied upon such materials inopposing defendant's motion to dismiss and, as Supreme Court found, "[did] not contestthe authenticity" thereof.