Matter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. vAubertine
2014 NY Slip Op 05395 [119 AD3d 1202]
July 17, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 27, 2014


[*1]
1 In the Matter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., etal., Appellants, v Darrel J. Aubertine, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, etal., Respondents, et al., Respondent.

The Vincelette Law Firm, Albany (Elizabeth Hallinan, Animal Legal Defense Fund,Cotati, California, pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Andrew B. Ayers of counsel), forDarrel J. Aubertine and another, respondents.

David Lenefsky, New York City, for HVFH, LLC, respondent.

Lahtinen, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), enteredJanuary 31, 2013 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted certain respondents' motions todismiss the petition/complaint.

The predominant method of producing the food known as foie gras is to force feedducks or geese so as to enlarge their livers (see Matter of Humane Socy. of U.S., Inc. v Brennan, 63 AD3d1419, 1419 n 1 [2009]). Petitioners contend that the force feeding procedure causesthe animals to be diseased and the food product from them to be adulterated (seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 200). Petitioner Animal Legal DefenseFund, Inc. (hereinafter ALDF) is a nonprofit California corporation that advocates for theprotection of animals, and petitioner Daniel Stahlie is a New York resident whooccasionally consumes foie gras, but is allegedly concerned [*2]that foie gras from force-fed animals increases the risk thathe will develop a medical condition known as secondary amyloidosis. This combinedCPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action was commenced againstrespondents Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets and the Department ofAgriculture and Markets (hereinafter collectively referred to as the state respondents), aswell as New York corporations that produce foie gras. Petitioners seek, among otherthings, a declaration that force-fed foie gras[FN*]is an adulterated food product and anorder prohibiting the state respondents from allowing foie gras into the human foodsupply. Pre-answer motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that petitionerslacked standing. Supreme Court granted dismissal upon such ground and petitionersappeal.

Standing "requir[es] that the litigant have something truly at stake in a genuinecontroversy" (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801,812 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]). Petitioners have "the burden ofestablishing both an injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone ofinterests sought to be protected by the statute alleged to have been violated" (Matter of Association for a BetterLong Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 23 NY3d 1, 6[2014]; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761,772-773 [1991]). The injury in fact element must be based on more than conjecture orspeculation (see New York StateAssn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]; Matter of Clean Water Advocatesof N.Y., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 103 AD3d 1006,1008 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 862 [2013]).

Petitioners contend that Stahlie has standing based upon allegations that heoccasionally eats foie gras at parties and other events and that this may increase his riskof developing secondary amyloidosis. They rely primarily upon Baur v Veneman(352 F3d 625 [2d Cir 2003]) as authority for standing to compel government action whena consumer faces an enhanced risk of injury from exposure to a potentially unsafeproduct. Although the Second Circuit found standing in Baur, it cautioned about"the potentially expansive and nebulous nature of enhanced risk claims" and reiteratedthat "the injury-in-fact analysis is highly case-specific" (id. at 637). "[I]njurybased on exposure to potentially or actually harmful products can take at least two forms:(1) 'uncontested exposure to a potentially harmful substance' . . . and (2)'potential exposure to an undisputedly dangerous contaminant' " (NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. v United States Food & Drug Admin., 710F3d 71, 83 [2d Cir 2013], quoting Baur v Veneman, 352 F3d at 634 n 8).

Baur was an example of the second form of enhanced risk standing as itinvolved a disease (mad cow disease) that was undisputedly very serious in that it hadalready caused many human fatalities. The alleged exposure was not as clear since itcame from a narrow aspect of the industry (i.e., meat from downed cows) and no deathshad occurred yet in this country. In that case, "critical factors" in finding standing alsoincluded that the government was being challenged for inactivity in an area where it hadissued "studies and statements confirm[ing] several of [the plaintiff's] key allegations"and the plaintiff's "risk of harm [arose] from an established government policy" (Baurv Veneman, 352 F3d at 637; see New York v United States Army Corps ofEngrs., 896 F Supp 2d 180, 193 [ED NY 2012]).

[*3] A case finding the first form of enhanced risk standingis Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v United States Food & DrugAdmin. (supra [hereinafter referred to as NRDC]). NRDCinvolved frequent exposure at work—up to 50 times per day—to a cleaningproduct that allegedly posed a health risk (id. at 81). Although the extent of therisk in NRDC was still a subject being studied, there was "no genuine disputethat [the product was] potentially harmful" (id.). Similar to Baur, the Foodand Drug Administration itself had issued a consumer notice (see id. at 78) andhad acknowledged "valid concerns" about use of the cleaning product as well as itspotential long-term serious health effects (id. at 78, 82). Succinctly stated, inBaur, the risk of exposure was uncertain but the harm was clear and significant,whereas in NRDC, the exposure was manifest and substantial but theharm—while potentially serious—was not yet certain (id. at83).

Here, the risk of exposure is minimal and the indication of harm uncertain. Althoughpetitioners included expert opinion indicating a possible risk of secondary amyloidosisfrom foie gras for some individuals with certain medical conditions, they cite no situationof any person ever suffering secondary amyloidosis that was linked to foie gras. Stahliedoes not contend that he has any of the underlying medical conditions that may be relatedto an increased risk of secondary amyloidosis. His exposure to foie gras is infrequent.There are no studies, statements or warnings by the regulating agency or other pertinentgovernmental entity regarding a relevant risk related to the occasional consumption offoie gras. Stahlie has, at best, occasional exposure to a product that has not yet beenconnected by any actual case to the purported risk of harm alleged by petitioners. Weagree with Supreme Court that, even affording petitioners the benefit of every favorableinference, their allegations regarding an injury in fact to Stahlie are speculative and restupon conjecture.

Next, petitioners argue that ALDF's use of its resources to investigate and litigate thealleged conduct of the state respondents establishes standing for ALDF. We areunpersuaded. Standing has been recognized in a narrow line of cases where anorganization that helps a particular group of people must expend funds and divertorganization resources because of conduct that directly interferes with the services thatthe organization provides to its clients (see e.g. Havens Realty Corp. v Coleman,455 US 363 [1982] [persons seeking affordable housing]; Mixon v Grinker, 157AD2d 423 [1990] [HIV-infected homeless persons]). Here, ALDF brought the litigationand it is expending funds in a manner consistent with its stated core mission of using thelegal system to advance its policy regarding animal cruelty. Finding standing under thesituation presented here would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time anadvocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction(cf. Nnebe v Daus, 644 F3d 147, 157-158 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Stray from the Heart, Inc.v Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of N.Y., 83 AD3d521, 522 [2011], affd 20 NY3d 946 [2012]; Henry v Isaac, 228AD2d 558, 559 [1996]).

Stahlie has not established that he has citizen taxpayer standing pursuant to StateFinance Law § 123-b. The statute is narrowly construed and "[c]laimswhich seek review of a [s]tate actor's alleged mismanagement of funds or the arbitraryand capricious distribution of funds lawfully allocated to an agency are not covered"(Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 92 NY2d579, 589 [1998]; see EmpireState Ch. of Associated Bldrs. & Contrs., Inc. v Smith, 21 NY3d 309, 323[2013]). While petitioners question the wisdom of the state respondents' decision not todeclare foie gras an adulterated product, the state respondents had authority to make sucha decision and did not illegally expend funds in doing so. Petitioners "have not alleged 'asufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the [s]tate to allow for[*4][State Finance Law §] 123-b standing' "(Empire State Ch. of Associated Bldrs. & Contrs., Inc. v Smith, 21 NY3d at323, quoting Rudder v Pataki, 93 NY2d 273, 281 [1999]).

The remaining arguments, to the extent properly preserved, have been consideredand are without merit.

McCarthy, Garry, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *:Since petitioners arechallenging only force-fed foie gras, all subsequent references herein to foie gras are toforce-fed foie gras.


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