| STS Steel, Inc. v Maxon Alco Holdings, LLC |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 08694 [123 AD3d 1260] |
| December 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| STS Steel, Inc., Respondent, v Maxon AlcoHoldings, LLC, Appellant. |
Gilberti Stinziano Heintz & Smith, PC, Syracuse (Kevin G. Roe of counsel), forappellant.
Hacker Murphy, LLP, Latham (James E. Hacker of counsel), for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Reilly Jr., J.), entered April 4,2013 in Schenectady County, which granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminaryinjunction.
Plaintiff owns an industrial building with deeded easements located withindefendant's industrial park in the City of Schenectady, Schenectady County. Plaintiff alsoleases from defendant an adjoining parcel with a general right of ingress and egress.Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaration that its leased right-of-way entitlesit to a general right of passage of commercial vehicles in connection with its heavy steelfabrication business operated on the premises. Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunctionprohibiting defendant from interfering with plaintiff's use of the general right-of-way andcompelling defendant to remove certain obstructions to its right of passage. Whenplaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, Supreme Court granted the motion.Defendant now appeals and we affirm.
In order to establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction, the moving party mustshow that it has a likelihood of success on the merits, it will suffer irreparable harm if therelief is not granted and the equities weigh in its favor (see CPLR 6301; Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine ArtsHous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; Norton v Dubrey, 116 AD3d 1215, 1215 [2014]; Karabatos v Hagopian, 39AD3d 930, 931 [2007]). As the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction iswithin the discretion of Supreme Court, our review is limited to whether the courtexceeded or abused its discretion as a matter of law (see Nobu Next Door, LLC vFine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d at 840; Norton v Dubrey, 116 AD3d at1215-1216; Confidential [*2]Brokerage Servs., Inc. v Confidential Planning Corp.,85 AD3d 1268, 1269 [2011]).
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that defendant wasunlikely to succeed on its claim that the metes and bounds easement conveyed to plaintiffwhen it purchased the building from defendant's predecessor limits and restricts thegeneral right of ingress and egress granted in the lease that was entered into at the sametime with that same predecessor. The general right-of-way in the lease is an easementappurtenant that "may be extinguished only by abandonment, conveyance, condemnationor adverse possession" (Niceforo v Haeussler, 276 AD2d 949, 950 [2000];see Will v Gates, 89 NY2d 778, 783 [1997]; Gerbig v Zumpano, 7 NY2d327, 330 [1960]). Inasmuch as there is no evidence that the general right-of-way wasabandoned, conveyed, condemned or adversely possessed, it continues to exist,notwithstanding any easement provided for in connection with the separate conveyanceof the building to plaintiff (seeNavin v Mosquera, 26 AD3d 556, 557-558 [2006]).
Given that plaintiff has a general right of ingress and egress, defendant may onlyalter the passageway "so long as [plaintiff's] right of passage is not impaired" (Lewisv Young, 92 NY2d 443, 449-450 [1998]; accord Thibodeau v Martin, 119 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2014];Sambrook v Sierocki, 53AD3d 817, 818 [2008]). Plaintiff presented photographs and an affidavit from itspresident establishing that defendant's placement of steel poles along the easement'sboundaries and a locked gate at one of the entrances restricted plaintiff's ingress andegress, thereby showing a likelihood of success on the merits of its action (see e.g. MacKinnon v Croyle,72 AD3d 1356, 1358 [2010]; Marek v Woodcock, 277 AD2d 864, 866[2000], lv dismissed 96 NY2d 792 [2001]). Defendant's argument that the lockedgate is necessary to comply with lawful orders issued by the City to protect itsunderground sewer pipeline in the vicinity is belied by the record, which reflects that theCity has approved a process for permitting plaintiff's use of a steel land bridge that wouldallow heavy trucks to pass over the City's sewer line without further damage.[FN*]
Given the absence of any argument on appeal that plaintiff has not established that itwould be irreparably harmed in the absence of injunctive relief, and the lack of anyapparent prejudice to defendant, we agree with Supreme Court that the equities balancein plaintiff's favor (see GreenHarbour Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v Ermiger, 67 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2009]; Cooperstown Capital, LLC vPatton, 60 AD3d 1251, 1253 [2009]; Lew Beach Co. v Carlson, 57 AD3d 1153, 1155[2008]).
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, with costs.
Footnote *:Further, we note thatplaintiff purchased insurance against any further risk of damage to the sewer line, and theparties' lease agreement contains an indemnification clause.