Norton v Dubrey
2014 NY Slip Op 02490 [116 AD3d 1215]
April 10, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 28, 2014


Karen Norton, Respondent, v Marilyn Dubrey et al.,Appellants, et al., Defendants.

—[*1]Roemer Wallens Gold & Mineaux LLP, Albany (Matthew J. Kelly of counsel),for appellants.

LaFave, Wein & Frament, PLLC, Guilderland (Michelle Sturm of counsel), forrespondent.

Peters, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), enteredJanuary 22, 2013 in Albany County, which denied a motion by defendants MarilynDubrey and Robert Dubrey for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff and defendant Marilyn Dubrey own adjoining parcels of property located inthe Town of Colonie, Albany County. In 2001, they entered into an agreement thatgranted plaintiff a six-foot-wide easement over a portion of Dubrey's land extendingfrom plaintiff's property to the bank of the Mohawk River, as well as an easement foringress and egress from Alix Road to plaintiff's driveway. The agreement provides, asrelevant here, that the easements are intended to be "solely for the benefit of theperson/entity holding fee title ownership of the Grantee's premises" and that "[t]he rightsafforded under this [agreement] shall not be conveyed, transferred or assigned to anyother person/entity who is not the fee title owner of [the premises] without the expresswritten consent of [Dubrey]." Over the course of the ensuing decade, disputes arosebetween the parties regarding the easements, prompting plaintiff to commence this actionseeking, among other things, to enjoin Dubrey and defendant Robert Dubrey (hereinaftercollectively referred to as defendants) from interfering with her use and enjoyment of theeasements. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff rented her home to a tenant. After moving into thepremises, the tenant was notified by defendants that the easements were solely for the useof the [*2]fee owner of the property and that he was notpermitted to use them. The tenant continued to do so, prompting defendants to move fora preliminary injunction prohibiting anyone but plaintiff (and any other fee owners of theproperty) from using the easements. Supreme Court denied the motion, and defendantsappeal.

We affirm. To establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction, defendants wererequired to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm in theabsence of an injunction and that the balance of the equities is in their favor (seeCPLR 6301; Nobu Next Door,LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; Moore v Ruback's Grove Campers'Assn., Inc., 85 AD3d 1220, 1221 [2011]). "[W]ith the decision to grant or denya request for a preliminary injunction committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,our review is limited to whether Supreme Court has either exceeded or abused itsdiscretion as a matter of law" (Schulz v State of N.Y. Exec., 108 AD3d 856, 857 [2013],lv denied 21 NY3d 1051 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];see Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d at 840; Emerald Green Prop. OwnersAssn., Inc. v Jada Developers, LLC, 63 AD3d 1396, 1397 [2009]). No suchfinding can be made here.

Even accepting defendants' interpretation of the easements as restricting access to feeowners of the premises, defendants have failed to show that they will be irreparablyharmed if the preliminary injunction were not granted. Although defendants voicedconcern regarding potential liability in the event that the tenant or his guests are injuredon the premises, this potential harm is both remote and speculative (see County of Suffolk vGivens, 106 AD3d 943, 944 [2013]; White v F.F. Thompson Health Sys., Inc., 75 AD3d 1075,1077 [2010]; Copart of Conn.,Inc. v Long Is. Auto Realty, LLC, 42 AD3d 420, 421 [2007]). Moreover,defendants have an adequate remedy at law and can be fully compensated by monetarydamages for any such liability (see Sync Realty Group, Inc. v Rotterdam Ventures, Inc., 63AD3d 1429, 1431 [2009]; Roushia v Harvey, 260 AD2d 687, 687-688[1999]; Betesh v Jemal, 209 AD2d 568, 569 [1994]; Byrne Compressed AirEquip. Co. v Sperdini, 123 AD2d 368, 369 [1986]).[FN*]Thus, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion.

Stein, McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: Indeed, the grant ofeasement specifically requires plaintiff to indemnify Marilyn Dubrey with respect to anyclaims, suits or liability arising from or related to the use of the easements by plaintiff orher "agents, workers, visitors, guests or invitees."


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