| Matter of Sequoyah Z. (Melissa Z.) |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03588 [127 AD3d 1518] |
| April 30, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Sequoyah Z. and Others, PermanentlyNeglected Children. Albany County Department for Children, Youth and Families,Respondent; Melissa Z., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Sequoyah Z.and Others, Permanently Neglected Children. Albany County Department for Children,Youth and Families, Respondent; Jimmy Z., Appellant. (Proceeding No.2.) |
Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for Melissa Z., appellant.
Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for Jimmy Z., appellant.
James J. Green, Albany County Department for Children, Youth and Families,Albany, for respondent.
Sharon Lee McNulty, Albany, attorney for the children.
[*2] Garry, J. Appeals from two corrected orders ofthe Family Court of Albany County (Duggan, J.), entered January 15, 2014, which,among other things, granted petitioner's applications, in two proceedings pursuant toSocial Services Law § 384-b, to revoke a suspended judgment, andterminated respondents' parental rights.
Respondent Melissa Z. (hereinafter the mother) and respondent Jimmy Z.(hereinafter the father) have six children, four of whom (born in Jan. 2006, Nov. 2006,2008 and 2010) are the subjects of these proceedings.[FN1] In April 2009, petitioner commencedneglect proceedings pertaining to the three older children, who were removed fromrespondents' care and later adjudicated to be neglected.[FN2] The youngest child was removed fromrespondents' care shortly after his birth in March 2010 and adjudicated to be neglectedupon respondents' consent. In February 2011, petitioner commenced proceedings toadjudicate the children to be permanently neglected and to terminate respondents'parental rights. Upon respondents' admissions, the children were adjudicated to bepermanently neglected. Following a dispositional hearing, Family Court issued asix-month suspended judgment. Four months later, petitioner commenced theseproceedings to revoke the suspended judgment. The court conducted a dispositionalhearing, granted the petitions and terminated respondents' parental rights. Respondentsappeal.
"The purpose of a suspended judgment is to provide a parent who has been found tohave permanently neglected his or her children with a brief grace period within which tobecome a fit parent with whom the children can be safely reunited" (Matter of Cole WW. [AmandaWW.], 106 AD3d 1408, 1409 [2013], lvs denied 21 NY3d 864, 865[2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). Family Court mayrevoke a suspended judgment and terminate a parent's rights when it is shown by apreponderance of the evidence that the parent has failed to comply with the judgment'sterms and conditions (see Matterof Michael HH. [Michael II.], 124 AD3d 944, 944 [2015]; Matter of Jason H. [Lisa K.],118 AD3d 1066, 1067 [2014]). Here, petitioner made the requisite showing of lackof compliance.
One of the terms of the suspended judgment required respondents to maintainappropriate housing for the children. When the suspended judgment was imposed,respondents were living in a suitable apartment, but they were subsequently evicted forfailure to pay the rent and, thereafter, they resided separately in a series of shelters. At thetime of the dispositional hearing, the father was still in a shelter, the mother was sharinga residence with a registered sex offender and both respondents were unemployed.Respondents testified that financial difficulties prevented them from finding affordablehousing. A caseworker testified that she had attempted to assist them with budgeting,finding employment and locating suitable housing, but that they had failed to availthemselves of her assistance. Respondents confirmed that they did not ask for help, andthe mother testified that she failed to qualify for a rental assistance program because shedid not comply with the program's job search requirements.
[*3] Although both respondents participated regularly invisits with the children, the visits could not be conducted in their home, as required bythe suspended judgment, as a result of their homelessness. Moreover, respondents werenever able to progress to fully unsupervised visitation, as required. Instead, theycontinued to need prompting to remind them to discipline the children, attend to theirsafety, provide them with needed care such as diaper changes, and pay attention to all ofthe children during visits rather than focusing on only one or two of them.
The terms of the suspended judgment required respondents to cooperate withpetitioner in developing and implementing a parenting plan, but they did not do so,failing to maintain contact with the caseworker or to respond to her messages and voicemails. After the eviction, they did not keep the caseworker informed of their whereaboutsas they moved from shelter to shelter, forcing her to search for them. At one point,respondents relocated to Schenectady County, interrupting the mother's mental healthtreatment and other services that had been in place in Albany County. Before servicescould be reestablished in the new location, the mother returned to Albany County,causing further disruptions.[FN3]
The suspended judgment further required respondents to participate in programs andcounseling deemed appropriate by petitioner. They successfully completed someprograms, such as parenting courses, but failed to participate in other recommendedclasses and counseling. The mother's attendance in mental health treatment was so poorthat she was at risk of termination. Respondents complied with the requirement to attendthe children's service plan reviews and family treatment meetings, but did not attendmany of their school events or medical appointments, as also required. Although some ofthese failures were caused by transportation difficulties, respondents did not takeadvantage of petitioner's offer to provide transportation upon advance notice.Accordingly, we find that the revocation of the suspended judgment based uponrespondents' violation of its terms is supported by a sound and substantial basis in therecord (see Matter of Jayden T.[Amy T.], 118 AD3d 1075, 1076-1077 [2014]; Matter of Marquise JJ. [BrithanyJJ.], 103 AD3d 937, 938 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859 [2013]).
The record further supports the termination of respondents' parental rights. At thetime of the revocation hearing, the three older children had been in foster homes for fouryears, and the youngest subject child had spent his life in foster care. More than a yearhad elapsed since the imposition of the six-month suspended judgment, but respondents'circumstances had deteriorated instead of improving during this extended graceperiod.[FN4] Thechildren's three foster families were committed to supporting and maintaining therelationships among the siblings, and at least one of the foster parents wished to adoptthe children who resided with her. Accordingly, the record also provides a sound andsubstantial basis for Family Court's determination that freeing the children for adoptionwas in their best interests (seeMatter of Madelyn D. [Direll D.], 112 AD3d 1165, 1166-1167 [2013]; Matter of Alexandria A. [AnnB.], 93 AD3d 1105, 1107 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805[2012]).
[*4] Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy andLynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the corrected orders are affirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1:Respondents' otherchildren (born in 2011 and 2013) are the subjects of separate neglect proceedings.
Footnote 2:Previous neglectproceedings pertaining to the two older children had been commenced in April 2007 andresolved by an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.
Footnote 3:Family Court found thatit was a "fair assumption" that respondents moved to Schenectady County in a"misguided attempt to get out from under [petitioner's] thumb."
Footnote 4:Family Court attributedthe delay in resolving the proceedings to, among other things, the births of respondents'youngest children and late substitutions of counsel arising from respondents' failure tocommunicate with their attorneys.