Matter of Gwen Y. v New York State Off. of Children &Family Servs.
2015 NY Slip Op 07710 [132 AD3d 1091]
October 22, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 9, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Gwen Y., Petitioner, v New York StateOffice of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

Arroyo Copland & Associates, PLLC, Albany (Amy C. Kendall of counsel), forpetitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Julie Sheridan of counsel), forrespondent.

Egan Jr., J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Greene County) to review a determination ofrespondent denying petitioner's application to have a report maintained by the CentralRegister of Child Abuse and Maltreatment amended to be unfounded and expunged.

On the afternoon of May 3, 2012, petitioner put her three young children down for anap. Shortly thereafter, petitioner's youngest daughter (hereinafter the child), who thenwas 21/2 years old, called out and indicated that she had "pooped."Petitioner did not immediately respond, as the child previously had made similar claimsin an effort to avoid nap time. When the child called out again, petitioner went into thechildren's bedroom and found her son and the child standing in the middle of the room.Petitioner confirmed that the child indeed needed a diaper change and bent over to pickup the child and lay her down on the floor. As petitioner was doing so, her son, whoapparently had taken it upon himself to check his sister's diaper, announced that he had"poopy on [his] hands." Petitioner turned to look at her son and, in the process, "let go"of the child, whose feet were estimated by petitioner to be 4 to 12 inches from the floor,with the intention that the child would land on her bottom. The child, however,apparently landed on some portion of her lower extremities and began to whimper.Petitioner initially concluded that the child had sprained her ankle and applied an icepack, but when the child continued to complain, petitioner took the child [*2]to a local urgent care center where an X ray revealed afracture of the child's right tibia.

As a result of this incident, a report was made to the Central Register of Child Abuseand Maltreatment and, following an investigation, the report was marked asindicated.[FN1]After respondent denied petitioner's request to amend the report from indicated tounfounded, an administrative hearing was held pursuant to Social Services Law§ 422 (8). At the conclusion of that hearing, the finding of maltreatment asto the child was upheld and petitioner's request to amend the subject report wasdenied.[FN2]Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to challengethe underlying determination.

"To establish maltreatment, the agency was required to show by a fair preponderanceof the evidence that the physical, mental or emotional condition of the child had beenimpaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired because of a failure bypetitioner to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with appropriatesupervision or guardianship" (Matter of Gerald HH. v Carrion, 130 AD3d 1174, 1175[2015] [citations omitted]; seeMatter of Maurizio XX. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.,125 AD3d 1174, 1174-1175 [2015]). As there is no dispute that the child suffered abroken leg, there can be no question that her physical condition was in fact impaired.Accordingly, our inquiry distills to whether the record supports a finding that suchimpairment was the result of petitioner's failure to provide appropriate supervision andguardianship.

In this regard, the evidence against petitioner consisted primarily of the investigationprogress notes, which summarized the caseworker's interviews with, among others,petitioner's son, the child's treating orthopedic surgeon and the child'sgeneticist.[FN3]"[T]here is no question that hearsay is admissible in expungement hearings and, ifsufficiently relevant and probative, may constitute substantial evidence to support theunderlying determination" (Matter of Theresa WW. v New York State Off. of Children &Family Servs., 123 AD3d 1174, 1176 [2014] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; see Matter of Gerald HH. v Carrion, 130 AD3d at 1175-1176).That said, the substantial evidence standard is not satisfied where, as here, the hearsayevidence at issue is "seriously controverted" (Matter of Gerald HH. v Carrion,130 AD3d at 1176 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

According to the progress notes, the treating orthopedic surgeon, who "[did] notbelieve that [petitioner] should have [custody of] the child," advised the caseworker thatthe child's injury could not have occurred in the manner described by petitioner because"more force would be [*3]needed to cause" what heregarded as "a spiral fracture of the [t]ibia." The orthopedist, however, was unaware thatthe child had been diagnosed with hemi-hypertrophy—a condition that caused theleft side of the child's body to grow faster than the right side. As explained by the child'sgeneticist, this condition could cause the bones on the right side of the child's body to be"more susceptible to pressure."[FN4] Indeed, the caseworker's notes reflectthat, according to the geneticist, a drop "even from [two] inches above the ground" couldhave caused the child's weight to shift to her more sensitive right foot. Further, withrespect to the resulting fracture, the geneticist, who reviewed the initial X rays, was notconvinced that the child actually had sustained a spiral fracture, noting that the fracture"look[ed] to be going through the bone" rather than "circling the bone the way it wouldin a spiral fracture."

Although the agency also relied upon the caseworker's interview of petitioner's then41/2-year-old son, his teacher, who was present for the interview andtestified at the administrative hearing, expressed misgivings as to the manner in whichthat interview was conducted. In conjunction with the earlier neglect proceeding, theteacher submitted an affidavit—entered into evidence at the subsequentadministrative hearing without objection—wherein she averred that, during thecourse of the interview, the caseworker "press[ed]" petitioner's son and "[made]suggestions to him about [petitioner's] conduct on the day of the incident, includingsuggestions about the way [petitioner] was standing . . . and how she washolding [the child]." According to the teacher, by the time the interview concluded, thecaseworker succeeded in "provok[ing the child], who was clearly frustrated, to throw thedoll he was holding on the floor in accordance with [the agency's] theory of how hissister was injured." The teacher, who testified that she had not observed any indicationsof abuse, averred that, in her opinion, petitioner's son would not have thrown the doll inthe fashion that he did "but for the suggestive and insistent conduct of [the] caseworker[]."

Finally, petitioner submitted affidavits from the child's pediatrician and a familyfriend, neither of whom had ever seen any indications of abuse or neglect, as well as thereport prepared by the psychologist who performed a mental health evaluation of her.According to the psychologist, her evaluation of petitioner disclosed no mental health orsubstance abuse disorders and revealed no prior history of violent behavior or impulsecontrol problems. The psychologist deemed petitioner's account of the underlyingincident to be "detailed and credible," concluded that petitioner was not a "candidate foranger management" counseling and advocated for petitioner's "return to her home assoon as possible" in order to "reduce the likelihood of further emotional damage to herchildren and the integrity of the family unit." In conclusion, the psychologist found thatthe child's injury "appear[ed] to be an isolated and aberrant incident . . .[that was] not reflective of [petitioner's] typical pattern and practice of parenting."

Upon due consideration of the record as a whole, we find that the evidence reliedupon by the agency was significantly undermined by the proof tendered by petitioner. Assuch, we are unable to conclude that respondent's determination is supported bysubstantial evidence. Accordingly, the underlying determination is annulled.

McCarthy, J.P., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isannulled, without costs, and petition granted.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Petitioner was removedfrom the home for approximately three months. Although a related neglect proceedingwas commenced against petitioner, that proceeding was adjourned in contemplation ofdismissal without a finding of wrongdoing; a separate criminal proceeding againstpetitioner stemming from this incident also was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal.

Footnote 2:The allegations ofexcessive corporal punishment as to petitioner's son were not sustained and are not atissue in this proceeding.

Footnote 3:Neither the caseworkernor the child's treating orthopedist testified at the hearing, and the child's geneticist wasunavailable to testify due to declining health.

Footnote 4:Petitioner testified thatshe was unaware of the child's increased susceptibility to bone fractures, and thegeneticist confirmed that he had not discussed this possibility with petitioner or herhusband prior to the child's injury.


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