Matter of Gerald HH. v Carrion
2015 NY Slip Op 05982 [130 AD3d 1174]
July 9, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 2, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Gerald HH., Petitioner, v GladysCarrion, as Commissioner of Children and Family Services, et al.,Respondents.

Gerald HH., Binghamton, petitioner pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jonathan D. Hitsous of counsel),for respondents.

Devine, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by orderof the Supreme Court, entered in Broome County) to review a determination ofrespondent Commissioner of Children and Family Services which denied petitioner'sapplication to have a report maintained by the Central Register of Child Abuse andMaltreatment amended to be unfounded and expunged.

A report was made to the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment allegingthat, in January 2012, petitioner physically mistreated his 11-year-old son. Aninvestigation by respondent Broome County Department of Social Services ensued,which uncovered evidence that petitioner had grabbed the child by the neck and liftedhim off the ground, yanked him out of bed by the arm, and caused him to stumble on aflight of stairs by pushing him. The report was accordingly marked as "indicated" formaltreatment. Petitioner requested that the Office of Children and Family Services amendthe report from indicated to unfounded, and his request was denied. Thereafter,following an administrative hearing conducted pursuant to Social Services Law§ 422 (8) (b), an Administrative Law Judge determined that maltreatmenthad been established by a fair preponderance of the evidence and that the indicated reportmay be disclosed to inquiring agencies pursuant to Social Services Law§ 424-a. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding tochallenge the determination.

[*2] To establishmaltreatment, the agency was required to show by a fair preponderance of the evidencethat the physical, mental or emotional condition of the child had been impaired or was inimminent danger of becoming impaired because of a failure by petitioner to exercise aminimum degree of care in providing the child with appropriate supervision orguardianship (see Matter ofTheresa WW. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 123 AD3d1174, 1175 [2014]; Matterof Cheryl Z. v Carrion, 119 AD3d 1109, 1110 [2014]). Our review is limited toassessing whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, meaning "suchrelevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion orultimate fact" (Matter of RidgeRd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494, 499 [2011]; see Matter of Maurizio XX. v NewYork State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 125 AD3d 1174, 1175[2015]; Matter of Theresa WW. v New York State Off. of Children & FamilyServs., 123 AD3d at 1175-1176).

Here, the proof introduced against petitioner consisted solely of the investigationprogress notes and a Family Court order from 1998 that adjudicated petitioner to haveneglected another son. The progress notes were prepared by a child protective servicescaseworker and include her accounts of interviews with numerous individuals, includingthe child and his therapist, that led her to the conclusion that maltreatment had occurred.Neither the caseworker nor her interview subjects testified before the AdministrativeLaw Judge, however, and the progress notes reflect that the child bore no marks orevident injuries as a result of the maltreatment. In contrast to this meager evidentiaryshowing, petitioner and his wife both testified and denied that any maltreatment hadoccurred. Petitioner also asserted, without contradiction, that he was physically incapableof engaging in some of the claimed maltreatment, such as lifting the 110-pound childwith one hand. His wife further stated that the child admitted to her that he was lyingabout the alleged maltreatment. The record suggests a reason why the child might beprompted to lie, as a bitter custody dispute between petitioner and the child's mother hasled to numerous unfounded reports of mistreatment regarding petitioner.

Like any administrative determination, one made after an expungement hearing maybe based solely upon hearsay evidence—or even double hearsayevidence—in the appropriate case (see Matter of Theresa WW. v New YorkState Off. of Children & Family Servs., 123 AD3d at 1176; Matter of Pluta v New York StateOff. of Children & Family Servs., 17 AD3d 1126, 1127 [2005], lvdenied 5 NY3d 715 [2005]). As such, "our concern is not the hearsay nature of theevidence, but whether it is sufficiently relevant and probative to constitute substantialevidence" (Matter of King v New York State Dept. of Health, 295 AD2d 743,744 [2002]; see Matter of Theresa WW. v New York State Off. of Children &Family Servs., 123 AD3d at 1176). Hearsay evidence will not satisfy that standard ifthe facts it purportedly establishes are "seriously controverted" (Matter of JMH, Inc. v New YorkState Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1260, 1261 [2009]; see Matter of Doctor v New YorkState Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 112 AD3d 1020,1022-1023 [2013]). Serious controversy is precisely what surrounds the hearsay evidencehere, given the hearing testimony that the maltreatment had not occurred and that thechild had recanted his claims, the proof that motivations may have existed for the child tofabricate the maltreatment, and the total lack of physical evidence suggesting that itoccurred. We accordingly agree with petitioner that substantial evidence does not supportthe challenged determination, which must be annulled as a result (see Matter ofTheresa WW. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 123 AD3dat 1176; Matter of Doctor v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & SubstanceAbuse Servs., 112 AD3d at 1022-1023).

Petitioner's remaining arguments, to the extent that they are properly before us byvirtue of him having raised them before the Administrative Law Judge and in hissubsequent CPLR article 78 petition, are rendered academic in light of theforegoing.

[*3] McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr.and Clark, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, without costs, andpetition granted.


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