| Matter of Ryan v Nolan |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09147 [134 AD3d 1259] |
| December 10, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Daniel W. Ryan,Appellant, v Karianne Ryan Nolan, Respondent. |
Maxwell & Van Ryn, Delmar (Paul W. Van Ryn of counsel), for appellant.
Newell & Klingebiel, Glens Falls (Karen Judd of counsel), for respondent.
Michael S. O'Dell, Glens Falls, attorney for the child.
Albert Lawrence, Greenfield Center, attorney for the child.
Rose T. Place, Glens Falls, attorney for the child.
Clark, J. Appeals (1) from two orders of the Family Court of Warren County (Breen,J.), dated September 19, 2013, which, among other things, in a proceeding pursuant toFamily Ct Act article 6, denied petitioner's motion to consolidate and vacated a priororder directing counseling, (2) from an order of said court (Kupferman, J.), dated January14, 2014, which, among other things, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6,denied petitioner's motion for a psychological evaluation, (3) from an order of said court(Kupferman, J.), dated January 23, 2014, which, among other things, in a proceedingpursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, partially denied petitioner's motion to compeldiscovery, (4) from an order of said court (Kupferman, J.), dated February 10, 2014,which, among other things, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, grantedrespondent's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition, and (5) from anorder of said court (Kupferman, J.), dated February 13, 2014, which, among other things,in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, ordered the parties to encourage oneof their children to cooperate in counseling.
Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent (hereinafter the mother) are thedivorced parents of three children (born in 2000, 2003 and 2005). Pursuant to asettlement [*2]agreement that was incorporated in theirApril 2011 judgment of divorce, the parties share joint legal and physical custody of thechildren. In January 2013, the mother filed a petition to enforce said settlementagreement, alleging that the father had violated it by, among other things, makingderogatory remarks about her in the presence of the children. The father answered andfiled combined demands for discovery. Thereafter, the father petitioned to modifycustody on or about July 17, 2013, seeking, among other things, sole legal custody and torestrict the mother's parenting time until she disclosed her alcohol evaluation andtreatment records and complied with certain treatment for alcohol abuse. Shortlythereafter, the father moved to consolidate the mother's enforcement petition and hiscustody petition and to compel discovery. On or about August 7, 2013, the attorney forthe children cross-moved to modify a temporary order to discontinue the children'scounseling with a licensed psychologist, based upon the wishes of the children and herbelief that the therapy had been "tainted" due to the father's counsel's repeated contactwith the psychologist. On or about August 8, 2013, the mother cross-moved for, amongother things, permission to discontinue her enforcement petition and a protective orderdenying discovery of her medical and mental health records that predated the judgmentof divorce. Family Court (Breen, J.) denied the father's motions to consolidate andcompel discovery, granted the mother permission to withdraw her petition withprejudice, vacated the temporary order directing counseling and denied the mother'srequest for a protective order because the issue was moot inasmuch as the father'sdiscovery demands related to the mother's petition.
On or about October 18, 2013, the father moved to compel discovery with regard tohis modification petition and affirmative defenses and for a psychological evaluation ofthe parties, the children and the people residing with the parties. Family Court(Kupferman, J.) denied the father's motion for psychological evaluations. Then, on orabout January 23, 2014, the court partially granted the father's motion to compeldiscovery, providing, among other things, that the mother would need to disclose alcoholand substance abuse treatment and evaluation records only from March 31, 2011 until thepresent time, that only family counseling records from portions of therapy wherein thefather was present would be discoverable and that such records would be examined onlyby counsel, in chambers. The court also set a trial date for February 2014.
On or about January 29, 2014, the father moved for a stay of the trial pending appeal.The mother cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the father's petition on thebasis that the parties had reached an agreement settling the custody dispute. Family Courtgranted the mother's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition anddenied the father's motion for a stay pending appeal as moot. Subsequently, the courtissued an order directing the parties to encourage one of the children to engage incounseling. The father appeals from six orders, and his appeals were consolidated by thisCourt.[FN*]
[*3] We affirm. Initially, the father's four appeals from theinterlocutory orders must be dismissed because appeals from nonfinal orders are onlypermitted in limited Family Court proceedings (see Family Ct Act§ 1112 [a]). However, the appeal from the February 10, 2014 final orderbrings these orders up for our review (see Matter of Curley v Klausen, 110 AD3d 1156, 1156 n 1[2013]). Next, in light of the mother's withdrawal of her petition for modification, wefind no error in Family Court's denial of the father's motion for consolidation, asconsolidation with the other proceeding was no longer possible (see CPLR 602[a]).
Family Court did not abuse its discretion in only partially granting the father's motionto compel discovery. The parties to a contested custody proceeding place their physicaland mental conditions at issue (see Matter of Ortiz v Winig, 82 AD3d 1520, 1522 [2011];Moor v Moor, 75 AD3d675, 678 [2010]). With that said, however, discovery is not unlimited and FamilyCourt has broad discretion in determining the scope of proof to be adduced (see Matter of Wilson vHendrickson, 88 AD3d 1092, 1093 [2011]; Matter of Cool v Malone, 66 AD3d 1171, 1173 [2009]). Asrelevant here, the inquiry as to whether a change in circumstances warrantingmodification of a prior custody order has occurred "should be limited to occurrencessince the date of the prior custody order" (Matter of Smith v O'Donnell, 107 AD3d 1311, 1312[2013]). Thus, we find that Family Court was well within its discretion in limitingdiscovery to records pertaining to the mother's alleged alcohol and substance abuse sincethe prior custody order (see Matter of Wilson v Hendrickson, 88 AD3d at 1093;Matter of Cool v Malone, 66 AD3d at 1173-1174).
Family Court likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying the father's motion forpsychological evaluations (see Family Ct Act § 251 [a]; Matter of Armstrong v Heilker,47 AD3d 1104, 1106 [2008]). In light of the information already before the courtwith respect to the mother's alleged alcohol and substance abuse issues, we agree that apsychological evaluation would have provided minimal additional value to the court (see Matter of Burola v Meek,64 AD3d 962, 964 [2009]; Matter of Johnson v Williams, 59 AD3d 445, 445 [2009])and, therefore, contrary to the father's position on the matter, denial of the request wasnot in error.
Nor do we find error in Family Court's order granting the mother's cross motion forsummary judgment dismissing the father's modification petition. In support of her crossmotion, the mother submitted an agreement executed by the parties in January 2014,which addressed parenting time during spring breaks and provided, without limitation,that "[a]ll other provisions of custody shall remain in place and unchanged." On thisbasis, we agree that the mother carried her initial burden of demonstrating that the partieshad settled their custody dispute and that there remained no issues of fact for the court todecide (see CPLR 3212; Family Ct Act § 165 [a]; Matter of LaBier v La Bier, 291 AD2d 730, 732-733 [2002], lv dismissed 98 NY2d 671[2002]; Matter of Patricia YY. v Albany County Dept. of Social Servs., 238AD2d 672, 673 [1997]). While the father opposed the motion with an affidavit attestingthat the agreement was not intended to settle all proceedings, the unambiguous languageof the agreement demonstrates otherwise. Thus, we find that the father's affidavit wasinsufficient to demonstrate a question of fact regarding the validity or interpretation ofthe parties' agreement and, accordingly, determine that summary judgment was properlygranted (see Matter of Wiltsey v Wiltsey, 294 AD2d 638, 639 [2002];compare Hopper v Lockey, 241 AD2d 892, 893 [1997]). Further, in light of the[*4]proper dismissal of the father's petition, Family Courtdid not err in denying his motion for a stay pending appeal (see CPLR 5519 [c];Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]).
The father's remaining contentions, to the extent they have been preserved, have beenconsidered and found to be without merit.
McCarthy, J.P., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeals from theorders dated September 19, 2013, January 14, 2014 and January 23, 2014 are dismissed,without costs. Ordered that the orders dated February 10, 2014 and February 13, 2014are affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *:The six ordersunderlying the instant appeals were signed and filed but were not entered. In fact, theWarren County Family Court has informed this Court that they routinely do not enterorders and have not done so for a number of years (see e.g. Matter of Sonley v Sonley, 115 AD3d 1071, 1071[2014]; Matter of Menditto vCollier, 101 AD3d 1409, 1409 [2012]). Inasmuch as appeals from orders thathave not been entered are subject to dismissal (see Family Ct Act§ 1118; CPLR 2220 [a]; 5016 [a]; 5513 [a]; People v Kemp, 130 AD3d1132, 1132-1133 [2015]; People v Davis, 130 AD3d 1131, 1132 [2015]), we notethat Family Court may not be engaging in the best practice. However, for purposes of theinstant appeals, we deem filing the equivalent of entry for purposes of jurisdiction andtreat the filing date as the date of entry.