| Matter of Matsen v New York State Dept. of MotorVehs. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09159 [134 AD3d 1283] |
| December 10, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Caralyn A. Matsen, Appellant, v NewYork State Department of Motor Vehicles et al.,Respondents. |
Gerstenzang, O'Hern, Sills & Gerstenzang, Albany (Eric H. Sills of counsel),for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), forrespondents.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.),entered June 20, 2014 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, among other things, grantedrespondents' motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition/complaint.
Petitioner was convicted in 2010 of driving while intoxicated, her thirdalcohol-related driving offense within a 10-year period. As a result of her conviction, herdriver's license was revoked for a minimum period of one year (see Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1193 [2] [b] [3]). When petitioner applied for a new licensein June 2012, respondent Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV) held theapplication in abeyance until later that year when emergency regulations were adoptedconcerning the review of applications for relicensing by persons with multiple alcohol-or drug-related driving offenses (see 15 NYCRR part 136). Once the newregulations were in place, DMV relied upon them to deny petitioner's application becauseshe was a person with "three or four alcohol- or drug-related driving convictions orincidents in any combination . . . and . . . one or more seriousdriving offenses within the 25[-]year look[-]back period" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [b][*2][2]).[FN1] Specifically, during the look-backperiod, petitioner committed the "serious driving offense" of having been twiceconvicted of speeding violations "for which five or more points [were] assessed on [her]driving record" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2] [iii]).
After her application was denied, petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment against DMV and respondentCommissioner of Motor Vehicles seeking, among other things, an order granting her anew driver's license and declaring that the emergency regulations are invalid.Respondents joined issue and moved for summary judgment dismissing petitioner'spetition/complaint, and Supreme Court granted the motion. Petitioner appeals.
Although petitioner argues that a number of the provisions of 15 NYCRR part 136either impermissibly conflict with preexisting statutes and case law or are arbitrary andcapricious, she fails to establish that she has suffered an injury in fact from the operationof any of the provisions she challenges other than 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a) (2) and (b) (2)(see New York State Assn. ofNurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]; Matter of Gym Door Repairs, Inc. vNew York City Dept. of Educ., 112 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2013]). Thus, with theexception of her specific arguments seeking the invalidation of 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a) (2)and (b) (2), her challenges are nonjusticiable, inasmuch as she lacks "an interestsufficient to constitute standing to maintain th[ose] [claims]" (American Ins. Assn. vChu, 64 NY2d 379, 383 [1985], appeal dismissed and cert denied 474 US803 [1985]; accord PoliceBenevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v New York State Div. of StatePolice, 40 AD3d 1350, 1352 [2007], appeal dismissed and lv denied 9NY3d 942 [2007]).[FN2]
Turning to petitioner's justiciable claims, we have previously held that other, similarprovisions of 15 NYCRR 136.5 were promulgated by the Commissioner in accordancewith her broad discretionary authority granted by the Legislature to approve or denyrelicensing applications, that she did not exceed her delegated rule-making authority indoing so and that the challenged regulations are otherwise rational, legal and valid(see Matter of Noonan v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 134 AD3d 1281 [2015] [decided herewith]; Matter of Joy v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 133AD3d 1167, 1169, 2015 NY Slip Op 08686, *2 [2015]; Matter of Carney v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 133AD3d 1150, 1152-1153, 2015 NY Slip Op 08681, *2-3 [2015]; Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.,132 AD3d 112, 118-122 [2015]; Matter of Kenny v Fiala, 127 AD3d 1359, 1359-1360[2015]; Matter of Berroa v[*3]Fiala, 122 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2014]; Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122AD3d 1197, 1198-1199 [2014]). The legal principles and analyses that undergirdour prior decisions are fully applicable to petitioner's challenge to 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b)(2) and, ultimately, confirm the validity of this regulatory provision as well. Accordingly,we need not address each of petitioner's arguments to the contrary.
We have not, however, addressed petitioner's contention that 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a)(2) (iii) arbitrarily designates a "conviction of two or more violations for which five ormore points are assessed on a violator's driving record" to be a serious driving offense.She argues that this definition is unfair because the two speeding tickets she receivedwithin the 25-year look-back period should not lead to a presumptive lifetime drivingban. We must disagree.
In the broadest sense, 15 NYCRR part 136 was promulgated to "establish[ ] criteriato identify individual problem drivers," that is, applicants for new licenses that "ha[ve]had a series of convictions, incidents and/or accidents . . . which in thejudgment of the [C]ommissioner . . . upon review of the applicant's entiredriving history, establishes that the person would be an unusual and immediate risk uponthe highways" (15 NYCRR 136.1 [a], [b] [1]). In developing these regulations, theCommissioner considered empirical data, which indicated that drivers with three or morealcohol- or drug-related driving convictions are involved in a disproportionate number ofmotor vehicle accidents. Accordingly, the Commissioner rationally determined that suchdrivers "pose the highest risk to the general population" (NY Reg, Mar. 13, 2013 at 43)and, thus, should not be granted new, unrestricted licenses until after a waiting period ofseveral years (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [b] [3], [4]). With that in mind, we cannotconsider the Commissioner's decision to subject such recidivist impaired or intoxicateddrivers to a longer—or even a presumptively permanent—ban onrelicensure to be arbitrary when, like petitioner, such drivers may independently qualifyas "problem drivers" because of the presence of speeding or other violations on theirdriving records (see 15 NYCRR 136.1 [b] [1]; 136.5 [a] [2]; [b] [2]).
As for petitioner's claim that her two six-point speeding violations during the 25-yearlook-back period are not serious enough to be expressly defined as a "serious drivingoffense" (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2] [iii]), we defer to the Commissioner'sdetermination, as it was made pursuant to her discretionary authority (see Vehicleand Traffic Law § 510 [5], [6]), and it was within the area of expertise ofthe agency she heads (see Matter of Consolation Nursing Home v Commissioner ofN.Y. State Dept. of Health, 85 NY2d 326, 331 [1995]; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. vJohnson, 52 AD3d 1072, 1074 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 716 [2009];Matter of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans vMuhl, 253 AD2d 158, 163 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 807[1999]).[FN3]
In the dissent's view, the scope of offenses that meet the definition of "seriousdriving [*4]offense" are "far too broad." The dissent'sposition, however, appears to be based not upon a legal conclusion, but upon a valuejudgment that two five-point traffic violations and a fatal accident cannot be placedunder the same definitional umbrella. "[A] [c]ourt's role in reviewing an agency action isnot to determine if the agency action was correct or to substitute its judgment for that ofthe agency, but rather to determine if the action taken by the agency was reasonable"(Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 396 [1995];see Paramount Communications v Gibraltar Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 507, 513-514[1997]; Matter of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue ShieldPlans v Muhl, 253 AD2d at 163). As we have said, the Commissioner's inclusion ofa conviction of two or more violations for which five or more points are assessed on aviolator's driving record in the definition of "serious driving offense" has a rational basisand is well within her discretionary authority. This rational determination cannot berendered irrational by the fact that the definition also includes other types of offenseswith more serious practical consequences. In other words, if the least serious offense isproperly included, this then confirms the propriety of including all of the remainingoffenses, and the definition of "serious driving offense" cannot be said to be overlybroad.
In any event, the criteria detailed in 15 NYCRR 136.5 represent only a "generalpolicy," and the Commissioner has retained the discretion to deviate from it when anyaffected person presents sufficient evidence of "unusual, extenuating and compellingcircumstances" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [d]). Here, however, it is unnecessary for us to decidewhether the Commissioner properly considered the evidence that petitioner presented tothat effect, as she does not argue that the Commissioner should have granted herrelicensing application pursuant to this provision.
McCarthy, J.P., and Devine, J., concur.
Lynch, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent, essentially for the same reasonsarticulated in the dissents in Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.(132 AD3d 112, 122-126 [2015]) and Matter of Carney v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. (133AD3d 1150, 1154, 2015 NY Slip Op 08681, *3-4 [2015]).[FN1] Under the challenged regulation, alifetime license revocation applies to a person with three or four alcohol-related drivingconvictions or incidents and one or more serious driving offenses within a 25-yearlook-back period (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [1], [2]; [b] [2]).
The additional focus here is on the "serious driving offense" component, which isdefined as "(i) a fatal accident; (ii) a driving-related Penal Law conviction; (iii)conviction of two or more violations for which five or more points are assessed on aviolator's driving record pursuant to [15 NYCRR 131.3]; or (iv) 20 or more points fromany violations" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2]). In 2010, petitioner was convicted of drivingwhile intoxicated, her third alcohol-related driving offense within a 10-year period. As aresult, her driver's license was revoked for one year (see Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1193 [2] [b] [3]). Pertinent to the "serious driving offense" category, shealso was assessed six points for driving 72 miles per hour in a 50 mile-per-hour zone inApril 2004 and received another six-point infraction in May 2004 for driving 59 milesper hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone.
[*5] As themajority recognizes, the governing regulation, 15 NYCRR part 136, has a twofoldpurpose of rehabilitating a "problem driver" and, when necessary, taking appropriatedisciplinary action to protect that driver "and the public alike" (15 NYCRR 136.1 [a],[b]). Without question, respondent Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may reasonablyconsider a traffic infraction as a "safety factor" in gauging whether an applicant isentitled to relicensure (15 NYCRR 136.1 [b] [5]; 136.4 [a] [3]). The issue here, however,is one of degree. Without the two speeding tickets, petitioner's three alcohol-relatedconvictions would be assessed under 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (3), effecting a five-year stayof a relicensure application (see Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of MotorVehs., 132 AD3d at 115). With the speeding tickets, her case was elevated to thepermanent revocation category defined in 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (2). This dramaticconsequence illustrates the arbitrariness of the subject rule. In my view, the variouscategories that make up a "serious driving offense" are far too broad. While one canreadily comprehend including a "fatal accident" within the definition, it is extraordinaryand irrational to equate two five-point violations with a fatal accident for purposes ofimposing a mandatory and permanent license revocation[FN2] (cf. Matter of Shearer v Fiala, 124 AD3d 1291, 1291[2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 909 [2015]; Matter of Scism v Fiala, 122 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2014]). Assuch, I would grant the petition to the extent of declaring 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (2) to benull and void, as beyond the Commissioner's administrative authority and as arbitrary andcapricious, and remit the matter to the Commissioner for further consideration ofpetitioner's relicensure application.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs. [Prior CaseHistory: 2014 NY Slip Op 31535(U).]
Footnote 1:A "serious drivingoffense" is defined as: "(i) a fatal accident; (ii) a driving-related Penal Law conviction;(iii) conviction of two or more violations for which five or more points are assessed on aviolator's driving record pursuant to [15 NYCRR 131.3]; or (iv) 20 or more points fromany violations" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2]).
Footnote 2:To the extent thatpetitioner's challenge to the definition of "alcohol- or drug-related driving conviction orincident" (see 15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [1]) may also present a justiciablecontroversy, petitioner did not raise that argument on administrative appeal and, thus,failed to preserve it for our review (see Matter of Tafari v Evans, 102 AD3d 1053, 1054[2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 852 [2013]; Matter of Walker v New York StateDiv. of Parole, 203 AD2d 757, 758 [1994]).
Footnote 3:We also rejectpetitioner's additional argument that the definition of "serious driving offense" isarbitrary because it does not expressly include convictions for aggravated unlicensedoperation of a motor vehicle in the first degree and leaving the scene of an accidentresulting in serious physical injury, both of which are felonies (see Vehicle andTraffic Law §§ 511 [3]; 600 [2] [c]). While neither is expresslydesignated as a serious driving offense, both are covered by the definition thereof, asthey are "driving-related Penal Law conviction[s]" (15 NYCRR 136.5 [a] [2] [ii]).
Footnote 1:In Matter ofAcevedo and Matter of Carney, the Court did not address the regulation atissue here, 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (2).
Footnote 2:As petitioner points out,effective June 1, 2013, cell phone and texting violations, designated as traffic infractions,are punishable by a fine between $50 and $200 and are assigned a five-point value(see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1225-c [4]; 1225-d [4]; 15NYCRR 131.3 [b] [4] [iii]).