| People v Watson |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 05871 [152 AD3d 1059] |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TyrellWatson, Appellant. |
G. Scott Walling, Schenectady, for appellant.
Joel E. Abelove, District Attorney, Troy (Vincent J. O'Neill of counsel), for respondent.
Garry, J.P. Appeal, by permission, from an order of the County Court of Rensselaer County(Ceresia, J.), entered August 18, 2014, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10to vacate the judgment convicting him of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree, after a hearing.
In August 2012, defendant was driving a vehicle containing four other individuals when theCity of Troy Police Department conducted a traffic stop. As relevant here, defendant and the fourpassengers were thereafter each charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree arising from a loaded revolver that was found on the back seat of the vehicle, anddefendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degreefor cocaine found on his person. In February 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree in full satisfaction of the charges against him andwas sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision.Defendant later filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his judgment alleging, among other things,that defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance. County Court denied the motionfollowing a hearing. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. "In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningfulrepresentation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record castsdoubt upon the apparent effectiveness of counsel" (People v Nieves, 89 AD3d 1285, 1286 [2011] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]; see Peoplev Dickson-Eason, 143 AD3d 1013, 1014 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1123[2016]; People v Briggs, 138 AD3d1355, 1356 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 927 [2016]). Here, defense counselsuccessfully argued for the suppression of [*2]the cocaineevidence and negotiated a favorable plea deal for defendant. As a second felony offender,defendant faced a possible maximum prison term of 5 to 15 years followed by five years ofpostrelease supervision if he had been found guilty at trial (see Penal Law§§ 70.02 [1] [b]; 70.06 [6] [b]; 70.45 [2]; 265.03). Counsel negotiated an offerthat allowed him to plead guilty in exchange for the statutory minimum sentence (seePenal Law §§ 70.06 [6] [b]; 70.45 [2]; People v Beekman, 134 AD3d 1355, 1357 [2015], lv denied27 NY3d 992 [2016]).
Consistent with his testimony at the hearing, defendant argues upon appeal that defensecounsel failed to inform him of the relevant statutory presumption of constructive possessionand, further, to apprise him of a statement made by codefendant Robert Davis Jr., in which Davisinformed the police that the revolver found in the back seat was his. Defendant claims that helacked knowledge of this statement. However, in support of his motion, defendant submitted anaffidavit in which he admits that defense counsel informed him of the statutory presumption.Relative to the statement by Davis, defendant asserted that he told his counsel about Davis'statement, but counsel failed to seek it out. Defense counsel testified at the hearing that, althoughhe did not view the video of Davis' statement until immediately after defendant's plea, he learnedthe substance of Davis' statement through Davis' counsel and discussed the same with defendantprior to the guilty plea. Defense counsel also testified that his advice to defendant would not havechanged had he viewed the video earlier. Finally, counsel asserted that he had informeddefendant of the statutory presumption applicable in this case.
Noting that defendant's testimony contradicted, in part, his sworn affidavit, and deferring toCounty Court's credibility determinations (see People v Bodah, 67 AD3d 1195, 1196 [2009], lv denied14 NY3d 838 [2010]), we find that defendant was afforded meaningful representation (seePeople v Dickson-Eason, 143 AD3d at 1014-1015). We further note that defendant stated atthe time of the plea that he was satisfied with defense counsel's representation, and that heentered into the plea voluntarily. Under these circumstances, we find that defendant fails toprovide any basis for vacating the plea (see People v Farnsworth, 140 AD3d 1538, 1540 [2016]; Peoplev Briggs, 138 AD3d at 1356; Peoplev Wren, 119 AD3d 1291, 1292 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1048[2014]).[FN*]
Egan Jr., Lynch, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote *:Another codefendant made asimilar statement, also claiming possession of the weapon found in the back seat. The recordreveals that defendant was aware of that statement before entering his plea.