| Roemer v Allstate Indem. Ins. Co. |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 05392 [163 AD3d 1324] |
| July 19, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| James T. Roemer, Respondent, v Allstate IndemnityInsurance Company, Also Known as Allstate Insurance Company,Appellant. |
Pemberton and Briggs, Schenectady (Paul Briggs of counsel), for appellant.
Ludemann, McMorris & Silvestri, PC, Glens Falls (John M. Silvestri of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Auffredou, J.), entered February 10,2017 in Warren County, which, among other things, partially denied defendant's motion forpartial summary judgment.
In March 2010, a fire destroyed plaintiff's residence located at 1 Braley Point in the Hamletof Bolton Landing, Warren County. Plaintiff's residence was one of two structures on the parcelof property (hereinafter the property), the other consisting of a lodge that plaintiff used as a rentalaccommodation during the summer tourist season. The homeowners insurance policy for theproperty was procured through defendant and plaintiff was listed as the named insured.Following the fire, plaintiff promptly notified defendant of the loss and an investigation ensued.The parties' subsequent attempts to reach a settlement with respect to the amount of loss provedunsuccessful, and plaintiff thereafter initiated the appraisal process as set forth in defendant'sinsurance policy. Although the independent appraisers hired by the parties ultimately agreedupon the amount of loss in June 2011, no payment was subsequently forthcoming fromdefendant. Rather, on July 1, 2011, defendant issued plaintiff a written disclaimer of coverage,determining that plaintiff lacked an insurable interest in the property, as the titled owner of theproperty was Roe Management and Development, Inc. and not plaintiff.[FN*]
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he had aninsurable interest in the property, that he is entitled to the agreed-upon settlement offer, that thedisclaimer of coverage was improper and wrongful and that defendant acted in bad faith.Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal ofplaintiff's claims for consequential damages, as well as plaintiff's claim alleging that defendantfailed to act in good faith in adjusting plaintiff's insurance claim. Supreme Court partially granteddefendant's motion by dismissing plaintiff's claim for counsel fees, but otherwise denied themotion, finding that defendant's alleged conduct created a question of fact as to whether itbreached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant now appeals.
As the proponent of the motion for summary judgment, it was defendant's burden to establishits prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting admissible evidencedemonstrating the absence of a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853[1985]; Smero v City of SaratogaSprings, 160 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2018]). "Only when the movant satisfies its obligationdoes the burden shift to the nonmovant to present evidence demonstrating the existence of atriable issue of fact" (Lacasse vSorbello, 121 AD3d 1241, 1241-1242 [2014] [citations omitted]; see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26NY3d 742, 763 [2016]). In reviewing such a motion, the facts must be viewed in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party, and every available inference must be drawn in favor ofthe nonmoving party (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d at 763).
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in every insurance contract andencompasses not only any promise that a reasonable promisee would understand to be included,but also that "a reasonable insured would understand that the insurer promises to investigate ingood faith and pay covered claims" (New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d308, 318 [1995]; accord Bi-EconomyMkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d 187, 194 [2008]; see Gutierrez v Government Empls. Ins.Co., 136 AD3d 975, 976 [2016]). In turn, "consequential damages resulting from abreach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be asserted in an insurance contractcontext, so long as the damages were within the contemplation of the parties as the probableresult of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting" (Panasia Estates, Inc. v Hudson Ins. Co., 10 NY3d 200, 203 [2008][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Yar-Lo, Inc. v Travelers Indem. Co., 130 AD3d 1402, 1403[2015]). As relevant here, to establish a prima facie case of bad faith, it must be established "thatthe insurer's conduct constituted a gross disregard of the insured's interests—that is, adeliberate or reckless failure to place on equal footing the interests of its insured with its owninterests when considering a settlement offer" (Pavia v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,82 NY2d 445, 453 [1993]; see Smith v General Acc. Ins. Co., 91 NY2d 648, 653 [1998]).In establishing a claim for bad faith, although not an exhaustive list, "the courts will consider thefacts and circumstances surrounding the case, including whether liability is clear, whether thepotential damages far exceed the insurance coverage and any other evidence which tends toestablish or negate the insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle" (Redcross v Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 260 AD2d 908, 911 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seePavia v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 82 NY2d at 455; see also Insurance Law§ 2601 [a] [4]).
Defendant contends that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that it acted in badfaith or engaged in conduct constituting a gross disregard of its insured's interests such that itestablished its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We disagree. Insupport of its motion, defendant submitted, among other things, a copy of plaintiff's summonsand complaint and plaintiff's verified bill of particulars. A review of the insurance claim processas set forth therein demonstrates that, the day after plaintiff's residence was destroyed by fire,plaintiff submitted a standard fire claim form notifying defendant of the loss and defendantthereafter commenced an investigation. While the investigation was pending, defendantadvanced plaintiff $5,000 for the removal of debris from the property pursuant to its insurancepolicy. The Warren County Fire Investigation Office subsequently determined that the cause ofthe fire was accidental such that there appears to be no dispute that the accident is covered by theinsurance policy. Additionally, for the following 12 months, defendant paid plaintiff foradditional living expenses in accordance with the terms and coverage limits provided for in itsinsurance policy. When initial settlement negotiations thereafter proved unsuccessful, plaintiffcommenced the appraisal process pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, and each partythereafter hired their own independent appraiser to determine the amount of loss. In June 2011,the appraisers mutually agreed upon the amount of loss; however, on July 1, 2011—16months after plaintiff's residence was destroyed by fire—defendant unexpectedlydisclaimed coverage on the basis that plaintiff did not have insurable interest in the property.
We find that defendant failed to present any admissible evidence in support of its motion toexplain why, after 16 months of investigation (see generally Insurance Law§ 2601 [a] [4]), it only disclaimed coverage after the parties' independent appraisershad reached a mutual agreement as to the amount of loss incurred. At no point prior to payingplaintiff various benefits to which he was otherwise entitled under the insurance policy, or duringsettlement negotiations or the appraisal process, did defendant ever indicate to plaintiff thatcoverage might ultimately be denied because he was apparently not the titled owner of theproperty—a fact of which plaintiff avers he made his insurance agent aware prior topurchasing the subject policy.
Although defendant submitted the affirmation of its counsel in support of its motion, saidaffirmation was not based on counsel's personal knowledge and, therefore, it lacked anyprobative value (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Hill v Country Club Acres, Inc., 134 AD3d 1267, 1268 [2015]) asto whether defendant's conduct in investigating and ultimately delaying its denial of coverageconstituted bad faith. Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we findthat defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law byeliminating all triable issues of fact as to whether it investigated the loss in good faith (seeBi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d at 192-194; Gauthier v Countryway Ins. Co., 100AD3d 1062, 1063-1064 [2012]; Gruenspecht v Balboa Ins. Co., 93 AD3d 482, 482 [2012]; compare Miller v Allstate Indem. Co.,132 AD3d 1306, 1307-1308 [2015]). Therefore, we need not determine whether the paperssubmitted by plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (seeWinegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853; Doody v Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 137 AD3d 959, 960 [2016]).Accordingly, we find that Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for partialsummary judgment dismissing that part of plaintiff's claim alleging that he failed to act in goodfaith.
McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.
Footnote *:The property was originallypurchased in July 2000 in the name of Roe Management and Development, Inc., a corporationwith only two shareholders—plaintiff, who owned 49% of the corporation, and MaryRoemer, plaintiff's sister, who owned 51%.