| Matter of New York State Bd. of Regents v State Univ. ofN.Y. |
| 2019 NYSlipOp 07458 [178 AD3d 11] |
| October 17, 2019 |
| Garry, P.J. |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| As corrected through Wednesday, December 4, 2019 |
[*1]
| In the Matter of New York State Board of Regents et al.,Respondents, v State University of New York et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent.(Proceeding No. 1.) |
| In the Matter of New York State United Teachers, by its PresidentAndrew Pallotta, et al., Respondents, v State of New York, Respondent, and State University ofNew York et al., Appellants. (Proceeding No. 2.) |
Third Department, October 17, 2019
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara, Wolf & Carone,LLP, Lake Success (Matthew F. Didora of counsel), for State University of NewYork and others, appellants.
Robert L. Dunn, New York City (Michael J. Hutter of Powers &Santola, LLP, Albany, of counsel), for Success Academy Charter Schools—NYC,appellant.
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Albany (Henry M. Greenberg of counsel), for NewYork State Board of Regents and others, respondents.
Robert T. Reilly Jr., General Counsel, Latham (Michael J. Del Piano ofcounsel), Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, New York City, and Beth A.Norton, New York City, for New York State United Teachers and others, respondents.
Jay Worona, Latham, for New York State School Boards Association, Inc. andanother, amici curiae.
{**178 AD3d at 15}Appeal from a judgment of the SupremeCourt (Young, J.), entered June 20, 2018 in Albany County, which granted petitioners'applications, in two combined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions fordeclaratory judgment, to annul certain regulations promulgated by respondent State University ofNew York Board of Trustees' Charter Schools Committee.
In October 2017, respondent State University of New York Board of Trustees' CharterSchool Committee (hereinafter the Committee) promulgated regulations (see 8 NYCRRpart 700 [hereinafter the regulations]) that purported to establish an independent licensureprocess for teachers in certain charter schools as a substitute for the teacher certification systemestablished by petitioners State Education Department and State Board of Regents. TheCommittee asserts that the independent licensure process is necessary to alleviate a teachershortage. Respondents Success Academy Charter Schools—NYC (hereinafter SACS) andBronx Charter School for Better Learning submitted plans for independent licensure programspursuant to the regulations, and the Committee approved them. Thereafter, these two combinedproceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment were commencedseeking to, among other things, annul the regulations on the grounds that they are in excess of theCommittee's authority under Education Law § 355 (2-a), conflict with EducationLaw article 56 (hereinafter the Charter Schools Act) and other provisions of the Education Law,violate the separation of powers doctrine and were not promulgated in accordance with the StateAdministrative Procedure Act.[FN1] Petitioners in proceeding No. 1 are the Board ofRegents, the Education Department, the Chancellor of the Board of Regents, the University ofthe State of New York, and the Commissioner of Education. Petitioners in proceeding No. 2 arethe New York State United Teachers (hereinafter NYSUT), the United Federation of Teachers,Local 2 (hereinafter UFT), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,New York State Conference, Robert Hunter Schoenfeld (a teacher), Edwin K. Bradley (ateacher), and Felicia Grace (a parent).
Before joining issue, petitioners in proceeding No. 1 moved for a temporary restraining orderand preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the implementation of the{**178 AD3d at 16} regulations. In response, the Committee andrespondents State University of New York (hereinafter SUNY), the SUNY Board of Trustees, theChancellor of SUNY, the Chair of the SUNY Board of Trustees, the SUNY Charter SchoolsInstitute and the Chair of the Committee (hereinafter collectively referred to as the SUNYrespondents) moved in proceeding No. 2 and cross-moved in proceeding No. 1 for an orderdismissing the amended petitions/complaints. The SUNY respondents asserted that petitioners inboth proceedings lacked standing to challenge the regulations and that petitioners in proceedingNo. 1 lacked the capacity to sue. Following oral argument, Supreme Court granted the amendedpetitions/complaints, vacated the regulations and enjoined their implementation. The court found,among other things, that the Education Department and the Commissioner have standing, thatEducation Law § 355 (2-a) does not authorize the Committee to promulgateregulations that alter minimum teacher certification requirements, and that the regulations werenot promulgated in accordance with the State Administrative Procedure Act.[FN2] The SUNY respondents andSACS (hereinafter collectively referred to as respondents) appeal.
[1] We turn first to the issues of capacity and standing. "Capacity to sue is athreshold matter allied with, but conceptually distinct from, the question of standing. As ageneral matter, capacity 'concerns a litigant's power to appear and bring its grievance before thecourt' " (Silver v Pataki, 96 NY2d 532, 537 [2001], quoting Community Bd. 7of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148, 155 [1994]). Governmental entities suchas petitioners in proceeding No. 1 have capacity to sue only when it is based upon a "concretestatutory predicate. Capacity to sue may be expressly granted in enabling legislation or it may beinferred from review of the entity's statutory functions or responsibilities" (Matter of Graziano v County ofAlbany, 3 NY3d 475, 479 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).Pursuant to the Education Law, the Commissioner is required to "enforce all general and speciallaws relating to the educational system of the state and execute all educational policiesdetermined upon by the [B]oard of [R]egents" (Education Law § 305 [1]). Further,Education Law {**178 AD3d at 17} § 308 providesthat the Commissioner has the power and the duty "to cause to be instituted such proceedings orprocesses as may be necessary to properly enforce and give effect to any provision in [theEducation Law] or in any other general or special law pertaining to the school system of the stateor any part thereof or to any school district or city." Accordingly, the Commissioner, acting in herroles as the chief executive officer of the Education Department and the Board of Regents, hasboth express and implied capacity to bring proceeding No. 1 (see Education Law§ 305 [1]; Hodgkins v Central School Dist. No. 1, 48 AD2d 302, 304-305[1975], lv denied 42 NY2d 807 [1977]).
[2] To establish standing, a petitioner must show that it "ha[s] something truly atstake in a genuine controversy" (Matterof Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v Aubertine, 119 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2014] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). To do so, it must "establish[ ] both an injury-in-fact andthat the asserted injury is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute allegedto have been violated" (Matter ofAssociation for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 23NY3d 1, 6 [2014]; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761,772-773 [1991]). Petitioners in proceeding No. 1 assert that the Commissioner has exclusivestatutory authority to promulgate regulations governing the certification of public schoolteachers, to certify qualified individuals to teach in public schools, and to register teacherpreparation programs in this state (see Education Law §§ 207, 3004;8 NYCRR part 80). They further assert that the regulations conflict with Education Law§§ 2854 (3) (a-1) and 3602-ee, which require teachers employed in charterschools and charter school prekindergarten programs to be certified according to the samerequirements that apply to other public school teachers, with certain limited exceptions. TheCommissioner averred by affidavit that the regulations usurp the Commissioner's authority,contravene the purposes and policies of the Charter Schools Act and Education Law§ 3004 and will injure petitioners in proceeding No. 1 and the students whoseeducation they are charged with protecting by permitting unqualified persons to teach inSUNY-authorized charter schools. These allegations are sufficient to establish that the claimedinjuries fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the Education Law and that theCommissioner has suffered "direct harm," consisting of "injury that is {**178 AD3d at 18}. . . different from that of the public atlarge" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 774; accord Matter of Sierra Club v Village ofPainted Post, 26 NY3d 301, 306 [2015]). Having found that the Commissioner hasstanding, we need not render a determination as to the remaining petitioners in proceeding No. 1(see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 813 [2003],cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]).
[3] We reach a different conclusion as to proceeding No. 2. The licensure programestablished by the regulations applies only to a certain subset of high-performingSUNY-authorized charter schools. Grace based her claim to standing on the fact that her childattends a SUNY-authorized charter school, but did not assert that this school is in the groupaffected by the regulations or, if so, has applied to be included in the licensure program.Schoenfeld and Bradley, who are certified teachers, did not show that the charter schools wherethey are employed are in the affected group. Thus, whether teachers licensed under theregulations will ever teach in these petitioners' schools is a matter of "conjecture [and]speculation" that cannot establish injury-in-fact (Matter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. vAubertine, 119 AD3d at 1203; seeMatter of Ellison v Stanford, 147 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d908 [2017]). As for the theory that the regulations may impair the economic value of the teachingcertificates held by Schoenfeld and Bradley by enlarging the pool of candidates for teachingpositions, neither petitioner expressed any intention to seek employment in a school affected bythe regulations. Even if they did, the regulations would not deprive them of the opportunity toapply for employment, but would merely eliminate the preference that certified teachers ingeneral now hold in obtaining teaching jobs—a form of potential harm which the Court ofAppeals has held is too "tenuous and ephemeral" to constitute injury-in-fact (Rudder vPataki, 93 NY2d 273, 279 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
[4] For similar reasons, the remaining petitioners in proceeding No. 2, all of whichare organizations, failed to establish organizational standing. NYSUT and UFT assert that theirmembers include teachers in public schools, charter schools and SUNY-authorized charterschools. Each union named the SUNY-authorized charter schools where their members areemployed—three in the case of NYSUT and eight in the case of UFT—but did notassert that any of these schools are included{**178 AD3d at 19}in the subset of high-performing charter schools that are affected by the regulations.[FN3] The National Association for theAdvancement of Colored People likewise did not show that any of its members has a child in oneof the affected schools.[FN4]Thus, on this record, none of these organizations showed "that at least one of [their] memberswould have standing to sue," and we need not examine the other elements of organizationalstanding (Matter of Mental HygieneLegal Serv. v Daniels, 33 NY3d 44, 51 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; see New York State Assn. ofNurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 214 [2004]; Rudder v Pataki, 93NY2d at 278-279; Matter of New YorkState Psychiatric Assn., Inc. v Mills, 29 AD3d 1058, 1059-1060 [2006], lvdenied 7 NY3d 708 [2006]). Accordingly, the amended petition/complaint in proceeding No.2 should have been dismissed.
[5] Turning to the merits of respondents' arguments, it is a basic principle ofadministrative law that an agency has only "those powers expressly conferred by its authorizingstatute, as well as those required by necessary implication" (Matter of City of New York vState of N.Y. Commn. on Cable Tel., 47 NY2d 89, 92 [1979]; accord Matter of Juarez v New York StateOff. of Victim Servs., 169 AD3d 52, 56 [2019], lv granted 33 NY3d 914[2019]). Education Law § 355 (2-a) authorizes the Committee, "[n]otwithstandingany other provision of law, rule, or regulation to the contrary, . . . to promulgateregulations with respect to governance, structure and operations of [SUNY-authorized] charterschools." Respondents assert that the regulations fall within this statutory authorization becauseteacher licensure pertains to the "operation" of SUNY-authorized charter schools. In analyzingthis claim, we need not defer to the Committee's interpretation of the Education Law, as "thequestion is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehensionof legislative intent" (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]; accord Matter of Carmel Academy v NewYork State Educ. Dept., 169 AD3d 1287, 1288 [2019]).
The Education Law does not define the word "operation" (see Education Law§ 2). "In the absence of a statutory definition, {**178AD3d at 20}we construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonlyunderstood meaning" (Yaniveth R. vLTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186, 192 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; accord Matter of Civil Serv.Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 163AD3d 1110, 1112 [2018]). The dictionary definition of "operation," in this context, is"performance of a practical work or of something involving the practical application of principlesor processes" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, operation[https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operation]). This definition, with its emphasis onpractical function, does not support respondents' interpretation. As respondents argue, theoperation or "practical work" of a charter school clearly includes the hiring and supervision ofteachers. However, such tasks are not the same as establishing requirements for the certificationof teachers, which other public schools do not perform, and which involves policy determinationsbeyond a school's ordinary management and functioning. We note that the Charter Schools Actconsistently uses the word "operation" to refer to the practical administration, management andsupervision of individual charter schools (see e.g. Education Law§§ 2851 [1] ["For charter schools established in conjunction with afor-profit business or corporate entity, the charter shall specify the extent of the entity'sparticipation in the management and operation of the school"], [2] [i] ["a charter school mayserve fewer than fifty students or employ fewer than three teachers in the school's first year ofoperation"]; 2856 [1] [b] ["Amounts payable to a charter school in its first year of operation shallbe based on (certain) projections"]).
We thus conclude that the inclusion of the word "operation" in Education Law§ 355 (2-a) does not authorize the Committee to promulgate regulations pertainingto teacher licensure and certification. We further find that the regulations conflict with provisionsof the Education Law that authorize the Commissioner to prescribe regulations governing thecertification of teachers and that require most teachers in charter schools and prekindergartens tobe certified in the same manner as other public school teachers (see Education Law§§ 2854 [3] [a-1]; 3004 [1]; 3602-ee [8], [12]).[FN5] The Committee therefore exceeded its authorityin promulgating the regulations, and Supreme{**178 AD3d at21} Court properly annulled them and enjoined their implementation.
As the above constitutes an adequate basis for our determination, we only briefly address twoother matters raised by the parties. After analyzing the guidelines first established in Boreali vAxelrod (71 NY2d 1 [1987]), we agree with Supreme Court that the regulations constituted aproduct of improper legislative policymaking by an administrative agency (see Matter of New York StatewideCoalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & MentalHygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 698-701 [2014]; Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d at 11-14;Matter of Ahmed v City of NewYork, 129 AD3d 435, 440 [2015]). We further agree that the SUNY respondentsviolated the State Administrative Procedure Act by making "substantial revision[s]" in theproposed regulations before their adoption without a notice of revised rulemaking and anopportunity for additional public comment (State Administrative Procedure Act§ 102 [9]; see State Administrative Procedure Act § 202[4-a] [a]; Siegal v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 143 AD2d430, 431-433 [1988]; People v Harris Corp., 104 AD2d 130, 133-134 [1984]).
Egan Jr., Lynch and Pritzker, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so muchthereof as denied the motion to dismiss the amended petition/complaint in proceeding No. 2;motion granted to that extent and said amended petition/complaint dismissed; and, as somodified, affirmed.
Footnote 1:Proceeding No. 2 was originallycommenced in New York County but was joined with proceeding No. 1 and transferred toAlbany County.
Footnote 2:Supreme Court made no expressdetermination as to the capacity of petitioners in proceeding No. 1 or the standing of petitionersin proceeding No. 2, but, by granting the amended petitions/complaints, made implieddeterminations in their favor.
Footnote 3:Neither union asserted that it hadmembers at SACS or the Bronx Charter School for Better Learning.
Footnote 4:The assertion that the subset ofaffected schools could expand in the future to include some of the schools where thesepetitioners have members is too speculative to establish injury-in-fact (see New York State Assn. of NurseAnesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 214 [2004]).
Footnote 5:This conclusion is not altered bythe inclusion of the phrase "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, rule, or regulation tothe contrary" in Education Law § 355 (2-a), as the authority granted by that statutedoes not include the promulgation of regulations related to teacher certification.