Matter of CLM Assoc., LLC v New York State Tax AppealsTrib.
2020 NY Slip Op 01531 [181 AD3d 999]
March 5, 2020
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2020


[*1]
 In the Matter of CLM Associates, LLC,Petitioner,
v
New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal et al.,Respondents.

Arent Fox, New York City (Michael P. McMahan of counsel), for petitioner.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Brian D. Ginsberg of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.

Clark, J.P. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuantto Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax AppealsTribunal sustaining a sales and use tax assessment imposed under Tax Law articles 28and 29.

The Premier Collection, LLC is an automobile sales and service group that whollyowns a number of luxury car dealerships, each of which is organized as a limited liabilitycompany. Petitioner is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Premier and, during the period inquestion, acted as the administrative arm of the group, providing centralized services tothe dealerships, such as accounting, human resources, record retention, informationtechnology and marketing. Although petitioner was once a licensed dealer, itrelinquished its dealer license in, or prior to, 2003.

Premier's dealerships maintain fleets of loaner cars, stocked with a rotating supply ofvehicles taken from new car inventory and set aside for customers to use while their carsare being serviced. Loaner cars are required to be "hard-plated," meaning that they mustbe titled and have a permanent, nondealer license plate (see Vehicle and TrafficLaw §§ 2102 [a] [2]; 2104 [a]). From September 1, 2004 throughAugust 31, 2010 (the audit period), eight of Premier's dealerships had title issued topetitioner for all new cars designated for loaner use.[FN1] The individual dealerships retainedphysical possession of the loaner cars and the corresponding title documents and,generally, before a loaner car exceeded certain time or mileage restrictions, the car wastaken out of loaner service and placed into the dealer's used car inventory for resale. Atthat time, an employee at the dealership would sign title over to the dealership on behalfof petitioner.

In June 2013, following completion of an audit and a conciliation conference, theDepartment of Taxation and Finance issued a notice of determination assessing petitioner$1,137,835.16 in sales tax liability, plus interest, on the basis that the transfers of theloaner cars from the dealerships to petitioner constituted taxable retail sales of tangiblepersonal property without any exemption. In reaching the total amount of sales tax owed,the Department gave petitioner trade-in credit for vehicles that were rotated out of loanerstatus and replaced with new loaner cars on the same day. Petitioner filed a petition forredetermination with the Division of Tax Appeals. Following a hearing, anAdministrative Law Judge sustained the sales tax assessment in principal part, butreduced petitioner's total amount of sales tax liability by $70,774 to account for sales taxthat had been paid when vehicles exceeded the time and/or mileage restrictions andbecame long-term loaner cars.[FN2] Petitioner filed an exception, and,following oral argument, respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal further reduced petitioner'ssales tax liability to provide credit for $186,288.73 in use tax payments made by thedealerships, but otherwise upheld the Administrative Law Judge's determination.Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge theTribunal's determination.

With certain limited exceptions not applicable here, Tax Law § 1105 (a)imposes sales tax upon "[t]he receipts from every retail sale of tangible personalproperty." A "retail sale" is defined, in pertinent part, as "[a] sale of tangible personalproperty to any person for any purpose, other than . . . for resale as such"(Tax Law § 1101 [b] [4] [i] [A]; see 20 NYCRR 526.6 [a], [c] [1]).Additionally, as relevant here, a "sale" is defined as "[a]ny transfer of title or possessionor both,. . . conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever fora consideration" (Tax Law § 1101 [b] [5]; see 20 NYCRR 526.7[a]). Under the Tax Law regulations, "[m]onetary consideration includes assumption ofliabilities, fees, rentals, royalties or any other charge that a purchaser, lessee or licensee isrequired to pay" (20 NYCRR 526.7 [b]).

Pursuant to Tax Law § 1132 (c) (1), petitioner was subject to thestatutory presumption that the transactions by which it acquired title to the loaner carswere taxable and, therefore, it had the burden of proving the contrary by clear andconvincing evidence (see Matterof Mayo v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 172 AD3d1554, 1554-1555 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1140 [2020]; Matterof Shuai Yin v State of N.Y. Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 151 AD3d 1497,1501 [2017]; Matter ofMacLeod v Megna, 75 AD3d 928, 929 [2010]). Petitioner argued that there wasa failure of consideration and, thus, no taxable retail sales because the titling of the loanervehicles to it was merely nominal and had no economic effect given that it and thedealerships were wholly owned by Premier.[FN3] The Tribunal rejected this argument,finding that petitioner's assumption of liability for personal injury claims resulting fromnegligence in the use or operation of a loaner vehicle (see Vehicle and TrafficLaw §§ 128, 388), together with the administrative benefits flowing tothe dealerships from petitioner's "centralized loaner management" services, "constitutedthe consideration required to qualify the transfer of the loaner titles to petitioner as[taxable] retail sales." If this determination is rationally based and supported bysubstantial evidence, we must confirm it, even if a different conclusion would have beenreasonable (see Matter ofToronto Dominion Holdings [U.S.A.], Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y.,162 AD3d 1255, 1257 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 907 [2018]; Matter of CS Integrated, LLC vTax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 19 AD3d 886, 889 [2005]).

At the hearing, Sean Coughlin, Premier's president and chief operating officer, andDale Leake, petitioner's chief financial officer, generally testified as to the administrativeconvenience of tasking petitioner with management of the dealerships' loaner fleets.Additionally, it is undisputed that, prior to acquiring title, petitioner did not bear anypotential liability for civil damages resulting from accidents involving the loaner cars,but that, upon receiving title, it assumed joint and several liability with eachdealership—which retained physical possession of the cars—for any suchdamages (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 128, 388). Coughlintestified that the impetus behind titling the loaner cars to petitioner was to enable Premierto spread liability among its dealerships, so that a particularly high damages award wouldnot burden or bankrupt any single dealership. Although testimony from Coughlin andLeake suggested that Premier may have been able to spread liability among itsdealerships even without titling the loaner cars to petitioner, petitioner's evidence wasconflicting on this point. Furthermore, Coughlin testified that titling the loaner cars topetitioner provided additional protection to the dealerships by keeping any singledealership's "name out of the paper" in the event of a bad accident involving a loaner car.Considering all of the foregoing evidence, we are constrained to conclude that theTribunal rationally determined that petitioner's assumption of liability, as well as theadministrative benefits of centralized loaner management, constituted the considerationrequired for a taxable retail sale and that such determination is supported by substantialevidence, despite evidence in the record that could support a contrary result (seeTax Law § 1101 [b] [5]; 20 NYCRR 526.7 [a], [b]; Matter of HygradeCasket Corp. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 212 AD2d 843, 844-845[1995]; Matter of Sunny Vending Co. v State Tax Commn., 101 AD2d 666,666-667 [1984]).

Although we find that there is substantial evidence in the record to support theTribunal's determination that the titling of the loaner cars to petitioner constituted taxableretail sales, we are troubled that such a technical application of the Tax Law does notcomport with "the spirit underlying our sales tax law, which is to impose the tax onlyupon the sale to the ultimate consumer" (Matter of Burger King v State TaxCommn., 51 NY2d 614, 623 [1980]). In our view, the Tribunal's determination mayresult in an unwarranted windfall to the state, which will ultimately receive sales tax frompetitioner—which in most cases held title to the vehicles for only 6 to 12months—and from the ultimate consumers who purchased the vehicleswhen they were rotated out of loaner status and placed in the dealerships' used carinventories. The Court of Appeals has suggested in dicta that, in determining whether ataxable retail sale occurred, it may be appropriate to consider whether an unwarrantedwindfall will be bestowed upon the state (Matter of EchoStar Satellite Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the Stateof N.Y., 20 NY3d 286, 292-293 [2012]). However, the Court of Appeals did notindicate that the Tribunal's determination can be annulled on that basis alone (id.at 292-293), and it is not for this Court to hold that it can be. Accordingly, given ourlimited scope of review, we must uphold the Tribunal's determination that thetransactions were taxable retail sales.

Petitioner alternatively challenges the amount of trade-in credit that it received forvehicles that were rotated out of loaner status and replaced with new loaner cars, arguingthat the trade-in credit should not have been limited to "swaps" that occurred on the sameday. In so challenging the audit, petitioner bore the burden of establishing by clear andconvincing evidence that the audit method and the resulting tax assessment wereunreasonable (see Matter of Mayo v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, TaxAppeals Trib., 172 AD3d at 1554-1555; Matter of Rodriguez v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y.,82 AD3d 1302, 1306 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 702 [2011]). The Tribunalfound that petitioner did not meet its burden here and, so "long as that 'determination isrationally based and is supported by substantial evidence, it must be confirmed, even if adifferent conclusion would not have been unreasonable' " (Matter of Mayo vNew York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 172 AD3d at 1555,quoting Matter of Toronto Dominion Holdings [U.S.A.], Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. ofthe State of N.Y., 162 AD3d at 1257).

In our view, because sales tax is imposed upon "[t]he receipts from everyretail sale of tangible personal property" (Tax Law § 1105 [a] [emphasisadded]) and because "sales tax[ is] due in full at the time of the taxable transaction" (Matter of General Elec. CapitalCorp. v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib., 2 NY3d 249,258 [2004]; see 20 NYCRR 525.2 [a] [2]; Matter of Prima Asphalt Concrete, Inc. v New York State TaxAppeals Trib., 162 AD3d 1281, 1282-1283 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d914 [2019]), the Tribunal reasonably limited trade-in credit to those transactions thatpetitioner could show through contemporaneous documentation—whether on theinvoice, bill of sale or other records demonstrating identifiable, traceabletrade-ins[FN4]—to "be a trade of one specific loaner for another." The Tribunal found that, "[i]nthe absence of documentation of identifiable, traceable trade-ins," petitioner failed todemonstrate its entitlement to trade-in credit for swaps that occurred on different days.We cannot say that such determination is irrational or unsupported by substantialevidence. Accordingly, we must uphold the Tribunal's method of determining the amountof trade-in credit provided to petitioner and the resulting tax assessment (see Matterof Prima Asphalt Concrete, Inc. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 162 AD3d at1283).

Devine, Aarons, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Adjudged that thedetermination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:These transactions werememorialized on petitioner's and the dealerships' respective inventory lists and ledgers,on bills of sale issued by the dealerships and on retail certificates of sale jointlycompleted by petitioner and the relevant dealership.

Footnote 2:During the audit period,31 vehicles became long-term loaners, and the dealerships paid sales tax on thosevehicles.

Footnote 3:Petitioner also nowargues that the transactions did not constitute taxable retail sales because the loaner carswere always intended and available "for resale" (Tax Law § 1101 [b] [4] [i][A]; see 20 NYCRR 526.6 [a], [c] [1]). However, as this argument was raised forthe first time in this proceeding, it is not preserved for our review (see Matter of 21 Club, Inc. v TaxAppeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 69 AD3d 996, 998 [2010]).

Footnote 4:The record demonstratesthat, in addition to trade-ins listed on the invoices or bills of sale, petitioner receivedtrade-in credit where there was a corresponding sticky note or email indicating that atrade-in was occurring at the time of the transaction.


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