| Matter of Eternal Flame of Hope Ministries, Inc. v King |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 06459 [76 AD3d 775] |
| August 23, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Eternal Flame of Hope Ministries, Inc.,Respondent, v Lorry King, as Assessor of the Town of Highland, et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Kalter, Kaplan, Zeiger & Forman, Woodbourne (Terry S. Forman of counsel), forrespondent.
Mercure, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered March 16,2009 in Sullivan County, which, among other things, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7,granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment striking certain real property from the taxassessment rolls of the Town of Highland.
Petitioner is a not-for-profit corporation organized in 2001 for the purpose of offering"spiritual renewal in accordance with the [principles] of the Catholic Church," and encouragingartists seeking inspiration and instruction in the Catholic faith. It receives a federal income taxexemption from the Internal Revenue Service and is classified as a public charity; contributionsto petitioner are deductible pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner was also listed inthe 2007 Official Catholic Directory as a private association affiliated with the Catholic Church.
Petitioner's president is Richard Bretone, an ordained Roman Catholic priest. In 2002,Bretone obtained a building permit from the Town of Highland, Sullivan County to construct anart studio on a 46-acre parcel of real property that he owned. The studio, designed to resemble achapel and adorned with religious art, was completed in December 2006 and the Town issuedBretone a certificate of occupancy. In February 2007, Bretone transferred theproperty—consisting of the art studio, a small barn, a four-bedroom chalet, two small ruralcabins and undeveloped land upon which a brook and seasonal waterfall were located—topetitioner. The art studio is used for the creation of religious art, spiritual talks and prayer, andthe entire property is used regularly for spiritual retreats by parishioners from New York Citychurches, prayer groups and college students. Mass and prayer services are an integral part of theevents at the property, and are held when visitors are present. In addition, petitioner erected ashrine to Our Lady of Mount Carmel in 2007 and commenced work on a "holiness trail," whichhas since been completed and dedicated to the 14 stations of the cross. Visitors to the shrine fillwater bottles in a nearby natural spring; the water is then blessed and taken home by the visitorsas "holy water."
In 2007, petitioner applied for a real property tax exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a (1) (a).Petitioner indicated that its purpose was religious, and listed its activities as "establishment [and]maintenance of a facility for religious (Roman Catholic) days of recollection, retreat,pilgrimages, shrines, mass, and adoration benediction." Respondent Assessor of the Town ofHighland denied the application on the ground that "[a] [r]etreat does not meet the qualificationsfor this exemption." Respondent Board of Assessment Review of the Town of Highland deniedpetitioner's subsequent grievance, and petitioner's property was included on the Town's 2007taxable assessment rolls.
Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7, seeking adeclaration that its property is exempt from taxation pursuant to RPTL 420-a, as well as a refundfor taxes paid. Petitioner moved for summary judgment, and respondents cross-moved forsummary judgment. Supreme Court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment anddirected respondents to strike the real property from its 2007 tax rolls. Respondents appeal, andwe now affirm.
We reject respondents' contention that this Court may not consider any of the evidentiarysubmissions in the record that were not supplied to the Town in connection with petitioner'sapplication for the exemption. First, as petitioner notes, there is no requirement that anapplication be filed to obtain an RPTL 420-a exemption (compare RPTL 420-a [11]with RPTL 420-b [7]). Moreover, an RPTL article 7 or CPLR article 78 proceedingcommenced to challenge the denial of a mandatory exemption is, in essence, a challenge to thetaxing authority's jurisdiction over the subject property (see Hewlett Assoc. v City of NewYork, 57 NY2d 356, 363-364 [1982]; see also Troy Towers Redevelopment Co. v Cityof Troy, 51 AD2d 173, 175-176 [1976], affd for reasons stated below 41 NY2d 816[1977]). Thus, contrary to respondents' argument, courts are not limited to the record adducedbefore "the agency" in such proceedings (see Matter of Word of Life Ministries v NassauCounty, 191 Misc 2d 110, 111-112, 115 [2002], affd 309 AD2d 760 [2003],affd 3 NY3d 455 [2004]; seealso Matter of TAP, Inc. v Dimitriadis, 49 AD3d 947, 948-949 [2008]; cf. Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An JingCtr., Inc. v Schoeberl, 45 AD3d 947, 951 [2007]). In any event, an RPTL article 7proceeding, such as the instant proceeding, "is in the nature of a trial de novo" (Matter ofTown of Pleasant Val. v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 253 AD2d 8, 14 [1999][internal quotation marks omitted]; see People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55,60 [1943]). In either an RPTL article 7 proceeding or a CPLR article 78 proceeding challengingthe denial of an exemption, "[t]he taxpayer seeking [the] real property tax exemption bears theburden of proof" (Matter of KsiazeChylinski-Polubinski Trust, Inc. v Board of Assessment Review for Town of De Kalb, 21AD3d 620, 621 [2005]; see Matter of Ingham v Town of Dickinson, 192 AD2d 813,814 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 653 [1993]).[*2]
Turning to the merits, under RPTL 420-a, real propertyowned and primarily used "by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusivelyfor religious, charitable, hospital, educational [purposes], or [for the] moral or mentalimprovement of men, women or children . . . shall be exempt from taxation" (RPTL420-a [1] [a]; see Matter of Legion ofChrist v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d 406, 411 [2004]). "To qualify for this taxexemption, '(1) the entity must be organized exclusively for purposes enumerated in the statute,(2) the property in question must be used primarily for the furtherance of such purposes,. . . (3) no pecuniary profit, apart from reasonable compensation, may inure to thebenefit of any officers, members, or employees, and (4) the entity may not be simply used as aguise for profit-making operations' " (Matter of TAP, Inc. v Dimitriadis, 49 AD3d at947-948, quoting Matter of Miriam Osborn Mem. Home Assn. v Assessor of City ofRye, 275 AD2d 714, 715 [2000]).
Here, respondents argue that petitioner failed to meet its burden of establishing that theproperty is used primarily in furtherance of a charitable purpose. Petitioner, however, presentedaffidavits, photographs and Bretone's testimony during his examination before trial detailing theuse of the property by students and parishioners from the New York City area as a spiritualretreat, as well as petitioner's concrete plans for further development of the unimproved land inthat regard. Notably, although respondents denied petitioner's application on the ground that "[a][r]etreat does not meet the qualifications for this exemption," this Court has held that propertyused as "a spiritual retreat" does, in fact, qualify for the exemption despite the fact that a "retreatcenter is not a church in the narrow sense" (Order Minor Conventuals v Lee, 64 AD2d227, 230-231 [1978]; see Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An Jing Ctr., Inc. v Schoeberl, 45AD3d at 950-951).
In addition, we have explained that unimproved land preserved in its natural state for use inconnection with a hermitage and retreat center "is further evidence of [a religious organization's]adherence to the belief that there is a need among the members of its faith for prayer and solitudefree from the external pressure and duress of contemporary living" (Order MinorConventuals v Lee, 64 AD2d at 230; see Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah vAssessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 NY2d 244, 252 [1992]; see also People ex rel.Corporation of Yaddo v Freeman, 259 NY 620, 620-621 [1932]; Matter of New CreationFellowship of Buffalo v Board of Assessment Review, 289 AD2d 1067, 1068 [2001]).Respondents' averments that petitioner placed restrictions on public access to the property, wasnot using the property as a church, and did not apply for a special use permit to use the premiseseither as a church or in connection with its proposed future use of the undeveloped portions ofthe property are insufficient to raise a question of fact regarding petitioner's entitlement to theexemption under RPTL 420-a (seeMatter of Korean Joong Bu Presbyt. Church of N.Y. v Incorporated Vil. of Old Westbury, 2NY3d 787, 788 [2004]; Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1NY3d at 412; Matter of Yeshivath Shearith Hapletah v Assessor of Town of Fallsburg,79 NY2d at 247-248; Matter of Symphony Space v Tishelman, 60 NY2d 33, 38-39[1983]; cf. Matter of Oxford Group-Moral Re-Armament, MRA, Inc. v Allen, 309 NY744, 746 [1955]).[FN*]With [*3]respect to the dissent's assertion that there are questionsof fact created by the Town's request that petitioner seek a special use permit, we note that theTown code enforcement officer's request was contained in a letter to petitioner indicating that"[i]t has come to our attention that you would like to change the status of the above property. . . to be as a Place of Worship," and followed petitioner's motion for summaryjudgment. It is this letter—sent one year after the Town Assessor denied the exemptionand, indeed, after petitioner had moved for summary judgment in thisproceeding—that the dissent relies upon as sufficient to find a question of fact requiringthe denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment. In our view, a letter sent in response to asummary judgment motion and merely requesting that petitioner seek a special use permit cannotmanufacture an issue of fact warranting the denial of petitioner's motion.
In any event, the dissent's conclusion that "it is difficult to see how [petitioner] is not usingthe art studio/chapel as a 'place of worship' " is directly contrary to extensive portions ofrespondents' brief, in which it is argued at length that the exemption must be denied because"[t]here is no structured type of religion" at the premises. Indeed, contrary to the dissent'sstatement that "[i]t is undisputed that petitioner uses its property generally as a spiritual retreat,"respondents now assert that "petitioner has failed to show that the property was beingexclusively used as a 'retreat.' " Respondents' assertion is, of course, in conflict with their statedrationale for denying the exemption—that a retreat does not meet the qualification for theexemption—and a transparent attempt to distinguish this case from our precedentestablishing that a spiritual retreat does qualify (see Matter of World Buddhist Ch'An JingCtr., Inc. v Schoeberl, 45 AD3d at 950-951; Order Minor Conventuals v Lee, 64AD2d at 230-231). Finally, we note that respondents make no assertion that a spiritual retreat is a"place of worship" within the meaning of its zoning code. While the dissent may find it difficultto see how the property is not being currently used as a "place of worship," the absence of anysuch claim by respondents is consistent with their failure to cite petitioner with any zoningviolation or obtain an injunction to prevent such current use in violation of their zoning code,further distinguishing this case from Matter of Oxford Group-Moral Re-Armament, MRA,Inc. v Allen (283 App Div 1061, 1062 [1954], revd 309 NY 744 [1955]).
In short, Supreme Court properly granted the application to strike petitioner's property [*4]from respondents' tax assessment rolls.
Cardona, P.J. and Kavanagh, J., concur.
Peters, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. It is settled that a property owner who isusing his or her property for exempt purposes in violation of an applicable municipal zoning lawis prohibited from receiving a tax exemption pursuant to RPTL 420-a (see Matter of OxfordGroup-Moral Re-Armament, MRA, Inc. v Allen, 309 NY 744, 745-746 [1955]; Congregation Or Yosef v Town ofRamapo, 48 AD3d 731, 732 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 711 [2008]; Matterof Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 266 AD2d 286, 287 [1999], revdon other grounds 95 NY2d 401 [2000]; Matter of United States Columbarium Co. v TaxCommn. of City of N.Y., 19 Misc 2d 256, 259-260 [1959]). Here, petitioner's property islocated in zoning district R1 (residential district) where permitted uses include, for example,single family dwellings, agriculture and business and professional offices. Special permitteduses, for which petitioner is required to obtain a special use permit from the Town of Highland,include "places of worship."
It is undisputed that petitioner uses its property generally as a spiritual retreat for religiousvisitors by appointment and uses the art studio—which petitioner also refers to as achapel—for the creation of religious art, celebration of mass, prayer and spiritualdiscussion.[FN1]Petitioner was using at least a portion of its property in this manner at the time its application fora tax exemption was considered and denied by respondents. For that reason, the cases cited bythe majority and by Supreme Court, which apply to applications for tax exemptions based uponproposed use of vacant or unimproved property, are not dispositive (see Matter of Korean Joong Bu Presbyt.Church of N.Y. v Incorporated Vil. of Old Westbury, 2 NY3d 787, 788 [2004]; Matter of Legion of Christ v Town ofMount Pleasant, 1 NY3d 406, 409-412 [2004]).
After respondents denied petitioner's application for a tax exemption, the Town's codeenforcement officer provided written notification to petitioner of the Town's position thatpetitioner's use of the art studio—for which a certificate of occupancy had beengranted—as a place of worship required a special use permit and advised petitioner to filesuch an application. Petitioner neither responded to this communication nor filed an applicationfor a special use permit. We cannot agree with the majority that petitioner's failure to apply for aspecial use permit was insufficient to raise an issue of fact to defeat petitioner's motion forsummary judgment. Although there is no indication that the Town has filed a notice of violationagainst petitioner or otherwise cited it for any zoning violations, its failure to do so under thesecircumstances should not be dispositive, particularly since many evidentiary details concerning[*5]petitioner's use of the property were not revealed until afterits application for an exemption was denied and this proceeding was commenced. Moreover,petitioner should not be permitted to avoid being found in violation of the zoningordinance—and thereby qualify for an RPTL 420-a tax exemption—by simplyrefusing to file an application for a special use permit after being requested to do so by the Town(see Matter of Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 266 AD2d at 287). It issufficient that the Town took the affirmative steps to notify petitioner of its position and advisedpetitioner to file a special use permit application. While the majority correctly notes that thiswritten notification came well after the denial of petitioner's application for an exemption and, infact, after petitioner's summary judgment motion, we reiterate that it was only through thesubmissions proffered on the motion that the Town learned of many of the evidentiary detailsconcerning petitioner's use of the property.
Furthermore, that petitioner is, in fact, operating in violation of the zoning ordinance issupported by the evidence in the record; although petitioner is not using the premises as a churchin the traditional sense, it is difficult to see how it is not using the art studio/chapel as a "place ofworship" (see e.g. Matter of Committeeto Protect Overlook, Inc. v Town of Woodstock Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 24 AD3d 1103,1104 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 714 [2006]).[FN2]Although, as pointed out by the majority, this position conflicts with respondents' argument thatthe exemption must be denied because there is no structured religion being practiced atpetitioner's premises, there is nothing prohibiting respondents from asserting inconsistent oralternative arguments in response to the petition. In other words, respondents are permitted toargue that petitioner is not entitled to an exemption because it is not using the propertyexclusively for religious purposes or, in the alternative, because petitioner's use of theproperty—even if truly for exempt purposes—violates a zoning ordinance. Underthese circumstances, we would conclude that respondents' evidence suggesting that petitioner isusing its property in violation of the zoning code creates an issue of fact as to whether petitioneris entitled to the tax exemption, and would reverse that part of Supreme Court's order as grantedpetitioner's motion.
Garry, J., concurs. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: Contrary to the dissent'sposition, we note that Matter of Korean Joong Bu Presbyt. Church of N.Y. v IncorporatedVil. of Old Westbury (supra) and Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of MountPleasant (supra) are applicable here inasmuch as respondents rely on that line ofcases in asserting that petitioner's proposed use of the balance of the property—the 46acres not including the art studio—does not meet the requirement for an exemption forfuture use. Such an exemption may be obtained when an owner "in good faith contemplate[s]"improvements for exempt purposes (RPTL 420-a [3] [a]). While respondents assert that theexemption is inapplicable under Matter of Oxford Group-Moral Re-Armament, MRA, Inc. vAllen (supra) because petitioner might need a special use permit for its proposedfuture use of the property, the Court of Appeals has held that "Oxford provides nosupport for the proposition that nonprofit organizations must acquire or apply for special permitsto qualify for tax exemption on the basis of good faith" (Matter of Legion of Christ v Townof Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d at 412). Furthermore, we reject respondents' assertion thatpetitioner's plans for using the undeveloped portions of the property were not sufficiently"concrete and definite" (id. at 411 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Footnote 1: In its application for a realproperty tax exemption, petitioner indicated that the property was used for "days of[r]ecollection, [r]eligious [r]etreats, pilgrimages, shrines, [m]ass [and a]doration [b]enediction."Petitioner also stated that a chapel had recently been completed on the property, apparentlyreferring to the art studio. In addition, petitioner was erecting the stations of the cross on itsproperty to serve as a pilgrimage trail.
Footnote 2: The term "places of worship" isnot defined in the Town's zoning ordinance.