| Muse Collections, Inc. v Carissima Bijoux, Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06096 [86 AD3d 631] |
| July 26, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Muse Collections, Inc., Plaintiff, v Carissima Bijoux, Inc.,Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. MGM Mirage, Inc., et al., Third-PartyDefendants-Respondents, et al., Third-Party Defendant. |
—[*1] Cozen O'Connor, New York, N.Y. (Devindra R.T. Kissoon of counsel), for third-partydefendant-respondent MGM Mirage, Inc. Lawrence B. Goodman, New York, N.Y., for third-party defendant-respondent RichardLazarus, doing business as Jewelez & Dreams.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for unpaid commissions, the defendant/third-partyplaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, NassauCounty (Feinman, J.), entered November 22, 2010, as granted that branch of the cross motion ofthe third-party defendant Richard Lazarus, doing business as Jewelez & Dreams, which waspursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against itfor lack of personal jurisdiction, and granted that branch of the cross motion of the third-partydefendants MGM Mirage, Inc., and Rachel Meyers which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) todismiss the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against the third-party defendant MGMMirage, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
Personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant can be conferred under CPLR 302 (a) (1)"even where that defendant has never physically entered the state, 'so long as the defendant'sactivities [in New York] were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between thetransaction and the claim asserted' " (Kaprall v WE: Women's Entertainment, LLC, 74 AD3d 1151, 1153[2010] [citation omitted], quoting Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467[1988]). Here, however, the Supreme Court properly determined that the number, nature, andquality of the contacts with New York by the third-party defendants MGM Mirage, Inc.(hereinafter MGM), and Richard Lazarus, doing business as Jewelez & Dreams (hereinafterLazarus), do not evince purposeful activities by which they availed themselves of the benefitsand protections of New York law (seePaolucci v Kamas, 84 AD3d 766 [2011]; Grimaldi v Guinn, 72 AD3d 37, 51-52 [2010]; Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz,Inc., 34 AD3d 433, 434 [2006]; O'Brien v Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 305AD2d 199, 201 [2003]).[*2]
The Supreme Court also properly determined thatpersonal jurisdiction over the third-party defendants MGM and Lazarus was not conferredpursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) based upon alleged tortious activity occurring outside NewYork, causing injury within New York. In response to those branches of the third-partydefendants' respective cross motions which were to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack ofpersonal jurisdiction insofar as asserted against MGM and Lazarus, the defendant/third-partyplaintiff failed to establish that the alleged injuries occurred in New York, that MGM andLazarus expected or should reasonably have expected their allegedly tortious acts to haveconsequences in the state, or that either of them derived substantial revenue from interstate orinternational commerce (see Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592 [1997]; Paolucci v Kamas, 84 AD3d 766[2011]; Bill-Jay Mach. Tool Corp. vKoster Indus., Inc., 29 AD3d 504, 506 [2006]; CPLR 302 [a] [3] [i], [ii]; cf.LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 214 [2000]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Lazarus's cross motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the third-party complaint insofar as assertedagainst it for lack of personal jurisdiction and that branch of the separate cross motion of thethird-party defendants MGM and Rachel Meyers which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) todismiss the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against MGM for lack of personaljurisdiction.
In light of our determination, we need not address the parties' remaining contentions. Mastro,J.P., Chambers, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.