| Agli v O'Connor |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01417 [92 AD3d 815] |
| February 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Michael Agli, Appellant, v James T. O'Connor et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Christopher Simone and Lauren J.Daniels of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an orderof the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), entered February 17, 2011, whichgranted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and denied his crossmotion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and torestore the action to the trial calendar.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A case in the Supreme Court marked off or struck from the trial calendar and not restoredwithin one year thereafter shall be deemed abandoned and shall be dismissed for neglect toprosecute (see CPLR 3404). Here, it is undisputed that the case was marked off the trialcalendar and not restored within one year thereafter (id.). A plaintiff seeking to restore acase to the trial calendar more than one year after it has been marked off must demonstrate theexistence of a potentially meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay inprosecuting the action, a lack of intent to abandon the action, and a lack of prejudice to thedefendant (see Vidal v Ricciardi, 81AD3d 635 [2011]; Nasuro v PIAssoc., LLC, 78 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2010]; Mooney v City of New York, 78 AD3d 795, 796 [2010]). All fourcomponents of the test must be satisfied before the dismissal can be properly vacated and theaction restored (see Vidal vRicciardi, 81 AD3d 635 [2011]; Nasuro v PI Assoc., LLC, 78 AD3d at 1031; Vaream v Corines, 78 AD3d 933[2010]).
Here, the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. The plaintiff's unsubstantiated contentionsregarding outstanding discovery did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the 18-month delay inprosecuting the action (see Vidal vRicciardi, 81 AD3d 635 [2011]; M. Parisi & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v Long Is. Obs/Gyn, P.C., 39 AD3d819, 820 [2007]; Jeffs v Janessa, Inc., 226 AD2d 504, 505 [1996]). Furthermore, theplaintiff engaged only in minimal activity regarding the case during the 18 months that elapsedfrom the date it was marked off the trial calendar to the date of his motion to restore. This limitedactivity was insufficient to rebut the presumption of abandonment that attached after the case wasautomatically dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404 (see Okun v Tanners, 11 NY3d 762, 763 [2008]; Mooney v Cityof New York, 78 AD3d at 796; Gajek v Hampton Bays Volunteer Ambulance Corps., Inc., 77 AD3d885, 886 [2010]; Castillo v City ofNew York, 6 AD3d 568, 569 [2004]). Moreover, since [*2]almost seven years elapsed between the date this action accrued andthe date of the plaintiff's motion to restore, the defendants would be prejudiced if the action wererestored to the trial calendar (see Gajek v Hampton Bays Volunteer Ambulance Corps.,Inc., 77 AD3d at 886; Kalyuskin v Rudisel, 306 AD2d 246, 247 [2003];McCarthy v Bagner, 271 AD2d 509, 510 [2000]). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 andproperly denied the plaintiff's cross motion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of theaction pursuant to CPLR 3404 and to restore the action to the trial calendar. Eng, J.P., Chambers,Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.