| Matter of Jesus S. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01413 [104 AD3d 694] |
| March 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Jesus S., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo andElizabeth I. Freedman of counsel; Daniel H. Fishman on the brief), forrespondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Jesus S.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Olshansky, J.),dated April 30, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated March 22,2012, made upon his admission, finding that he had committed acts which, if committedby an adult, would have constituted the crime of assault in the third degree, adjudged himto be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation under the supervision of theProbation Department of the County of Kings for a period of 12 months.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding (see Family Ct Act § 141; Matter of Tafari M., 90 AD3d1052, 1053 [2011]; Matterof Cooper C., 81 AD3d 643, 644 [2011]; Matter of Gustav D., 79 AD3d 868, 869 [2010]), and itsdetermination is accorded great deference (see Matter of Donovan E., 92 AD3d 881, 882 [2012]).Here, contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and placing him on probation for aperiod of 12 months instead of directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal(see Family Ct Act § 315.3; Matter of Natasha G., 91 AD3d 948, 949 [2012]). Theappellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merelybecause this was his first encounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigatingcircumstances that he cites (seeMatter of Ashanti D., 100 AD3d 886 [2012]; Matter of Natasha G., 91AD3d at 949; Matter of Tafari M., 90 AD3d at 1053). The record establishes thatthe imposition of probation was the least restrictive alternative consistent with theappellant's best interests and the need for protection of the community (seeFamily Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]), particularly in light of, among other factors, theseriousness of the offense and the recommendation made in the probation report (seeMatter of Cooper C., 81 AD3d at 644; Matter of Gustav D., 79 AD3d at869). Eng, P.J., Rivera, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.