| Garcia v Garcia |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01802 [104 AD3d 806] |
| March 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Alba Garcia, Respondent, v Israel Garcia,Appellant. |
—[*1] Parola & Gross, LLP, Wantagh, N.Y. (Barry J. Gross of counsel), forrespondent.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated May19, 2008, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(McNulty, J.), dated August 1, 2011, which denied, without prejudice, his motion for adownward modification or suspension of his maintenance obligation set forth in astipulation of settlement dated October 2, 2007, which was incorporated but not mergedinto the judgment of divorce, and granted the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to enter amoney judgment against him in the principal sum of $32,599.04, representing arrears inmaintenance and health insurance payments, and for an award of an attorney's fee in thesum of $6,545.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A party seeking to modify a maintenance award must include, in his or her movingpapers, a sworn statement of net worth (see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2]). Theproper course where a party fails to include the required statement of net worth is "todecline to hear the motion . . . or to deny it without prejudice to renewalupon compliance with the applicable requirements" (Matter of Fischer-Holland v Walker, 12 AD3d 671, 672[2004]; see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2], [5] [ii]). Contrary to the defendant'scontention, there was no language in the stipulation of settlement exempting the partiesfrom that requirement. As the defendant failed to provide a statement of net worth insupport of his motion for a downward modification of his maintenance obligationpursuant to the stipulation, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion indenying the motion without a hearing (see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2], [5] [ii]; cf. Bertone v Bertone, 15AD3d 326 [2005]; Matter of Fischer-Holland v Walker, 12 AD3d at 672).
The defendant does not dispute the amount of arrears allegedly owed, but arguesonly that he cannot afford to pay that amount or, indeed, any amount. However, insteadof seeking to modify the maintenance obligation when his employment was terminated inJanuary 2010, the defendant waited until March 1, 2011, to file his motion for adownward modification. Since, during the period from the termination of the defendant'semployment until his filing of the deficient motion, the defendant improperly resorted tothe "self-help" measure of unilaterally ceasing payment of maintenance and healthinsurance costs, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff was entitled toarrears in the principal sum of $32,599.04 for the period from March 1, 2009, until [*2]the filing of the cross motion on April 21, 2011 (see Pollack v Pollack, 3 AD3d482, 483-484 [2004]; Matter of Gleason v Gleason, 247 AD2d 384, 385[1998]; Theodoreu v Theodoreu, 225 AD2d 686, 687 [1996]).
The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's cross motionwhich was for an award of an attorney's fee, as the plaintiff was entitled to such an awardpursuant to the default provision in the parties' stipulation of settlement (see Martin v Martin, 92 AD3d646 [2012]; Szekely vSzekely, 73 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2010]; Rawlings v Rawlings, 50 AD3d 998, 999 [2008]; Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d552, 554 [2004]). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiff wasnot required to provide proof regarding the parties' relative financial circumstances, asthe stipulation of settlement entitled her to attorney's fees, "without regard to thewillfulness of the defaulting party or the means of the nondefaulting party" (Matter of Milark v Meigher,56 AD3d 1018, 1021 [2008]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Angiolillo,Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.