| Matter of Jalen G. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01830 [104 AD3d 853] |
| March 20, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Jalen G., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Linda D. Fakhoury, County Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Jalen G.appeals from (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, DutchessCounty (Posner, J.), dated March 20, 2012, which, upon her admission, found that sheviolated the terms and conditions of probation previously imposed by the same court inan order of disposition dated May 18, 2010, placing her on probation, vacated the priororder of disposition dated May 18, 2010, and thereupon, placed her in the custody of theDutchess County Department of Social Services for a period of up to 12 months, and (2)an order of the same court, also dated March 20, 2012, which remanded her to anonsecure detention facility.
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition, and the order of detention, areaffirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the Presentment Agency's contentions, the instant appeal has not beenrendered academic by the appellant's consent to a modification of the order offact-finding and disposition, upon the Presentment Agency's motion, to change theagency with which the appellant was placed from the Dutchess County Department ofSocial Services (hereinafter DSS) to the New York Office of Child and Family Services.The appellant consented only to the change of placement agency, not to placement itself.Thus, her arguments regarding the appropriateness of her placement remain viable(see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]).
The appellant challenges the propriety of the Family Court's determination to placeher with the DSS for a period of up to 12 months, which was contrary to therecommendation of her probation officer that she be continued on probation in thecommunity. The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriatedisposition in a juvenile delinquency case (see Matter of Antoine H., 81 AD3d 646 [2011]; Matter of Gustav D., 79 AD3d868, 869 [2010]; Matter ofAbel R., 77 AD3d 758, 759 [2010]; Matter of Aaron P., 72 AD3d 826, 827 [2010]). Here, theFamily Court providently exercised its discretion in placing the appellant in the custodyof the DSS for a period of up to 12 months, and in remanding the appellant to anonsecure detention facility. Under the circumstances of this case, the disposition was theleast restrictive alternative consistent with the best interests of the appellant and theneeds of the community in light of, inter alia, the seriousness of the offense, theappellant's poor [*2]school attendance, and her repeatedviolations of the terms and conditions of probation (see Family Ct Act §352.2 [2] [a]; Matter ofDonovan E., 92 AD3d 881, 882 [2012]; Matter of Gabriel C., 90 AD3d 752, 753 [2011]; Matter of Leonard J., 67 AD3d911, 912 [2009]). Despite the appellant's contentions to the contrary, "[t]he FamilyCourt is not bound to follow any recommendations submitted for its consideration" andmay make its own determination based upon the materials and evidence before it (Matter of Erika R., 55 AD3d740, 740 [2008]; see Matterof Calvin L., 83 AD3d 842, 843 [2011]). Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal andHall, JJ., concur.