| Cajas-Romero v Ward |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 03446 [106 AD3d 850] |
| May 15, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Mario F. Cajas-Romero et al., Appellants, v IrvingK. Ward, Respondent. |
—[*1] Picciano & Scahill, P.C., Westbury, N.Y. (Francis J. Scahill and Andrea E. Ferrucciof counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.), dated October 11, 2011,which denied their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, withoutprejudice to renewal after the completion of discovery.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs' motionfor summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.
The plaintiffs allegedly were injured when the defendant's motor vehicle collidedwith the rear of their motor vehicle at the intersection of Jamaica Avenue and 186thStreet in Queens. After joinder of issue, but before depositions were conducted, theplaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Courtdenied the motion, without prejudice to renewal after the completion of discovery.
A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from behind is required tomaintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions toavoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; Ortiz v Hub Truck RentalCorp., 82 AD3d 725 [2011]; Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 AD3d 672 [2010]). Drivershave a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under thecircumstances to avoid an accident (see Filippazzo v Santiago, 277 AD2d 419[2000]; Johnson v Phillips, 261 AD2d 269 [1999]).
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie caseof negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring thatoperator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation forthe collision (see Tutrani vCounty of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Parra v Hughes, 79 AD3d1113, 1114 [2010]; DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp., 75 AD3d 489,490 [2010]; Volpe vLimoncelli, 74 AD3d 795 [2010]; Staton v Ilic, 69 AD3d 606 [2010]; Lampkin v Chan, 68 AD3d727 [2009]). A trailing driver's conduct in failing to leave reasonable distancecreates the possibility that a sudden stop will be necessary (see Lowhar-Lewis v MetropolitanTransp. Auth., 97 AD3d 728 [2012]; Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d 471[1999]; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 [*2]AD2d 570[1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
In support of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, theplaintiffs submitted their respective affidavits in which they averred that their vehiclewas stopped at a red light at the aforementioned intersection when it was struck in therear by the defendant's vehicle. These affidavits were sufficient to establish the plaintiffs'prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Ramos v TC Paratransit,96 AD3d 924 [2012]; Napolitano v Galletta, 85 AD3d 881 [2011]; Kastritsios v Marcello, 84AD3d 1174 [2011]).
The defendant, relying on his affidavit in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue offact. The defendant averred that he came to a complete stop behind the plaintiffs' vehicleat the red light. When the light turned green in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant,the plaintiffs' vehicle moved forward into the intersection and the defendant followedbehind it, at approximately five miles per hour. The defendant averred that a third vehicle"cut off" the plaintiffs' vehicle, causing the plaintiffs' vehicle to stop short. The defendantadmittedly was unable to stop in time, and his vehicle struck the rear of the plaintiffs'vehicle. Although the defendant's version of the events leading to the subject rear-endcollision differed from the plaintiffs' version of events, the defendant's version of events,even if accepted as true, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of anonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision. The fact that the defendant wastraveling extremely close behind the plaintiffs' vehicle without leaving a reasonabledistance created the possibility that a sudden stop would be necessary, and, by his ownadmission, the defendant clearly breached his duty to maintain a reasonably safe distancefrom the plaintiffs' vehicle, which he was following (see Ayach v Ghazal, 25 AD3d 742 [2006]; Pappas vOpitz, 262 AD2d 471 [1999]).
The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs' motion was premature. Aparty who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required todemonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or the facts essential to justifyopposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of themovant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d703 [2012]; Dietrich vGrandsire, 83 AD3d 994 [2011]; Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). Thedefendant's contention that the plaintiffs' motion was premature because the plaintiffshad not yet been deposed at the time the plaintiffs' motion was filed did not establishwhat information the defendant hoped to discover at the plaintiffs' depositions that wouldrelieve him of liability in this case. "The mere hope or speculation that evidencesufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during thediscovery process is insufficient to deny the motion" (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs' motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability. Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Austin andHinds-Radix, JJ., concur.