Matter of Chynn v DeChance
2013 NY Slip Op 06861 [110 AD3d 993]
October 23, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 27, 2013


In the Matter of Emil William Chynn,Appellant,
v
Paul M. DeChance et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Richard I. Scheyer, Nesconset, N.Y., for appellant.

Robert F. Quinlan, Town Attorney, Farmingville, N.Y. (Daniel Belano of counsel),for respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, in effect, to review a determination ofthe Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Brookhaven dated April 6, 2011, whichdenied the petitioner's application for an area variance for a second-story deck extensionand to relocate a staircase, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court,Suffolk County (Baisley, Jr., J.), dated May 15, 2012, which denied the petition anddismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

In October 2010 the petitioner applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Townof Brookhaven (hereinafter the Zoning Board) for, inter alia, an area variance for asecond-story deck extension and to relocate a staircase to accommodate the deckextension. On April 6, 2011, the Zoning Board, among other things, denied theapplication for an area variance for the deck extension and to relocate the staircase. InMay 2011, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, ineffect, to review the Zoning Board's determination denying the application for the areavariance and to relocate the staircase. In a judgment dated May 15, 2012, the SupremeCourt denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

"Local zoning boards have broad discretion in considering applications for variances,and judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board wasillegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Matejko v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town ofBrookhaven, 77 AD3d 949, 949 [2010]). "Accordingly, on judicial review, thedetermination of a zoning board should be sustained if it is not illegal, has a rationalbasis, and is not arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Pinnetti v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of MountKisco, 101 AD3d 1124, 1125-1126 [2012]; see Matter of Sasso vOsgood, 86 NY2d 374, 384 [1995]).

"Pursuant to Town Law § 267-b (3), in determining whether to grant anapplication for an area variance, a town's zoning board must weigh the benefit to theapplicant against the detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood orcommunity if the variance is [*2]granted" (Matter of Davydov vMammina, 97 AD3d 678, 679 [2012]). A zoning board must also consider "(1)whether an undesirable change will be produced in the character of the neighborhood ora detriment to nearby properties will be created by the granting of the area variance; (2)whether the benefit sought by the applicant can be achieved by some method, feasible forthe applicant to pursue, other than an area variance; (3) whether the requested areavariance is substantial; (4) whether the proposed variance will have an adverse effect orimpact on the physical or environmental conditions in the neighborhood or district; and(5) whether the alleged difficulty was self-created" (Town Law § 267-b [3] [b]).

Here, the denial of the application for an area variance for a second-story deckextension and to relocate a staircase was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse ofdiscretion in light of, inter alia, the findings by the Zoning Board, based on the record,that granting the application would result in a detriment to a neighboring property owner,that the requested variance was substantial, and that the petitioner's claimed hardship wasself-created (see Matter of Davydov v Mammina, 97 AD3d at 679; Matter of Fagan v Colson, 49AD3d 877 [2008]).

Further, although "[a] determination of a zoning board of appeals that ' "neitheradheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reason for reaching a different resulton essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious" ' " (Matter of Campo GrandchildrenTrust v Colson, 39 AD3d 746, 746 [2007], quoting Knight v Amelkin,68 NY2d 975, 977 [1986], quoting Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv.[Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 517 [1985]), the Zoning Board reasonably determined thatthe circumstances of various prior variances it had granted were distinguishable fromthose of the instant application and, thus, the Zoning Board was not bound by its earlierdeterminations (see Matter of194 Main, Inc. v Board of Zoning Appeals for Town of N. Hempstead, 71 AD3d1028, 1030 [2010]; Matterof Conversions for Real Estate, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Roslyn,31 AD3d 635 [2006]).

The petitioner's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly beforethis Court.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Miller, JJ., concur.


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