| Matter of Town of Woodbury v County of Orange |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01330 [114 AD3d 951] |
| February 26, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Town of Woodbury et al.,Respondents-Appellants, et al., Petitioner/Plaintiff-Respondent, v County ofOrange et al., Respondents, and Village of Kiryas Joel,Appellant-Respondent. |
—[*1] David K. Gordon and James B. Bacon, New Paltz, N.Y., forpetitioners/plaintiffs-respondents-appellants. David L. Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Matthew J. Nothnagle ofcounsel), for respondents/defendants-respondents County of Orange, Orange CountyLegislature, and Orange County Sewer District Number 1. Norton & Christensen, Goshen, N.Y. (Henry N. Christensen, Jr., of counsel), forrespondent/defendant-respondent Village of Chester.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review (a) a determination ofthe Orange County Legislature dated February 4, 2010, accepting an amended finalenvironmental impact statement and adopting an amended findings statement in relationto a proposed sale of wastewater treatment capacity, and (b) the alleged failure of theCounty of Orange to comply with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art8) in executing an agreement dated February 19, 2010, between the County of Orangeand Orange County Sewer District No. 1, and action for a judgment declaring theFebruary 19, 2010, agreement void, the Village of Kiryas Joel appeals, as limited by itsbrief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, OrangeCounty (Nicolai, J.), dated May 2, 2012, as granted that branch of the amendedpetition/complaint which was to annul the agreement dated February 19, 2010, and thepetitioners/plaintiffs Town of Woodbury and Village of Harriman cross-appeal, aslimited by their brief, from so much of the same order and judgment as (1) denied thosebranches of the amended petition/complaint which were to annul the determination datedFebruary 4, 2010, and (2) dismissed the sixth cause of action of the amendedpetition/complaint as moot.
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting theprovision thereof granting that branch of the amended petition/complaint which was toannul the agreement dated February 19, 2010, and substituting therefor a provisiondenying that branch of the [*2]amendedpetition/complaint, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof dismissing the sixth cause ofaction of the amended petition/complaint as moot; as so modified, the order andjudgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costspayable to the Village of Kiryas Joel by the petitioners/plaintiffs, the sixth cause of actionof the amended petition/complaint is reinstated and severed, and the matter is remitted tothe Supreme Court, Orange County, for further proceedings on that cause of action.
The Harriman Wastewater Treatment Plant (hereinafter the HWWTP) is located inthe Village of Harriman and the Town of Woodbury. The HWWTP serves OrangeCounty Sewer District No. 1 (hereinafter the District) and portions of neighboringcommunities known collectively as the Moodna Communities. The HWWTP wasoriginally constructed in 1974 with 2 million gallons per day (hereinafter mgd) oftreatment capacity. It was thereafter expanded to 6 mgd, the last expansion made in 2006.The 2006 expansion was the subject of review pursuant to the State EnvironmentalQuality Review Act (ECL art 8; hereinafter SEQRA), by the Orange County Legislature(hereinafter the Legislature) as lead agency, which accepted and adopted a finalenvironmental impact statement (hereinafter FEIS) and findings statement for theexpansion in 2001.
By letter dated January 8, 2007, Orange County (hereinafter the County) inquired ofthe Moodna Communities whether they were interested in purchasing expanded capacityat the HWWTP pursuant to their proportionate allocations listed in a 1978 intermunicipalagreement. The Village of Kiryas Joel (hereinafter Kiryas Joel), which is one of thecommunities within the District, commenced a hybrid proceeding and action seeking toenjoin the County from entering into a contract of sale of capacity to the MoodnaCommunities, contending that the County had failed to determine that adequate capacityexisted for communities within the District. The Supreme Court agreed and enjoined theCounty from selling such capacity without first complying with SEQRA, among otherrequirements.
While the County's appeal from that determination was pending, the County andKiryas Joel entered into a memorandum of understanding to settle that litigation andanother pending litigation in which the County had challenged Kiryas Joel's SEQRAreview of a pipeline project. As part of the global settlement, Kiryas Joel drafted furtherreports related to its pipeline SEQRA review. The County conducted a populationgrowth study to analyze the treatment capacity needs of the District, and amended its2001 FEIS to incorporate its conclusions. The Legislature accepted and adopted theamended FEIS and an amended findings statement on February 4, 2010.
The County and the District entered into an agreement dated February 19, 2010(hereinafter the District Agreement), whereby they agreed to initiate specified planningprocedures for a further expansion of District capacity upon the flow of the HWWTP andany other District facilities reaching 85% of design capacity. The County and the Districtagreed, among other things, to a timetable within which to file preliminary maps andplans for a proposed expansion with the Clerk of the Legislature, together with requeststo the Legislature to set a date for a public hearing pursuant to County Law § 268and for a resolution approving the expansion. The pending proceedings were thendiscontinued, and the Supreme Court's injunction vacated.
The Town of Woodbury, Village of Woodbury, and Village of Harriman (hereinaftercollectively the petitioners) subsequently commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78 to review the Legislature's approval of the amended FEIS and amendedfindings statement and the County's alleged failure to comply with SEQRA in executingthe District Agreement, and action for a judgment declaring the District Agreement void,inter alia, due to alleged violations of SEQRA and breaches of a 1995 inter-municipalagreement. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the amended petition/complaintwhich was to annul the District Agreement, denied those branches of the amendedpetition/complaint which were to annul the Legislature's approval of the amended FEISand amended findings statement, and dismissed the remaining causes of action and across claim by the Village of Chester as moot. Kiryas Joel appeals, and the petitionersVillage of Harriman and Town of Woodbury cross-appeal.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioners established "a [*3]demonstrated interest in the potential environmentalimpacts of the project" (Matterof Town of Babylon v New York State Dept. of Transp., 33 AD3d 617, 618-619[2006]) and, thus, had standing to challenge the amended FEIS, amended findingsstatement, and District Agreement (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County ofSuffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 774 [1991]; Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45AD3d 74, 86-87 [2007]).
Further, the Supreme Court properly upheld the amended FEIS and amendedfindings statement against the petitioners' procedural SEQRA challenges. TheLegislature's determination to accept the amended documents in lieu of requiringpreparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement was not arbitrary andcapricious (see 6 NYCRR 617.9 [a] [7] [i]; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town ofSoutheast, 9 NY3d 219, 231, 235 [2007]; Matter of Muir v Town of Newburgh Planning Bd., 49 AD3d742 [2008]; see also 6 NYCRR 617.3 [h]), and the petitioners' furtherprocedural challenges are without merit (see 6 NYCRR 617.11 [a]; 617.12 [b];617.2 [n]; Matter of East EndProp. Co. #1, LLC v Kessel, 46 AD3d 817, 820 [2007]).
However, the Supreme Court erred in annulling the District Agreement for purportedviolations of SEQRA. "Although a SEQRA review is required for any 'action' taken byan agency (6 NYCRR 617.3 [a]), preliminary steps in the planning of a project do notconstitute such an action unless they 'commit the agency to a definite course of futuredecisions' " (Matter ofPalczynski v County of Herkimer, 55 AD3d 1242, 1243 [2008], quoting 6NYCRR 617.2 [b] [2]; seeMatter of East End Prop. Co. #1, LLC v Kessel, 46 AD3d 817, 821 [2007]).Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the District Agreement did not commit to anexpansion of the HWWTP or other District facilities. The Legislature is the only entitywith the authority to commit to an expansion of wastewater treatment facilities, followingpublic hearing and appropriate environmental review (see County Law §268). The District Agreement merely commits the County Executive and/or theAdministrative Head of the District to seek such approval from the Legislature in aspecified time frame and with specified procedures. Accordingly, the District Agreementdid not constitute an "action" pursuant to SEQRA requiring prior environmental review(6 NYCRR 617.2 [b] [2]; seeMatter of Palczynski v County of Herkimer, 55 AD3d 1242 [2008]; HudsonRiv. Sloop Clearwater v Cuomo, 222 AD2d 386 [1995]).
While the petitioners further challenge the provisions of the District Agreementproviding for the timing of a contemplated SEQRA review of any expansion, it would bepremature to review the Legislature's future approval of any expansion pursuant toCounty Law § 268 for its compliance with SEQRA.
Upon annulling the District Agreement, the Supreme Court dismissed, as moot, thesixth cause of action seeking a judgment declaring the District Agreement void on theground that it breached a 1995 intermunicipal agreement. In light of our determination,that cause of action is no longer academic. However, in the absence of a dispositivemotion addressed to that cause of action seeking declaratory relief, that cause of actionmay not be summarily determined (see Matter of Lake St. Granite Quarry, Inc. v Town/Village ofHarrison, 106 AD3d 918 [2013]; Matter of Rosenberg v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation, &Historic Preserv., 94 AD3d 1006 [2012]). We therefore reinstate the sixth causeof action, sever it, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.
The remaining contentions of the County, Legislature, and District are without merit.Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Cohen, JJ., concur.