| Matter of Kondylis v Alatis Interiors Co., Ltd. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02478 [116 AD3d 1184] |
| April 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Gregory Kondylis,Appellant, v Alatis Interiors Company, Ltd., et al., Respondents. Workers'Compensation Board, Respondent. |
—[*1] William O'Brien, State Insurance Fund, Endicott (Charles L. Browning of counsel),for Alatis Interiors Company, Ltd. and another, respondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed May30, 2012, which ruled that claimant was not entitled to a schedule loss of use award.
Claimant, a painter, was injured in June 2008 while lifting a heavy object, and hisresulting claim for workers' compensation benefits initially was established for injuries tohis back and left knee. A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ)awarded benefits, which continued until claimant's death from unrelated causes in July2009. Thereafter, claimant's attorney sought to amend the claim for injuries to claimant'sneck and right shoulder and, in connection therewith, submitted a report from claimant'streating physician, Emmanuel Lambrakis, indicating that claimant had sustained a 60%schedule loss of use of both his right shoulder and left knee.
In March 2010, the WCLJ, among other things, granted a posthumous schedule lossof use award to claimant's widow based upon Lambrakis's report. Upon the workers'compensation carrier's appeal, the Workers' Compensation Board rescinded the awardwithout prejudice and [*2]directed Lambrakis to appearat the deposition for the purpose of being cross-examined by the carrier. When the carrierfailed to pursue the deposition, the WCLJ deemed the carrier's rights in this regard to bewaived and reinstated the schedule loss of use award. The carrier appealed the WCLJ'sdecision, contending that such award was not supported by substantial evidence. TheBoard agreed, finding, among other things, that the report submitted by Lambrakis failedto "identify any specific guidelines or any specific findings on clinical evaluation" tosupport the schedule loss of use award. This appeal by claimant ensued.[FN*]
We affirm. "Whether a condition warrants a schedule loss award or an award ofcontinuing disability benefits is a question of fact for resolution by the Board, and itsdetermination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Haight v ConEdison, 78 AD3d 1468, 1468 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 708 [2011][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of DeGennaro v Island Fire Sprinkler, Inc., 85AD3d 1513, 1514 [2011]; see Matter of Jweid v Vicks Lithograph & Print., 25 AD3d930, 930 [2006]; Matter of Dillabough v Jaquith Indus., 305 AD2d 884, 885[2003]). Generally speaking, "[w]here there is no continuing need for medical treatmentand the medical condition is essentially stable, a schedule loss of use award isappropriate" (Matter of Jweid v Vicks Lithograph & Print., 25 AD3d at 931; see Matter of Grugan vRecord, 84 AD3d 1648, 1649 [2011]; Employer: MVP Delivery & LogisticsInc., 2012 WL 3237998, *2-4, 2012 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 11699, *5-11 [WCBNo. 8050 2891, Aug. 7, 2012]). Conversely, "[a]n award of continuing disabilitybenefits, rather than one for a schedule loss of use, is appropriate [w]here there is acontinuing condition of pain or continuing need for medical treatment or the medicalcondition remains unsettled" (Matter of Haight v Con Edison, 78 AD3d at1468-1469 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Dillaboughv Jaquith Indus., 305 AD2d at 884-885).
Here, claimant's own medical records reflect that he continued to report "severe pain"in his left knee as of March 2009 and was continuing to receive physical therapy as ofApril 2009 for his "temporary" disability. Additionally, in his November 2009 report,Lambrakis—although concluding that claimant suffered a 60% schedule loss ofuse of his left knee and right shoulder—nonetheless indicated that if claimant "hadnot passed away[,] both the left knee and the right shoulder would have required surgicalintervention." Under these circumstances, the Board's finding that the medical evidencefell short of demonstrating that "claimant had reached maximum medical improvementand required no further treatment" is supported by substantial evidence; hence, aschedule loss of use award was not warranted.[*3]
Our conclusion in this regard is in no way alteredby the fact that the report issued by Lambrakis was the only medical opinion evidencebefore the Board. Indeed, this Court consistently has held that "[t]hough the Board maynot fashion its own expert medical opinions, it may reject medical evidence as incredibleor insufficient even where . . . no opposing medical proof is presented" (Matter of Jaquin v CommunityCovenant Church, 69 AD3d 998, 1000 [2010]; accord Matter of Eber v Jawanio,Inc., 85 AD3d 1520, 1521-1522 [2011]; see generally Matter of Bailey v Binghamton Precast & SupplyCorp., 103 AD3d 992, 994 [2013]). Here, as the Board aptly observed,Lambrakis's conclusion as to the propriety of a schedule loss of use award was stated inan entirely conclusory fashion, was not supported by "any specific clinical criteria" andwas made without reference to either the Board's own guidelines "or any specificfindings on clinical evaluation." We therefore discern no basis upon which to disturb theBoard's factual finding that there was insufficient medical evidence to support a scheduleloss of use award. Claimant's remaining arguments, to the extent not specificallyaddressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: The Board directed thata formal order of substitution be made by claimant's surviving spouse (see CPLR1015 [a]; 1021), but no such order appears in the record before us. Although the absenceof a proper legal representative ordinarily would leave this Court without jurisdiction toentertain the appeal (see Matterof Giaquinto v Commissioner of the N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 91 AD3d 1224,1225 n 1 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 861 [2013]), the carrier has not raised thisissue and, given that claimant's surviving spouse has actively participated in thisproceeding, we deem this jurisdictional impediment to be waived (see Bauernfeind vAlbany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 154 AD2d 754, 755 n 1 [1989]; compare Hemphill vRock, 87 AD2d 836, 836-837 [1982]).