| Matter of Russell F. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04484 [118 AD3d 874] |
| June 18, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Russell F., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgowof counsel; Rogan McCally on the brief) for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, RussellF. appeals from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Kings County (Olshansky,J.), dated April 24, 2013, made after a fact-finding hearing, finding that he committedacts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary inthe second degree, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifthdegree, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court dated July 19, 2013, which,upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him onprobation for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after ahearing, of that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to suppressidentification testimony.
Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements, as the fact-finding order was superseded by the order of disposition, andis brought up for review on the appeal from the order of disposition; and it isfurther,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the showup procedure by which thecomplainant identified him was reasonable under the circumstances, having beenconducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the incident (see People vDuuvon, 77 NY2d 541, 544 [1991]; Matter of Dashawn R., 114 AD3d 686 [2014]; People v Guitierres, 82 AD3d1116, 1117 [2011]; Matter of Kassan D., 282 AD2d 747 [2001]).Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue suggestiveness (see People v Guy, 47 AD3d643, 644 [2008]; Matter ofLouis C., 6 AD3d 430, 431 [2004]; People v Yearwood, 197 AD2d 554[1993]). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied suppression of the identificationtestimony.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter ofDavid H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), the evidence was legally sufficient to establishbeyond a reasonable doubt the appellant's identity and that he committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the seconddegree, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree(see People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990 [1993]; Matter of Uriah M., 107 AD3d997, 999 [2013]; Matter ofTrayvond W., 71 AD3d 683 [2010]; People v John, 51 AD3d 819, 819-820 [2008]). Moreover,upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the Family Court's[*2]determination was not against the weight of theevidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]). Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.