Deas v Ahmed
2014 NY Slip Op 05945 [120 AD3d 750]
August 27, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 24, 2014


[*1]
 Ned Deas, Respondent,
v
Chaudhary M.Ahmed, Appellant.

Nancy L. Isserlis, Long Island City, N.Y. (Lawrence R. Miles of counsel), forappellant.

Dinerman, Bergam & Dinerman, LLP (Barry M. Dinerman and Arnold E.DiJoseph, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Arnold E. DiJoseph III], of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated January 4, 2013,which denied his motion to change venue of the action from Kings County to NassauCounty.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action in Kings County. Thereafter, the defendantserved a timely demand for a change of venue, and subsequently moved in timely fashionto change venue from Kings County to Nassau County, where the defendant maintaineda residence. The defendant alleged that Kings County was not a proper venue becauseneither party resided there at the time of the commencement of the action. The SupremeCourt denied the defendant's motion to change venue. The defendant appeals.

CPLR 503 (a) provides, in relevant part, that "the place of trial shall be in the countyin which one of the parties resided when it was commenced." "For venue purposes, aresidence is where a party stays for some time with a bona fide intent to retain the placeas a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency" (Ellis v Wirshba, 18 AD3d805, 805 [2005]; see Forbesv Rubinovich, 94 AD3d 809, 810 [2012]; Furth v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 509, 510 [2004]).Residence means living in a particular place, while domicile means "living in that localitywith intent to make it a fixed and permanent home" (Matter of Newcomb, 192NY 238, 250 [1908]; see King vCar Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d 205, 210 [2006]; cf. Antone v General MotorsCorp., Buick Motor Div., 64 NY2d 20, 29-30 [1984]). In the context of determiningthe proper venue of an action, a party may have more than one residence (seeCPLR 503 [a]; King v Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d at 210).

In order to prevail on a motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (1) to change venue, adefendant must show that the plaintiff's choice of venue is improper, and also that thedefendant's choice of venue is proper (see CPLR 511 [b]; Gonzalez v Sun Moon Enters.Corp., 53 AD3d 526, 526 [2008]; see also Lopez v K Angle K, Inc., 24 AD3d 422, 423[2005]). To succeed on his motion here, the defendant was obligated to demonstrate that,on the date that this action was commenced, neither of the parties resided in KingsCounty (see Chehab v Roitman, 120 AD3d 736 [2014] [decided herewith]; Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62 AD3d 773[2009]; Baez v Marcus, 58AD3d 585, 586 [2009]; Corea v Browne, 45 [*2]AD3d 623, 624 [2007]; see also Clarke v Ahern Prod.Servs., 181 AD2d 514, 515 [1992]). Only if the defendant made such a showingwould the plaintiff have been required to establish, in opposition, that the venue that heselected was proper (see Chehab v Roitman, 120 AD3d 736 [2014] [decided herewith]; Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797 [1999]).

Here, the sole piece of evidence that the defendant submitted with respect to theplaintiff's residence was the police accident report referable to the subject accident. Thisevidence merely showed that, when the accident occurred, the plaintiff maintained aresidence in New York County. However, this evidence failed to demonstrate that theplaintiff did not maintain a residence in Kings County at the time the action wascommenced, more than two years after the accident (see Chehab v Roitman, 120AD3d 736 [2014] [decided herewith]; Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62AD3d at 773; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d at 586; Corea v Browne, 45AD3d at 624; see also Fiallos vNew York Univ. Hosp., 85 AD3d 678, 678 [2011]; Clarke v Ahern Prod.Servs., 181 AD2d at 515). Consequently, the defendant failed to meet his initialburden.

Although a plaintiff may choose venue based solely on a defendant's address, as setforth in a police accident report (see Gonzalez v Weiss, 38 AD3d 492, 493 [2007]; Furthv ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d at 510), a police accident report referable to the subjectaccident, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, on the date thatan action is commenced, a plaintiff does not reside in the county where he or she elects toplace the venue of trial (see Chehab v Roitman, 120 AD3d 736 [2014] [decided herewith]). To the extent that this Court's decisions in Samuel vGreen (276 AD2d 687 [2000]) and Senzon v Uveges (265 AD2d 476 [1999])may be read to indicate the contrary, they should not be followed.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to changevenue of the action from Kings County to Nassau County. Skelos, J.P., Lott, Roman andMiller, JJ., concur.


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