| People v Hoffmann |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 08352 [122 AD3d 945] |
| November 26, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Richard Hoffmann, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Patricia Pazner of counsel), for appellant, andappellant pro se.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Laura T. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Lewis, J.), rendered December 14, 2011, convicting him of driving while intoxicated inviolation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying defensecounsel's challenge for cause to a prospective juror is only partially preserved forappellate review, as defense counsel failed to challenge the prospective juror on one ofthe specific grounds asserted on appeal (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Campbell, 111 AD3d760, 760 [2013]). In any event, the contention is without merit. A prospective jurormay be challenged for cause on the ground that "[h]e [or she] has a state of mind that islikely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon theevidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]). "[A] prospective juror whosestatements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excusedunless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair andimpartial" (People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]; see People vArnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001]). "Where a prospective juror offers suchassurances, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause if it determinesthat the juror's promise to be impartial is credible" (People v Johnson, 40 AD3d 1011, 1011-1012 [2007];see People v Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363). Here, although the prospective jurorinitially raised a concern regarding his ability to be impartial in a case involving analleged drunk driver, he provided multiple unequivocal assurances that he could renderan impartial verdict based solely on the evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause(see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d at 418-419; People v Williams, 107 AD3d746, 747 [2013]; People vHewitt, 95 AD3d 1358, 1359 [2012]).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court's instructions to the jury on theissue of reasonable doubt were constitutionally inadequate is unpreserved for appellatereview (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2009]). In any event,the defendant's contention is without merit because the instructions, on the whole,conveyed the correct standard to be employed by the jury (see People v Fields, 87NY2d 821, 823 [1995]; Peoplev Morris, 120 AD3d 835 [2014]; People v King, [*2]73 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2010]; People v Coles, 62AD3d at 1023).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplementalbrief, that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see Strickland vWashington, 466 US 668 [1984]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708,712-713 [1998]).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro sesupplemental brief, are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Miller and Duffy, JJ., concur.