Matter of Suffolk County Assn. of Mun. Empls., Inc. vLevy
2015 NY Slip Op 08181 [133 AD3d 676]
November 12, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 30, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Suffolk County Association ofMunicipal Employees, Inc., Appellant,
v
Steve Levy et al.,Respondents.

Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C, New York, N.Y. (Barry J. Peek, Hanan B.Kolko, and Max H. Sicherman of counsel), for appellant.

Lamb & Barnosky, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Richard K. Zuckerman and Matthew J.Mehnert of counsel), for respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, in effect, to review a determination ofAlan Schneider, Personnel Director for the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service,dated June 29, 2010, and in the nature of mandamus, inter alia, to compel therespondents to treat employees of Suffolk County Community College as employees ofSuffolk County for purposes of eligibility for promotions to positions with SuffolkCounty, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Asher, J.), dated July 9, 2013, which, upon, among other things, a decision of the samecourt dated March 28, 2013, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner is a labor union representing employees of Suffolk County. Some ofthe petitioner's members work at Suffolk County Community College (hereinafter theCollege). Prior to 2010, the petitioner's members, including those working at the College,had been considered County employees with the right to seek promotions to positionsinside and outside of the College pursuant to the Suffolk County Civil Service Rules. In2009, the County and the College entered into a Sponsor Service Agreement and aMemorandum of Understanding of Procedures (hereinafter together the New OperatingAgreement), which redefined the parameters of the relationship between the County andthe College. A provision of the New Operating Agreement provided that the College andthe County are independent entities and that neither entity's employees are to be deemedemployees of the other entity.

In early 2010, Alan Schneider, Personnel Director for the Suffolk CountyDepartment of Civil Service (hereinafter the County DCS), determined that Collegeemployees would no longer be eligible for promotions to County positions, and thatCounty employees would no longer be eligible for promotions to College positions. Thisdetermination was based upon his interpretation of the New Operating Agreement, bywhich he concluded that the College was to be considered a [*2]separate and distinct jurisdiction or municipality from theCounty for purposes of the Suffolk County Civil Service Rules. In a letter dated June 29,2010, Schneider denied the petitioner's request to rescind that determination. Thepetitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.

The agency determination under review was not made after a quasi-judicialevidentiary hearing. In this circumstance, "courts examine whether the action taken bythe agency has a rational basis and will overturn that action only where it is taken withoutsound basis in reason or regard to the facts, or where it is arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Halpert v Shah, 107AD3d 800, 801-802 [2013] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Wooley v New YorkState Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 280 [2010]; Matter of Peckham v Calogero,12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]). Moreover, a court "must defer to an administrativeagency's rational interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise" (Matterof Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d at 431). Here, the challenged determinationprecluding cross-promotions between positions with the College and positions with theCounty, which was based upon the conclusion that the College and the County areseparate jurisdictions or municipalities for purposes of the Suffolk County Civil ServiceRules, had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse ofdiscretion.

" 'The extraordinary remedy of mandamus is available in limitedcircumstances only to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act which does notinvolve the exercise of official discretion or judgment, and only when a clear legal rightto the relief has been demonstrated' " (Matter of Gonzalez v Village of Port Chester, 109 AD3d614, 615 [2013], quoting Matter of Rose Woods, LLC v Weisman, 85 AD3d 801,802 [2011]; see New York Civ.Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 184 [2005]; CPLR 7803[1]). "A discretionary act 'involve[s] the exercise of reasoned judgment which couldtypically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions directadherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result' " (NewYork Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d at 184, quoting Tango vTulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41 [1983]). Since the petitioner sought to compel conductclearly involving the application of the discretion and judgment of the County DCS, theremedy of mandamus is not available.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding.

The respondents' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of ourdetermination. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.


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