| People v Hamilton |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 08661 [133 AD3d 1090] |
| November 25, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vRoyal D. Hamilton, Appellant. |
Theresa M. Suozzi, Saratoga Springs, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Stuart M. Cohen, Special Prosecutor, Rensselaer, for respondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County(Scarano, J.), rendered November 8, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of thecrime of assault in the second degree.
Defendant was an inmate at the Saratoga County Correctional Facility and, onOctober 9, 2012, had gathered with others in his housing unit for lunch. The victim, alsoan inmate, worked as a kitchen aide and was delivering lunch to the unit. While thevictim was doing so, defendant abruptly rose from his seat and punched the victim in theface. Defendant was charged in an indictment with assault in the second degree as aresult of the attack and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. County Courtsentenced defendant, a second felony offender, to five years in prison to be followed byfive years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
"To prove that defendant committed the crime of assault in the second degree ascharged, the People were required to establish that, while incarcerated after having beencharged or convicted of a crime, defendant intentionally caused physical injury to anotherperson" (People v Hadfield,119 AD3d 1224, 1225 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1002 [2014]; seePenal Law § 120.05 [7]). The People were further obliged, givendefendant's invocation of the defense of justification, to show "beyond a reasonabledoubt that defendant's actions were unjustified" (People v Terk, 24 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2005]; seePenal Law §§ 25.00 [1]; 35.15 [1]). Defendant argues that the proof attrial did not establish that he intended to physically injure the victim and, moreover, wasinadequate to defeat his claim of self-defense. The latter contention, to the extent [*2]that it is styled as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of theevidence, is unpreserved for our review due to defendant's failure to advance itspecifically in his trial motion to dismiss (see People v Carncross, 14 NY3d 319, 324-325 [2010]; People v Briggs, 129 AD3d1201, 1202 [2015]). In any event, that claim will be assessed within the context ofour weight of the evidence review, which necessarily includes an assessment as towhether all elements of the charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial(see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]; People v Briggs, 129 AD3d at 1202).
An " '[intent to cause injury can be inferred from the circumstances' of analtercation, including the injuries inflicted" (People v Taylor, 118 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2014], lvdenied 23 NY3d 1043 [2014], quoting People v Newland, 83 AD3d 1202,1204 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 798 [2011]; see People v Terk, 24AD3d at 1039). Defendant and the victim gave differing accounts of their priorinteractions, but defendant was admittedly irked by the victim's prior refusal to give hima glass of milk. As for the attack itself, the victim testified, and a video of the incidentconfirmed, that defendant abruptly stood up and punched the victim in the face. Thevictim's nose was broken by the initial punch, and he sustained facial lacerations thatrequired multiple sutures to close. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable tothe People (see People vRamos, 19 NY3d 133, 136 [2012]), a rational trier of fact could readily find thatdefendant intended to injure the victim (see People v Taylor, 118 AD3d at 1045;People v Zindle, 48 AD3d971, 973 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 846 [2008]). The jury did make thatfinding over the conflicting testimony of defendant and, "[v]iewing the evidence in aneutral light and acknowledging that '[g]reat deference is accorded to the fact-finder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor,' "we conclude that its decision to do so was not against the weight of the evidence(People v Zindle, 48 AD3d at 973, quoting People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d490, 495 [1987]; see People v Hogencamp, 300 AD2d 734, 735 [2002]).
Use of physical force against a person is justified when a defendant "reasonablybelieves such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he orshe reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by suchother person" (Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; see People v McManus, 67NY2d 541, 545-546 [1986]). Defendant testified that he felt menaced by the victimbecause of prior interactions between them, and he acted in self-defense when the victimapproached him with what he believed to be ill intent. Those claims flew in the face oftestimony from the victim that he did not know defendant aside from the milk incidentand from correction officers who were unaware of any tension between the two, as wellas the video showing what can only be described as an unprovoked attack by defendant.The jury determined from the above evidence that defendant could not have reasonablybelieved that force was necessary to confront an imminent use of force by the victim, andthat finding was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Terk, 24AD3d at 1039-1040; People v Hogencamp, 300 AD2d at 735). Thus, we have noquarrel with the jury's verdict.
Defendant next contends that County Court erred in failing to dismiss the indictmentdue to a defect in the grand jury proceedings, namely, that the grand jury also heardevidence against defendant addressing an unrelated criminal transaction. "[T]he merepresentation to a single grand jury of evidence regarding two different alleged criminaltransactions—even though the offenses arising therefrom would not bejoinable—neither 'fails to conform to the requirements of [CPL article 190]' nordoes it, without more, present an impairment of the integrity of the grand jury which mayresult in prejudice to the defendant" so as to require dismissal (People v Nash, 64 AD3d878, 882 [2009], quoting CPL 210.35 [5]; see People v Nieves, 279 AD2d388, 388 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 804 [2001]). County Court determined afterinspecting the grand jury minutes—and our review confirms—that therewere no "improprieties in the manner in which the two alleged criminal transactions werepresented to the [*3]grand jury which may have impairedthe grand jury's integrity and prejudiced defendant" (People v Nash, 64 AD3d at882; see People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]).
County Court did err, however, in denying defendant's request to represent himself attrial. "A criminal defendant may be permitted to proceed pro se if the request is timelyand unequivocal, there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel,and defendant has not engaged in conduct that would interfere with a fair and orderlytrial" (People v Ryan, 82 NY2d 497, 507 [1993] [citation and italics omitted];see People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17 [1974]). Defendant here made a timelyrequest before the commencement of trial (see People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d at17), and the record is devoid of anything to suggest that he would act in a mannerinconsistent with an orderly trial (cf. People v Eady, 301 AD2d 965, 965-966[2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 538 [2003]). County Court then engaged in therequisite inquiry, examining defendant's "education, occupation, previous exposure tolegal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntarywaiver" (People v Smith, 92 NY2d 516, 520 [1998]; see People vCrampe, 17 NY3d 469, 481 [2011], cert denied 565 US —,132 S Ct 1746 [2012]). Defendant revealed that he had the equivalent of a high schooldiploma, was literate, had no history of mental illness and was not on any medication. Hefurther expressed a basic understanding of the concepts involved in a trial, such as thediffering roles of the judge and jury and the need to ask questions of witnesses in anappropriate and non-leading manner. He also, however, had no relevant work experienceand had never undergone the ordeal of a criminal trial. He admitted that he lackedknowledge of trial procedures and "may not understand" when good "legal reasons"existed for him to remain silent. He further professed a lack of understanding ofchallenges during jury selection.
No reason exists to doubt that defendant was competent to waive his right to counseland represent himself; significant reason exists to doubt his knowledge of trialprocedures. Allowing a defendant who is unfamiliar with the process to conduct his orher own trial undermines the "powerful ideal that our criminal justice system mustdetermine the truth or falsity of the charges in a manner consistent with fundamentalfairness" (People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d at 14). Nevertheless, the "right toself-representation embodies one of the most cherished ideals of our culture; the right ofan individual to determine his [or her] own destiny" (id.). The Court of Appealshas therefore "recognized that even in cases where the accused is harming himself [orherself] by insisting on conducting his [or her] own defense, respect for individualautonomy requires that he [or she] be allowed to go to jail under his [or her] own bannerif he [or she] so desires and if he [or she] makes the choice with eyes open" (Matter of Kathleen K. [StevenK.], 17 NY3d 380, 385 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];see People v Vivenzio, 62 NY2d 775, 776 [1984]). If a defendant is notdissuaded from representing himself or herself even after being warned "that his or herlack of knowledge, relative to that of a lawyer, will be detrimental," he or she must bepermitted to do so (People vSealy, 102 AD3d 591, 591 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1009 [2013][emphasis omitted]; see People v Crampe, 17 NY3d at 483; People vSmith, 92 NY2d at 520).
County Court here advised defendant that he "would have to try the whole case" onhis own, although he would be able to ask questions of standby counsel, and that therules would not be relaxed for defendant if he proceeded pro se. Defendant confirmedthat he was not bothered by his ignorance of rules associated with the essential parts of atrial, including those for the admission of evidence and the questioning of witnesses.Defendant stated that his sole interest was in telling his story in his own way, and hecontinued to seek to represent himself even after receiving commitments that he couldtestify on his own behalf if he was represented. County Court bluntly warned defendantthat "if you represent yourself on this, you're going to make a mess of it, and you're morelikely to be convicted," and defense counsel lamented that "it's a [*4]tragedy watching [defendant] drive the ship into the iceberghere." Defendant acknowledged those risks, but never wavered in his desire to proceedpro se, simply stating that "[i]f I lose, I lose. . . . I don't mind if I losebecause of my lack of knowledge." Inasmuch as the foregoing reflects that defendant wasmade "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel" and stilldesired to proceed pro se, County Court erred in denying his request to do so (People v Providence, 2 NY3d579, 582 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People vRyan, 82 NY2d 497, 507-508 [1993]; cf. People v Middlemiss, 125 AD3d 1065, 1067 [2015]).The refusal to grant a request under these circumstances is not subject to harmless erroranalysis (see People vLaValle, 3 NY3d 88, 106 [2004]), and, as such, we are constrained to reversethe judgment and remit for a new trial (see People v Tafari, 68 AD3d 1540, 1541-1542 [2009]; People v Williams, 27 AD3d770, 771-772 [2006]).
Defendant's remaining arguments, advanced by defense counsel and in asupplemental brief submitted by defendant pro se, are rendered academic in light of theforegoing.
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Saratoga County for anew trial.