Matter of DeFeo v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofBedford
2016 NY Slip Op 02082 [137 AD3d 1123]
March 23, 2016
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 27, 2016


[*1]
 In the Matter of Dino DeFeo,Respondent-Appellant,
v
Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Bedford et al.,Appellants-Respondents.

Keane & Beane, P.C., White Plains, NY (Joel H. Sachs of counsel), forappellants-respondents Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Bedford and PlanningBoard of Town of Bedford.

Young/Sommer LLC, Albany, NY (Joseph F. Castiglione of counsel), forappellants-respondents Splash Management Group, LLC, ONAB Corp., and 570 NorthBedford Road, LLC.

Banks Curran Schwam and Squirrell, LLP, Mount Kisco, NY (David J. Squirrell ofcounsel), for respondent-appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a resolution of the PlanningBoard of the Town of Bedford dated July 16, 2012, adopting a negative declarationunder the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act and a resolution of theZoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bedford dated December 20, 2012, which,after a hearing, granted the applications of Splash Management Group, LLC, ONABCorp., and 570 North Bedford Road, LLC, for use and area variances and a specialpermit, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bedford and the Planning Board ofthe Town of Bedford appeal, and Splash Management Group, LLC, ONAB Corp., and570 North Bedford Road, LLC, separately appeal, as limited by their respective briefs,from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Zambelli, J.),entered October 4, 2013, as granted that branch of the petition which was to annul theresolution of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Bedford granting the usevariance and annulled, as academic, the resolutions granting the area variances andspecial permit, and the petitioner cross-appeals from so much of the judgment as deniedthat branch of the petition which was to annul the resolution of the Planning Board of theTown of Bedford adopting the negative declaration.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The address of the subject property is 562-570 North Bedford Road, and it is locatedon the east side of North Bedford Road, also known as Route 117, at the intersectionwith Valerio Court in Bedford Hills, in Westchester. Valerio Court is a private roadwayending in a cul-de-sac. ONAB Corp. (hereinafter ONAB) is the owner of one of the threelots included within the subject property, and 570 North Bedford Road, LLC (hereinafter570 LLC), is the owner of the other two lots. The petitioner, Dino DeFeo, is the owner of17 Valerio Court, which is near the subject property.

[*2] The majority of the subject property is commerciallyzoned as "RB," or roadside business; a portion of the rear of the property, however, isresidentially zoned as "R-1/2A," or residential 1/2 acre. On or about July23, 2010, ONAB, 570 LLC, and Splash Management Group, LLC (hereinaftercollectively the Splash parties), filed a preliminary site plan with the Planning Board ofthe Town of Bedford (hereinafter the Planning Board). The application pertained to theSplash parties' plan to construct a "New Car Wash with Express Lube & DetailFacility." The Splash parties intended to use the R-1/2A zoned portion of the property asa driveway and parking lot. The Town of Bedford Comprehensive Plan recommends thatany property located along a side street should consider connection to the side street,even if the side street is largely residential. Therefore, the entrance and exit to thecarwash driveway were designed to be on Valerio Court. The subject property's existingcurb cuts on Route 117 were to be eliminated.

Due to its concern about traffic flow expected to be generated by the proposedproject, the Planning Board took lead agency status for the purposes of a review pursuantto the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]).Traffic consultant reports submitted by the Splash parties and by the neighbors opposedto the project, which included the petitioner, were considered and discussed duringseveral public meetings. The Planning Board also retained its own traffic consultant whoreviewed the other consultants' traffic reports and submitted his own report. Theconsultants also commented on each other's reports. The Planning Board ultimatelyissued a negative SEQRA declaration, determining that there would be no large andimportant impacts and, therefore, that the project will not have a significant impact on theenvironment (see 6 NYCRR 617.7 [a] [2]).

On or about June 10, 2011, the Splash parties applied to the Town of BedfordZoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA) for use and area zoning variances and aspecial permit. Several public meetings were held before the ZBA. By resolution datedDecember 20, 2012, the ZBA granted the Splash parties' application. Regarding the usevariance, the ZBA found that the applicants could not realize a reasonable return withoutthe granting of the variance and that the hardship had not been self-created.

Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul thePlanning Board's negative declaration under SEQRA and the use and area variances andspecial permit granted by the ZBA.

The Supreme Court upheld the Planning Board's SEQRA determination, but thecourt found that the ZBA's determination granting the use variance was not supported bya rational basis in the record, so it annulled that determination. The court also annulledthe ZBA's determination granting the area variances and special permit and the site planapproval by the Planning Board as academic in light of its annulment of the ZBA'sdetermination granting the use variance. The parties appeal and cross-appeal from theportions of the court's judgment adverse to them.

"[A] determination of a zoning board should be sustained upon judicial review if ithas a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Ifrah vUtschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]). "To qualify for a use variance premised uponunnecessary hardship there must be a showing that (1) the property cannot yield areasonable return if used only for permitted purposes as currently zoned, (2) the hardshipresulted from unique characteristics of the property, (3) the proposed use would not alterthe character of the neighborhood, and (4) the alleged hardship was not self-created" (Matter of Westbury Laundromat,Inc. v Mammina, 62 AD3d 888, 891 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted];see Town Law § 267-b [2] [b]).

With regard to the first element, "[i]t is well settled that 'a landowner who seeks a usevariance must demonstrate factually, by dollars and cents proof, an inability to realize areasonable return under existing permissible uses' " (Matter of Dreikausen vZoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 287 AD2d 453, 456 [2001], quotingMatter of Village Bd. of Vil. of Fayetteville v Jarrold, 53 NY2d 254, 256 [1981],and Matter of Bella Vista Apt. Co. v Bennett, 89 NY2d 465, 469 [1997]). Here,the Splash parties submitted evidence that the residential portion of the property couldnot be developed for a residence, or for any of the permitted uses in the residentialR-1/2A zone, due to, [*3]among other things, thetopography, the fact that a septic system could not be supported, and the fact that theresidential portion of the property was very narrow. The Splash parties also submitted anappraisal which stated that, if the use variance for the residential portion of the propertywere not granted, the development potential of the RB-zoned portion of the propertywould be reduced for the subject carwash project by 27%, for retail purposes by 35%,and for office space purposes by 53%. The Splash parties did not, however, submit anyactual financial information, such as the original purchase price of the property, theexpenses and carrying costs of the property, the present value of the property, the taxes,the amount of any mortgages or other encumbrances, the amount of income presentlyrealized, if any, or an estimate as to what a reasonable return on the entire property or anyportion should be (see Matter of Village Bd. of Vil. of Fayetteville v Jarrold, 53NY2d at 256; Matter of Crossroads Recreation v Broz, 4 NY2d 39, 44[1958]).

Entitlement to a use variance is not established merely by proof that the proposed usewould be more profitable than a smaller scaled project not requiring a use variance(see Matter of Crossroads Recreation v Broz, 4 NY2d at 46). The Splash partiesare entitled to a reasonable return, not the most profitable return (see id.;Matter of Westbury Laundromat, Inc. v Mammina, 62 AD3d at 891). Thus, theSupreme Court properly found that the ZBA's determination that the Splash partiesestablished unnecessary hardship was arbitrary and capricious since it does not have arational basis in the record (seeMatter of Hejna v Board of Appeals of Vil. of Amityville, 105 AD3d 843, 845[2013]; Edwards v Davison,94 AD3d 883, 884 [2012]; Matter of Park Hill Residents' Assn. v Cianciulli,234 AD2d 464 [1996]; Matter of Ferruggia v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofWarwick, 233 AD2d 505, 507 [1996]; see also Matter of Westbury Laundromat,Inc. v Mammina, 62 AD3d at 891). Accordingly, the court properly granted thatbranch of the petition which was to annul the ZBA's determination granting the usevariance and annulled, as academic, the determinations granting the area variances andspecial permit.

With respect to the negative declaration under SEQRA, "[a] court's authority toexamine a SEQRA review conducted by an entity that was required to do so is limited toreviewing whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, wasaffected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Therelevant question before the court is 'whether the agency identified the relevant areas ofenvironmental concern, took a "hard look" at them, and made a "reasoned elaboration" ofthe basis for its determination' " (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town ofSardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 688 [1996], quoting Matter of Jackson v New York StateUrban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417 [1986]). Judicial review must be genuine, butthe agency's substantive obligations under SEQRA must be viewed in light of a "rule ofreason," and "the degree of detail with which each environmental factor must bediscussed will necessarily vary and depend on the nature of the action underconsideration" (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d at688 [internal quotation marks omitted]). As the Supreme Court concluded, the recordhere demonstrates that the Planning Board took a hard look at the issue of traffic thatwould be generated by the proposed project. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, thePlanning Board was not required to accept the opinions of his traffic consultant over itsown traffic consultant (seeMatter of Thorne v Village of Millbrook Planning Bd., 83 AD3d 723, 725[2011]; Matter of BrooklynBridge Park Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v New York State, 50 AD3d 1029, 1031[2008]; Matter of Ball v NewYork State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 35 AD3d 732, 733 [2006]). Thepetitioner's remaining contentions regarding the Planning Board's SEQRA review arewithout merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the petition whichwas to annul the Planning Board's resolution adopting the negative declaration. Rivera,J.P., Balkin, Cohen and Barros, JJ., concur.


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