| Matter of Furman v Annucci |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 02881 [138 AD3d 1269] |
| April 14, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Roman Furman, Appellant, v AnthonyJ. Annucci, as Acting Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, et al.,Respondents. |
Roman Furman, Wallkill, appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Brian D. Ginsberg of counsel), forrespondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hard, J.), entered April 28, 2015 inAlbany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner'srequest for parole release.
Following a fatal automobile accident that occurred as a result of petitioner drivingunder the influence of alcohol, he was convicted of a number of crimes, the most seriousof which was manslaughter in the second degree, and was sentenced to an aggregateprison term of 5 to 15 years. In April 2014, he made his second appearance before theBoard of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. The Board denied himrelease and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. He filed an administrativeappeal and, when the Board did not decide it within four months, he commenced thisCPLR article 78 proceeding. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed thepetition and this appeal ensued.
We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and willnot be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements ofExecutive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320, 1320[2015]; Matter of Hill v NewYork State Bd. of Parole, 130 AD3d 1130, 1130 [2015]). Petitioner contendsthat the Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors in denying him release andfocused solely upon the serious nature of his crimes. The record, however, discloses thatthe Board considered not only the [*2]serious nature ofpetitioner's crimes, but also his minimal criminal record, prison disciplinary infractions,program accomplishments, certificate of earned eligibility and postrelease plans (see Matter of Sanchez v Divisionof Parole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]). The Board further took into accountthe sentencing minutes and the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument(see Matter of Neal v Stanford, 131 AD3d at 1321; Matter of Diaz v New York StateDept. of Corrections & Community Supervision, 127 AD3d 1493, 1494[2015]). The Board was not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor andcould place greater emphasis on the severity of petitioner's crimes (see Matter of Feilzer v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 131 AD3d 1321, 1322 [2015]; Matter of Leung v Evans, 120AD3d 1478, 1479 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 914 [2015]). In view of this,and given that the Board's decision does not exhibit " 'irrationality bordering onimpropriety' " (Matter ofPartee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 901[2014], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [1980]), we find no reason to disturb it.
Lahtinen, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.