| Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel, N.Y. v Village of Woodbury,N.Y. |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 03005 [138 AD3d 1008] |
| April 20, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel, New York, etal., Respondents, v Village of Woodbury, New York, et al., Appellants, et al.,Respondent. |
Stepanovich Law, PLC, Nanuet, NY (John G. Stepanovich of counsel), forrespondents/defendants-appellants.
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany, NY (Michael G. Sterthous andRobert S. Rosborough IV of counsel), for petitioners/plaintiffs-respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review resolutionsadopting the Comprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury and Local Law Nos. 3and 4 of 2011 of the Village of Woodbury, and action, among other things, for ajudgment declaring that the Comprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury and LocalLaw Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011 of the Village of Woodbury are void and unenforceable, theVillage of Woodbury, New York, the Village of Woodbury Board of Trustees, theVillage of Woodbury Planning Board, and Gary Thomasberger appeal, as limited by theirbrief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, OrangeCounty (Nicolai, J.), dated March 19, 2014, as converted that branch of their motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the fourth cause of action into one forsummary judgment dismissing that cause of action, thereupon denied that branch of themotion, searched the record, and awarded summary judgment to the petitioners/plaintiffson the fourth cause of action, granted so much of the petition/complaint as sought toannul the resolutions adopting the Comprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury andLocal Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011 of the Village of Woodbury on the grounds that theVillage of Woodbury Board of Trustees failed to comply with the procedural andsubstantive mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act and GeneralMunicipal Law § 239-m, annulled the resolutions adopting theComprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury and Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011of the Village of Woodbury, and declared that the Comprehensive Plan for the Village ofWoodbury is void and unenforceable, and that certain portions of Local Law Nos. 3 and4 of 2011 of the Village of Woodbury are void and unenforceable, and, in effect, deniedthat branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b) to strike scandalousand prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in the pleadings.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order and judgment as, in effect, deniedthat branch of the motion of the Village of Woodbury, New York, the Village ofWoodbury Board of Trustees, the Village of Woodbury Planning Board, and GaryThomasberger which was pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b) to strike scandalous and prejudicialmatter unnecessarily inserted in the pleadings is dismissed, as no appeal lies as of righttherefrom (see CPLR 5701 [b] [3]), and leave to appeal has not been granted; andit is further,
[*2] Ordered that the order andjudgment is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof searching therecord and awarding summary judgment to the petitioners/plaintiffs on the fourth causeof action, (2) by deleting the provisions thereof granting so much of thepetition/complaint as sought to annul the resolutions adopting the Comprehensive Planfor the Village of Woodbury and Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011 of the Village ofWoodbury on the grounds that the Village of Woodbury Board of Trustees failed tocomply with the procedural and substantive mandates of the State Environmental QualityReview Act and General Municipal Law § 239-m, and substituting therefora provision denying those branches of the petition/complaint and dismissing thoseportions of the proceeding/action, and (3) by deleting the provisions thereof annulling theresolutions adopting the Comprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury and LocalLaw Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011 of the Village of Woodbury, and (4) by deleting the provisionsthereof declaring that the Comprehensive Plan for the Village of Woodbury is void andunenforceable, and that certain portions of Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011 of theVillage of Woodbury are void and unenforceable; as so modified, the order and judgmentis affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioners/plaintiffs commenced this hybrid proceeding, inter alia, pursuant toCPLR article 78 to review resolutions adopting the Comprehensive Plan for the Villageof Woodbury (hereinafter the Comprehensive Plan) and Local Law Nos. 3 and 4 of 2011of the Village of Woodbury (hereinafter together the Zoning Amendments), and action,among other things, for a judgment declaring that the Comprehensive Plan and theZoning Amendments are void and unenforceable. As relevant here, thepetition/complaint alleged that the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments arevoid and unenforceable on the ground that the Village of Woodbury Board of Trustees(hereinafter the Board of Trustees) failed to strictly comply with the procedural andsubstantive mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8[hereinafter SEQRA]), and on the ground that the Board of Trustees failed to complywith General Municipal Law § 239-m. The petition/complaint also alleged,in the fourth cause of action, that the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendmentsamounted to unconstitutional exclusionary zoning, and sought a judgment declaring thatthe Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Amendments are void and unenforceable.
The respondents/defendants Village of Woodbury, New York, the Village ofWoodbury Board of Trustees, the Village of Woodbury Planning Board, and GaryThomasberger (hereinafter collectively the appellants) moved, inter alia, pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the fourth cause of action. As relevant here, in the order andjudgment appealed from, the Supreme Court converted that branch of the motion intoone for summary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action, denied that branch ofthe motion, searched the record, and awarded summary judgment to thepetitioners/plaintiffs on the fourth cause of action. The court also granted so much of thepetition/complaint as sought to annul the Comprehensive Plan and the ZoningAmendments on the ground that the Board of Trustees failed to strictly comply with theprocedural and substantive mandates of SEQRA, and on the ground that the Board ofTrustees failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-m. The courtthen annulled the resolutions adopting the Comprehensive Plan and the ZoningAmendments, and declared that the Comprehensive Plan is void and unenforceable, andthat the Zoning Amendments are void and unenforceable except to the extent that theZoning Amendments adopted and codified section 310-13 of the Code of the Village ofWoodbury. Additionally, the court, in effect, denied that branch of the appellants' motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b) to strike scandalous and prejudicial matterunnecessarily inserted in the pleadings.
The Supreme Court erred in granting so much of the petition/complaint as sought toannul the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments on the ground that theBoard of Trustees failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of SEQRA."SEQRA mandates literal compliance with its procedural requirements and substantialcompliance is insufficient to discharge the responsibility of the agency under the act" (Matter of East End Prop. Co. #1,LLC v Kessel, 46 AD3d 817, 820 [2007]). As relevant here, 6 NYCRR 617.6(a) (4) permits an agency to waive the requirement for an environmental assessment form(hereinafter EAF) if a draft environmental impact statement is prepared or submitted. Inthis case, such a draft environmental impact statement was prepared. Thus, the failure toprepare an EAF did not amount to a failure to literally comply with SEQRA's proceduralrequirements. Accordingly, the court should have denied so much of the [*3]petition/complaint as sought to annul the ComprehensivePlan and the Zoning Amendments on the ground that the Board of Trustees failed tostrictly comply with the procedural requirements of SEQRA, and dismissed that portionof the proceeding/action.
The Supreme Court also erred in granting so much of the petition/complaint assought to annul the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments on the ground thatthe Board of Trustees failed to strictly comply with the substantive requirements ofSEQRA. "Judicial review of an agency determination under SEQRA is limited towhether the agency procedures were lawful and whether the agency identified therelevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasonedelaboration of the basis for its determination" (Matter of Falcon Group Ltd. Liab. Co. v Town/Village of HarrisonPlanning Bd., 131 AD3d 1237, 1239 [2015] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d400, 417 [1986]). "In a statutory scheme whose purpose is that the agencydecision-makers focus attention on environmental concerns, it is not the role of the courtsto weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives, but to assure that theagency itself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively" (Matter ofJackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 416). "The agencydecision should be annulled only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by theevidence" (Matter of Falcon Group Ltd. Liab. Co. v Town/Village of HarrisonPlanning Bd., 131 AD3d at 1239; see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town ofSoutheast, 9 NY3d 219, 231-232 [2007]).
Here, the Board of Trustees satisfied SEQRA's substantive requirements. Inparticular, the Board of Trustees adequately analyzed a reasonable range of alternatives(see Matter of East End Prop. Co. #1, LLC v Kessel, 46 AD3d at 822; Matterof Rusciano & Son Corp. v Kiernan, 300 AD2d 590, 591-592 [2002]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied so much of the petition/complaint assought to annul the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments on the ground thatthe Board of Trustees failed to strictly comply with the substantive requirements ofSEQRA, and dismissed that portion of the proceeding/action.
Additionally, the Supreme Court erred in granting so much of the petition/complaintas sought to annul the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments on the groundthat the Board of Trustees failed to comply with General Municipal Law§ 239-m. "To facilitate regional review of amendments to a local zoningordinance, General Municipal Law § 239-m requires the local municipalityto refer its proposed amendments to the county planning board" (Matter of Benson Point RealtyCorp. v Town of E. Hampton, 62 AD3d 989, 991 [2009]). Here, no recordevidence contradicts the Village Planner's assertion that the report of final action wassubmitted following enactment of the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments(cf. Red Wing Props., Inc. vTown of Milan, 71 AD3d 1109, 1112 [2010]). Moreover, the revisions made tothe Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments after referral were "embracedwithin the original referral" (Matter of Benson Point Realty Corp. v Town of E.Hampton, 62 AD3d at 992). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied somuch of the petition/complaint as sought to annul the Comprehensive Plan and theZoning Amendments on the ground that the Board of Trustees failed to comply withGeneral Municipal Law § 239-m and dismissed that portion of theproceeding/action.
Since the Supreme Court should not have granted so much of the petition as soughtto annul the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Amendments on the ground that theBoard of Trustees failed to comply with the procedural and substantive mandates ofSEQRA, and failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-m, itshould not have annulled the resolutions adopting the Comprehensive Plan and theZoning Amendments based upon these allegations.
With respect to the fourth cause of action, which alleged that the ComprehensivePlan and the Zoning Amendments are void and unenforceable on the ground that theyamount to unconstitutional exclusionary zoning, we conclude that neither side is entitledto summary judgment. "[B]oth the constitutional and statutory validity of a zoningordinance depend on the facts of the particular case and whether it is really designed toaccomplish a legitimate public purpose" (Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v Incorporated Vil.of Upper Brookville, 51 NY2d 338, 343 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted])."As legislative acts, zoning ordinances carry a presumption of constitutionality. We havestated on several occasions that this presumption is rebuttable, but thatunconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt" (id. at 344[citations omitted]). "Generally then, [*4]a zoningordinance enacted for a statutorily permitted purpose will be invalidated only if it isdemonstrated that it actually was enacted for an improper purpose or if it was enactedwithout giving proper regard to local and regional housing needs and has an exclusionaryeffect. Once an exclusionary effect coupled with a failure to balance the local desireswith housing needs has been proved, then the burden of otherwise justifying theordinance shifts to the defendant" (id. at 345).
Here, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the Comprehensive Plan and theZoning Amendments amount to unconstitutional exclusionary zoning. Accordingly, theSupreme Court properly denied that branch of the appellants' motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action, but erred in searching therecord and awarding summary judgment to the petitioners/plaintiffs on the fourth causeof action. Concomitantly, the court should not have declared that the ComprehensivePlan and certain portions of the Zoning Amendments are void and unenforceable basedupon the fourth cause of action.
The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal,Dickerson and Miller, JJ., concur.