| Ferrara v Peaches Café LLC |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 03286 [138 AD3d 1391] |
| April 29, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| Angelo A. Ferrara, Appellant, v PeachesCafé LLC et al., Defendants, and COR Ridge Road Company, LLC, Also Knownas COR Holt Road Company, LLC, Respondent. |
Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester (Thomas A. Fink of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.
Mannion & Copani, Syracuse (Gabrielle Mardany Hope of counsel), fordefendant-respondent and defendant New York Life Insurance Company.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Matthew A.Rosenbaum, J.), entered January 23, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, deniedplaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action and grantedthat part of the motion of defendant COR Ridge Road Company, LLC, also known asCOR Holt Road Company, LLC seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause ofaction against it.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversedon the law without costs, the motion of defendant COR Ridge Road Company, LLC, alsoknown as COR Holt Road Company, LLC, is denied in part, the first cause of action isreinstated, plaintiff's motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court,Monroe County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum:Plaintiff appeals from an order insofar as it denied its motion for partial summaryjudgment on its first cause of action, for foreclosure on a mechanic's lien under Lien Law§ 3, and granted that part of the motion of COR Ridge Road Company,LLC, also known as COR Holt Road Company, LLC (defendant) for summary judgmentdismissing the first cause of action against it. According to plaintiff, Supreme Court erredin determining that defendant did not consent to the work its assignor performed on thesubject property within the meaning of Lien Law § 3. We agree.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Defendant owns commercial property in theTown of Webster that it leased to defendant Peaches Café LLC (Peaches), whichintended to operate a restaurant on the premises. Pursuant to the written lease, Peacheswas obligated to supply "[a]ll electrical work other than items furnished by [defendant]."The lease further provided that Peaches could not commence construction work on theproperty without defendant's consent, and that Peaches could use contractors approvedonly by defendant. Finally, the lease stated that any alterations, additions, orimprovements to the premises "shall at once become a part of the realty and belong to[defendant] and shall be surrendered with the Premises."
Peaches hired nonparty Quinlan Ferrara Electric, Inc. (Quinlan) to perform theelectrical work contemplated by the lease. Although Quinlan performed the work in asatisfactory manner, Peaches was unable to pay for it. Defendant eventually evictedPeaches for nonpayment of rent, and Quinlan filed a mechanic's lien against the propertypursuant to Lien Law § 3. Quinlan thereafter assigned the lien to plaintiff,who commenced this action to foreclose on the lien.
Defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing, inter alia, the firstcause of action, which seeks to enforce the lien under Lien Law § 3.According to defendant, because it did not have any direct dealings with Quinlan and didnot explicitly consent to the specific electrical work performed by Quinlan, the liencannot be enforced against it. Plaintiff, on the other hand, moved for partial summaryjudgment on the issue of liability on the first cause of action. The court agreed withdefendant and, insofar as relevant to this appeal, dismissed the first cause of action.
Lien Law § 3 provides in relevant part that a "contractor. . . who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of realproperty with the consent or at the request of the owner thereof . . . shallhave a lien . . . upon the real property improved." For purposes of thisprovision, a "requirement in a contract between . . . landlord and tenant, thatthe . . . tenant shall make certain improvements on the premises is asufficient consent of the owner to charge his property with claims which accrue inmaking those improvements" (Jones v Menke, 168 NY 61, 64 [1901]; see DeKlyn v Gould, 165 NY 282, 287 [1901]). The Court of Appeals subsequentlyreaffirmed Jones's broad interpretation of section 3 in McNulty Bros. vOfferman (221 NY 98 [1917]), holding that, as long as "the liens have been confinedto work called for by the lease[,] . . . the landlords' estate may be charged tothe same extent as if the owners of that estate had ordered the work themselves. Insubstance, they have made the lessee their agent for that purpose" (id. at 106).Jones and McNulty Bros. have not been overturned or disavowed.
As plaintiff correctly notes, our decision in Boyle v Paolini Cafeteria &Rest., Inc. (220 App Div 482 [1927]) is consistent with the precedents of the Courtof Appeals and is virtually indistinguishable from the case at hand. We enforced the lienin Boyle because, even though "latitude was allowed to the tenant to determinethe character of the alterations and improvements to be made" (id. at 485), it wasundisputed that "[t]he lease itself authorized the tenant to make the alterations whichwere made" (id. at 484). Consistent with Boyle, we more recentlyobserved that "consent [for purposes of Lien Law § 3] may be inferred fromthe terms of the lease" (J.K.Tobin Constr. Co., Inc. v David J. Hardy Constr. Co., Inc., 64 AD3d 1206, 1208[2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
We acknowledge that our sister Departments have all concluded, at various times,that a lien under Lien Law § 3 is valid only when the property ownerdirectly authorizes the contractor to undertake the relevant improvements (see PaulMock, Inc. v 118 E. 25th St. Realty Co., 87 AD2d 756, 756 [1982], citing Sagerv Renwick Park & Traffic Assn., 172 App Div 359, 367, 368 [1916]; see also Matell Contr. Co., Inc. vFleetwood Park Dev., LLC, 111 AD3d 681, 683 [2013]; Interior Bldg. Servs., Inc. vBroadway 1384 LLC, 73 AD3d 529, 529 [2010]; Drapaniotis v 36-08 33rd St.Corp., 48 AD3d 736, 737 [2008]; but see Gescheidt & Co., Inc. vBowery Sav. Bank, 251 App Div 266, 266-267 [1937], affd 278 NY 472[1938]; Osborne v McGowan, 1 AD2d 924, 925 [1956]). In our view, however,those cases cannot be squared with McNulty Bros. and Jones, which, ofcourse, we must follow.
Here, it is undisputed that the lease between defendant and Peaches obligatedPeaches to install electrical upgrades on the premises in order to effectuate the purpose ofthe lease, i.e., the creation and operation of a restaurant. It is also undisputed that Peacheshired Quinlan, plaintiff's assignor, to perform the electrical work contemplated by thelease. We therefore conclude that Lien Law § 3 obligates defendant, as theowner of the benefitted property, to pay for the "reasonable value of [Quinlan's] services"(Scrufari v Cowdrick, 64 AD2d 1016, 1017 [1978]; see McNulty Bros.,221 NY at 105-106; Jones, 168 NY at 64-65; Boyle, 220 App Div at484-485). In light of our determination, plaintiff is entitled to an inquest on damageswith respect to the first cause of action (see Scrufari, 64 AD2d at 1017).
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that its responsibility under Lien Law§ 3 is extinguished by a provision in the lease that purports to disclaim itsliability for any mechanic's lien incurred as a result of work by Peaches. That provision ismerely an indemnification clause, and it has no bearing on whether defendant consentedto the improvements for purposes of section 3. Indeed, " 'once [the owner andtenant] have given their consent to an improvement, they cannot by any arrangementamong themselves cut off the rights of lienors' " (Grassi & Bro. v Lovisa& Pistoresi, Inc., 259 NY 417, 423 [1932], quoting McNulty Bros., 221NY at 105).
We therefore reverse the order insofar as appealed from, deny defendant's motion forsummary judgment insofar as it sought dismissal of the first cause of action, reinstate thatcause of action, and grant plaintiff's motion. We remit the matter to Supreme Court for aninquest on damages with respect to the first cause of action. Present—Lindley,J.P., DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Troutman, JJ.