| People v Ryder |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 00046 [146 AD3d 1022] |
| January 5, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Thomas Ryder, Appellant. |
Carolyn B. George, Albany, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L. Grome of counsel), forrespondent.
Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch,J.), rendered May 13, 2014, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crimesof attempted murder in the second degree, strangulation in the first degree, strangulationin the second degree and assault in the second degree (two counts).
Defendant was charged in a six-count indictment with one count of attempted murderin the second degree, one count of strangulation in the first degree, two counts ofstrangulation in the second degree and two counts of assault in the second degree. Thecharges stem from defendant's May 23, 2013 beating of his 65-year-old mother(hereinafter the victim). Defendant waived a jury trial and County Court found defendantguilty of attempted murder in the second degree, strangulation in the first degree,strangulation in the second degree and both counts of assault in the second degree. Hewas sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 21 years with five years of postreleasesupervision.
Defendant argues that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidenceand was against the weight of the evidence. "In determining legal sufficiency, we viewthe evidence in the light most favorable to the People and give them the benefit of everyfavorable inference. We will not disturb the verdict if the evidence demonstrates a validline of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to theconclusion reached by the jury. When we conduct a weight of the evidence review, if weare satisfied that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we independentlyassess the relative probative force of [*2]conflictingtestimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from thetestimony" (People v Baltes,75 AD3d 656, 658 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvdenied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]).
On May 23, 2013, at approximately 3:30 a.m., the victim was in her apartmentgetting ready to report to work as a hotel laundry attendant. Three days earlier, she hadagreed to let defendant, her 45-year-old son, stay in her spare bedroom for a few daysfollowing his 15-year absence. She ventured from her bedroom into the living room toturn off the television. Defendant was sleeping on the couch and when she tried to turnthe television off, she accidentally knocked a DVD player onto the floor, wakingdefendant. Defendant rose up and stared at her. He pushed the victim to the floor,causing her to strike her shoulder and head. After she got up, he ordered her to sit on thecouch and watch a movie. He informed her that he was going to get a gun and kill her.When she tried to leave, he punched her in the face causing her to land on her back.Defendant jumped on top of her and began punching her in the face and head with hisfists. He dragged her around the room by her hair, then stomped on her with his feet, andkicked her in the breast, stomach, wrists and legs. Defendant retrieved a pair ofheadphones from his bedroom and started beating the victim in the mouth with them. Hetried to open her mouth and shove them down her throat, raking them across her teeth.He put his hand around the victim's throat and choked her while she begged for her life.She was unable to breathe and believed that she was dying, testifying at trial that "it allwent black." When she opened her eyes, she saw that defendant was standing by thebedroom with his back to her. The victim escaped the apartment and, as she was walkingdown the street toward the police station in her nightgown, a cab driver stopped anddrove her to the police station. She was transported to the hospital and, uponexamination, found to have sustained swelling to her right eye, a broken right arm, threedistinct fractures to the right side of her face, a subconjunctive hemorrhage in the innereye and extensive bruising on her face, neck, torso and legs. At trial, defendant admittedthat he grabbed and punched a person in the apartment that morning, believing theperson to be an intruder. He ultimately admitted that the person he attacked was hismother, but asserted that he did not realize it at the time. He also denied ever stranglingher, using headphones to beat her or trying to kill her.
Defendant's challenge to the conviction of attempted murder in the second degreecenters on the fact that the victim was treated and released from the hospital the same dayand that there was no proof of a need for follow-up medical care. A person is guilty ofmurder in the second degree, when, with an intent to kill, that person causes the death ofanother person (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). A person is guilty ofan attempt to commit a crime, when, with specific intent to commit such a crime, thatperson "engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime" (PenalLaw § 110.00). The " 'intent to kill may be inferred from thesurrounding circumstances and a defendant's actions' " (People v Stanford, 130 AD3d1306, 1308 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1043 [2015], quoting People v Hamilton, 127 AD3d1243, 1245 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1164 [2015]). The proof must showthat the defendant "engaged in conduct that came dangerously near commission of thecompleted crime" (People v Kassebaum, 95 NY2d 611, 618 [2001] [internalquotation marks omitted], cert denied 532 US 1069 [2001]).
The brutal beating and choking of the victim, together with defendant's threateningwords in the course thereof, clearly demonstrated his intent to kill. Medical testimonyestablished that the act of strangling a person to the point where the person losesconsciousness is life-threatening due to deprivation of oxygen and blood flow to thebrain. The absence of a long-term serious injury to a victim does not preclude the findingof life-threatening actions by a defendant (see People v Greenfield, 112 AD3d 1226, 1227-1228[2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1037 [2014]; People v Fernandez, 88 NY2d777, 783 [1996]). Under these circumstances, we find that the People's proof in supportof this charge was legally sufficient and the verdict was not [*3]against the weight of the credible evidence.
With regard to count 5 of the indictment, assault in the second degree, defendantcontends that the weight of the evidence does not establish that he used headphones inthe course of the victim's beating, and that headphones do not constitute a dangerousinstrument as defined in Penal Law § 10.00 (13). As relevant here, a personis guilty of assault in the second degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury toanother person, he [or she] causes such injury to such person . . . by meansof a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]). Adangerous instrument is defined as "any instrument, article or substance . . .which, under the circumstances in which it is used, . . . is readily capable ofcausing death or other serious physical injury" (Penal Law § 10.00 [13]).We conclude that, in light of the manner in which the headphones were used, asdescribed by the victim here, they qualify as a dangerous instrument (see People vRay, 273 AD2d 611, 613 [2000]). Defendant notes that the victim did not mentionthe headphones in her initial report to the police or to the medical providers and that theywere not identified at trial. These points merely address the credibility of her assertionthat the headphones were used to beat her about the face and mouth. While a differentverdict on this count would not have been unreasonable in light of defendant's testimony,after considering the evidence in a neutral light and according due deference to CountyCourt's credibility determinations, we conclude that the verdict on this count is notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Pine, 126 AD3d 1112, 1115-1116 [2015],lv denied 27 NY3d 1004 [2016]).
Turning to the charge of strangulation in the second degree, we reject defendant'scontention that there was a lack of evidence of "stupor, loss of consciousness for anyperiod of time, or any other physical injury or impairment" (Penal Law§ 121.12). The victim's description of her experience while defendant wassqueezing her throat with his hand confirms her loss of consciousness since she testifiedthat she "saw black spots and lights flashing" before "it went all black." She also testifiedthat she lost bladder function. Medical proof confirmed how pressure to the throat leadsto a loss of consciousness and loss of bladder control. Further, the strangulation injuriesas described by the victim and the medical care providers amply established physicalinjury, which is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (PenalLaw § 10.00 [9]). Photographs of the victim's neck taken several days afterthe attack confirm bruising consistent with the pressure applied to the victim's neck. Wefind that this evidence was sufficient as a matter of law (see People v Carte, 113 AD3d191, 194 [2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1035 [2014]). Nor was the verdict onthis charge against the weight of the evidence, since there was ample basis for CountyCourt to credit the victim's testimony and the medical proof presented by the People.
Finally, we reach the same conclusion as to the proof in support of the charge ofstrangulation in the first degree, which required the People to prove that the victimsustained a "serious physical injury" (Penal Law § 121.13). To establish thiselement, the proof must show an injury "which creates a substantial risk of death, orwhich causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment ofhealth or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ" (Penal Law§ 10.00 [10]). As noted above, testimony by a pathologist confirmed thatthe restriction of blood flow to the brain to the extent that it causes unconsciousness,impaired vision and/or loss of motor function is life-threatening. We find that thisevidence was legally sufficient to establish the element of serious physical injury becauseit constituted an impairment of her physical condition creating a substantial risk of death(see People v McCann, 126AD3d 1031, 1034 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1167 [2015]; People vMiller, 290 AD2d 814, 815 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 678[2002]).
[*4] Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose andClark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.