| People v Spratley |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 01488 [159 AD3d 725] |
| March 7, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lakime J. Spratley, Appellant. |
Del Atwell, East Hampton, NY, for appellant.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Stephen L.Greller, J.), rendered April 22, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the facts, and the matter is remitted to the CountyCourt, Dutchess County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 330.20.
On July 10, 2013, at around 11:30 p.m., the defendant shot and killed Talesha Wright in agrocery store in Poughkeepsie. At trial, the defendant asserted the affirmative defense of lack ofcriminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15).The People did not dispute that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at thetime of the shooting, but they disagreed as to the nature of the disease or defect and whether itcaused the defendant to lack substantial capacity to know or appreciate either the nature andconsequences of his conduct or that it was wrong. The jury convicted the defendant of murder inthe second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, implicitly rejectinghis affirmative defense. On appeal, the defendant contends, among other things, that the verdictof guilt was against the weight of the credible evidence as it found that he failed to establish theaffirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. We agree, and therefore reverse hisconvictions and remit the matter to the County Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedingspursuant to CPL 330.20.
The incident was captured on several surveillance cameras, which show that at the subjecttime, the defendant was walking on a sidewalk on Academy Street in Poughkeepsie. An SUVtraveled down the street and stopped in front of the A & M Grocery. Wright, who had beenhanging out of the rear driver's side window as the SUV was moving, exited through the vehicle'swindow and walked into the store. The defendant continued to walk down the sidewalk until hereached the A & M Grocery and then turned to enter the store, and, from the doorway,pulled a gun from the waistband of his shorts and fired at Wright, who was standing only a fewfeet away at the counter. The defendant exited the store and paced outside for approximately oneminute and then slowly walked a short distance away. Moments later, police cars arrived and thedefendant immediately put his hands in the air and laid down on the ground. A police officerhandcuffed the defendant, and according to the officer, the defendant "stated something about asuitcase and he said [*2]that bitch stole my clothes and they knowhow they get when they mess with me."
In a videotaped interview at the police precinct, the defendant told detectives that he hadbeen "paranoid," "hearing voices and stuff," and "having issues or whatever with [himself]." Hestated that he had seen Wright in the SUV three to four times earlier that day without incident.However, the defendant told detectives that, shortly before the shooting, he had seen a bluesuitcase that belonged to him sitting on a street corner. He stated that he looked at the suitcase fora long time, and was uncertain of whether what was happening was "reality." The defendant saidthat he was certain that the suitcase was his, but walked away to try to "figure it out." As thedefendant was walking, the SUV with Wright came down the street. The defendant told thedetectives that at this time, he was hearing voices that were telling him "all kinds of. . . negative stuff." When the SUV pulled up, the defendant believed that Wrightwas making signals with her hands at him, including "like gun [signals] and signs," and that shewas wearing his shorts. The defendant believed that "they" were playing "mind games" with him.He stated that when Wright "put a gun sign on," he thought, "hold on, you're talking aboutendangering my life," and it "really triggered" him. The defendant told the detectives that herecalled walking into the grocery store and asking Wright why she was wearing his shorts. Thedefendant claimed that he then "blanked out," and he did not remember whether Wrightresponded to him and did not remember shooting her. When one of the detectives pressed thedefendant to try to remember what happened after he was "triggered," the defendant said "this"happened, and pointed to his shoe, leg, and shorts. The detective asked the defendant whether hehad urinated on himself, and the defendant replied, "yeah, I was hearing voices." The defendanttold the detectives that he recalled feeling "bad" after he left the store and feeling "lost" when hewas on the sidewalk following the shooting. The defendant admitted to the detectives that he hadbeen carrying the gun with him all day because he was hearing voices and needed to protecthimself. Wright's wife testified that she and Wright knew the defendant through a mutual friend,and there had never been any disagreements between them.
The defense presented the expert testimony of a board-certified forensic psychiatrist whoopined that at the time he possessed the gun and shot Wright, the defendant was suffering from asevere, persistent, and serious mental disease, namely, schizoaffective disorder, and that becauseof this mental disease the defendant lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate that whathe did was wrong. The defense expert described schizoaffective disorder as having acombination of symptoms of both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. To support the expert'sconclusion, the defense presented evidence that throughout the defendant's childhood, his parentswere severely drug addicted and that in 1995, when the defendant was about 15 years old, hismother, suffering from mental illness, stabbed his father to death. The defendant was imprisonedas a juvenile offender in 1995 for assault and attempted robbery. He was released from prisonbriefly, but then convicted of selling a controlled substance, so that he remained incarceratedalmost continuously from 1995 to December 2010. The defendant received numerousdisciplinary citations while incarcerated, and was in isolation in the special housing unit duringthe majority of his time in prison.
The defense evidence also showed that the defendant began complaining of hearing voices in1995 or 1996 when he was 15 or 16 years old. At times, the defendant expressed a belief thatcorrections officers and/or other detainees were poisoning his food. However, prison staffrepeatedly concluded that the defendant was "faking" in order to gain special favors, and thus hewas treated punitively for his behavior. In 2008, the defendant was diagnosed with bipolardisorder with psychotic features, and was prescribed antipsychotic medication for the first time.The defense expert testified that the defendant's prison records reflect that the defendant'sbehavior changed drastically after he was medicated, his symptoms went away and he was able toavoid citations.
The defendant was released on parole in December 2010. Upon his release, the defendantwas treated at a community mental health clinic. The defense expert testified that the notes fromthe clinic indicate that at the December 2010 intake interview, the defendant complained ofhearing voices that were telling him to hurt himself and other people. The defendant expressed abelief that there was a secret society of assassins that were trying to kill him, and that the societyutilized both people he knew and strangers in its conspiracy to assassinate him. The clinic treatedthe defendant from December 2010 until March 2013 for schizoaffective disorder withantipsychotic, [*3]mood stabilizing, and antidepressantmedications. It is unclear from the record why the defendant's treatment stopped in March2013.
On June 20, 2013, 20 days before he shot Wright, the defendant was in an automobileaccident in which another vehicle struck the vehicle he was driving. The hospital recordsindicated that the defendant exited his vehicle after the accident and appeared as though he wasgoing to attack the other driver, but that he then had a seizure and was brought to the hospital.The defense expert testified that the defendant told him that at the time of the accident, hebelieved the driver of the other vehicle was an assassin from the secret society and that theaccident was an assassination attempt. The community mental health clinic records indicated thatthe defendant returned to the clinic several times after the June 20 automobile accident askingthat he be prescribed a particular antipsychotic medication that he had received when he wasbeing treated at the clinic, but that the defendant was unable to get the prescription filled. Theseattempts included one on the day before the subject shooting, at which time the clinic evaluatedthe defendant as being at "the highest lethality risk for hurting someone else and hurtinghimself," but still the defendant was unable to get the prescription filled.
The defense additionally presented evidence that on the day of the shooting, the defendantcalled his aunt repeatedly to complain that someone was after him. The aunt testified that shefound the defendant on the street at about 8:15 p.m. and tried to persuade him to go home. Shestated that the defendant was talking about people who kept moving in and out of different carsand jumping from one car to another. After some time, one of the defendant's cousins came toassist, but when the cousin reached into his pocket to give the defendant's aunt some money, thedefendant reacted as though his cousin was trying to draw a weapon. The two were unable topersuade the defendant to go home. The subject shooting occurred approximately two hourslater.
The defense expert testified that the defendant told him that on the day of the shooting, thedefendant's mother was acting in a manner that made the defendant believe that she was amember of the secret society of assassins and was going to try to kill him, and so the defendantretrieved his gun and left the apartment. The defendant further told the expert that while he wasout walking, he observed several cars which he believed were being driven by members of theassassination society, who were following him and preparing another assassination attempt. Thedefendant told the expert that when he thought he saw Wright exit the SUV and point her fingersat him while wearing his clothing, it validated his assessment that Wright was the assassin sent tokill him. The expert explained that the defendant's fixation on his belief that the shorts belongedto him was because this constituted proof that the secret society of assassins was able to get intohis apartment and it was sending a signal to the defendant that society assassins were going tokill him. The defense expert opined, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that at thetime the defendant possessed the gun and shot Wright, he was suffering from schizoaffectivedisorder, and that because of the disease, he lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciatethat what he was doing was wrong because he believed he was killing the person who wascoming to assassinate him.
To rebut the defendant's evidence, the People presented the testimony of a licensedpsychologist with a practice in forensic psychology, who opined that at the time he shot Wright,the defendant both knew and appreciated the nature and consequences of his conduct and that theconduct was wrong. The People's expert agreed that the defendant was suffering from a mentaldisease or defect at the time of the subject shooting, but, based on the expert's interview with thedefendant, the expert diagnosed the defendant as having an unspecified bipolar related disorder.The People's expert also diagnosed the defendant with an antisocial personality disorder, which,he testified, would not qualify as a mental disease or defect. The expert conceded that thedefendant had "incorrect perceptions" and was "paranoid" at the relevant time, but he concludedthat it was not the paranoia or incorrect perceptions that motivated the defendant's acts, but ratherhis "antisocial conduct." More specifically, the People's expert opined that the defendant actedbecause he believed that Wright had stolen his shorts and his "antisocial orientation" made thedefendant feel justified in performing a violent act of revenge. The People's expert found thatbecause the defendant attempted to get treatment prior to the shooting, he was aware of hisparanoia and thus he was "grounded to a degree in reality" and "never gone that far." The expertalso concluded that because [*4]the defendant kept the gunhidden from his mother and, while he was in public, he was aware that possessing the gun waswrong.
The People's expert noted that the defendant had not mentioned assassins when the expertinterviewed him. He acknowledged that, in addition to the diagnosis relative to the defendant'scommunity mental health treatment from December 2010 to March 2013, the defendant wasdiagnosed with schizoaffective disorder in January 2011 by the Dutchess County Department ofMental Hygiene, at a time when the defendant was complaining of a "shadow organization" thatwas after him and which had recruited his mother and grandmother to try to assassinate him.Nonetheless, the People's expert did not believe that the defendant suffered from aschizoaffective disorder. The expert opined that the defendant's auditory hallucinations wererelated either to his bipolar condition or substance use. Although there was no evidence that thedefendant had tested positive on any drug test or admitted to any drug use, the People's experttheorized that the defendant had begun to use PCP upon his release from prison and this is whathad caused his hallucinations. This theory was based on the defendant's previous conviction forselling a controlled substance and the notations in his prison records indicating that he had apolysubstance abuse problem, with one entry indicating a preference for PCP, and the expert'sopinion that it was "very rare for someone to sell substances without using substances."
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of aweapon on the second degree, and the defendant appeals.
In order to establish a lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect, adefendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, at the time the defendantengaged in the proscribed conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he or she lackedsubstantial capacity to know or appreciate either (1) the nature and consequences of suchconduct, or (2) that such conduct was wrong (see Penal Law §§ 25.00[2]; 40.15).
In conducting a weight of the evidence review, an appellate court must first determinewhether, "based on all the credible evidence a different finding would not have beenunreasonable" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348 [2007]; People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006]). If it would have been reasonable for the factfinder toreach a different conclusion, "the court must weigh conflicting testimony, review any rationalinferences that may be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions"(People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; see People v Romero, 7 NY3d at 643;People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). "If it appears that the trier of fact has failed to givethe evidence the weight it should be accorded, then the appellate court may set aside the verdict"(People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348;People v Romero, 7 NY3d at 643).
Here, as the People concede, a finding of not responsible by reason of mental disease ordefect would have been reasonable. Moreover, upon weighing the credible evidence, weconclude that the jury was not justified in finding that the preponderance of the evidence failed toestablish that the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate that his conductwas wrong at the time that he possessed the loaded firearm and shot Wright. The undisputed trialevidence established that at the relevant time, the defendant was suffering from auditoryhallucinations, paranoia, and "incorrect perceptions" of reality. The opinion of the People's expertpsychologist that the defendant did not suffer a schizoaffective disorder, notwithstanding such adiagnosis by the defendant's treating psychiatrists over the past three years, was conclusory.Moreover, the psychologist's alternative theory that the defendant's hallucinations were due to hisuse of PCP were purely speculative and without adequate evidentiary support. The psychologist'sconclusion that the defendant was motivated by revenge against a person he mistakenly perceivedto have stolen his shorts was also speculative and contrary to the credible evidence presented. Weaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, andobserve demeanor (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d at 644), and weigh conflicting expertevidence (see People v Wood, 12 NY2d 69, 77 [1962]). However, on this record, therational inferences which can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial do not support theconviction. Thus, contrary to the jury's determination, we find that the defendant met his burdenof establishing the affirmative defense of mental disease [*5]ordefect by the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and thematter remitted to the County Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL330.20.
In light of our determination we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions. Hall,Barros and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Rivera, J.P., dissents, and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: Irespectfully disagree with my colleagues' determination to reverse the judgment. Accordingly, Ivote to affirm the judgment of conviction.
In July 2013, the defendant walked into a grocery store in Poughkeepsie and brutally shot thevictim, causing her death. Indeed, the incident was fully recorded on surveillance footage.
At the ensuing jury trial, the defendant asserted the affirmative defense of lack of criminalresponsibility by reason of mental disease or defect (see Penal Law§ 40.15). In this regard, the defendant proffered the testimony of a forensicpsychiatrist who diagnosed the defendant with schizoaffective disorder. The defendant's experttestified that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant suffered from a "severe, persistent andserious mental disease, and as a result of that disease he lacked substantial capacity to know orappreciate that such conduct was wrong." On rebuttal, the People offered the testimony of aforensic psychologist, who concluded that the defendant did not suffer from schizoaffectivedisorder. Instead, the People's expert opined that the defendant suffered from bipolar disorder andantisocial personality disorder. According to the People's expert, the defendant "both knew andappreciated the nature and consequences of his conduct, and he knew and appreciated thewrongfulness. In other words, he did not lack substantial capacity." Based upon all the evidencepresented, which included extensive cross-examination, the defendant was convicted of murderin the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
On the instant appeal, my colleagues determine that the jury verdict was against the weight ofthe evidence. My colleagues conclude that "the jury was not justified in finding that thepreponderance of the evidence failed to establish that the defendant lacked the substantialcapacity to know or appreciate that his conduct was wrong at the time that he possessed theloaded firearm and shot" the victim. However, in conducting an independent review of theweight of the evidence, I am satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Romero, 7NY3d 633 [2006]).
A weight of the evidence review requires this Court to affirmatively review the record,independently assess all of the proof, substitute its own credibility determinations for those madeby the trier of fact in an appropriate case, determine whether the verdict was factually correct,and acquit a defendant if the court is not convinced that the trier of fact was justified in findingthat guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Delamota, 18 NY3d 107, 116-117 [2011]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,348 [2007]). "In conducting our weight of the evidence review where a defendant relies solelyupon the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, we first determine whether a finding ofnot responsible by reason of mental disease or defect would have been reasonable" (People v Hernandez-Beltre, 157 AD3d814, 816 [2018]). "If we answer that question in the affirmative, then we must weighconflicting testimony, review any rational inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, andevaluate the strength of such conclusions in order to decide whether the defendant met his burdenof proving the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect by the preponderance of evidence"(id.; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; see also Penal Law§§ 25.00 [2]; 40.15). "Where conflicting expert testimony is presented, thequestion [of] whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of thecommission of the crime is for the fact finder, who may accept or reject the opinion of anyexpert" (People v Hill, 276 AD2d 716, 716 [2000]; see People v Capela, 97 AD3d 760, 761 [2012]; People v Collins, 27 AD3d 660,661 [2006]).
[*6] As set forth above, each partypresented conflicting expert opinions. Both experts were eminently qualified in their respectiveprofessional fields and deemed by the County Court to be so qualified (see CPL 60.55[1]). In his brief on appeal, the defendant goes to great lengths to denigrate the People's expert.This unprofessional and disingenuous attempt to disparage the People's expert is unavailing. Thetestimony of the People's expert regarding the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crimewas well-reasoned and supported by the evidence. That expert presented his opinions andsupported his conclusions. Moreover, his experience, credentials, and qualifications in the fieldof forensic psychology were fully set forth in the record.
The defendant's personal, criminal, and psychiatric history were all explored, testified to bywitnesses, and commented upon by counsel. The primary issue before the jury was whether at thetime "when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct," that is, when he shot and killed thevictim, "he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect" (Penal Law§ 40.15). "Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of suchconduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, [the defendant] lacked substantial capacity toknow or appreciate either: (1) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or (2) That suchconduct was wrong" (Penal Law § 40.15). On this point, the instant case boileddown to a battle of the experts. On the one hand, the defense expert opined that, due to a mentaldisease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate that suchconduct was wrong when he committed the crimes and, on the other hand, the People's expertrebutted that testimony. In rendering its verdict, the jury, in effect, concluded that,notwithstanding the evidence provided by the defense expert, the defendant failed to establish thedefense by a preponderance of the evidence.
My colleagues assert that the People "concede" that a finding of not responsible by reason ofmental disease or defect would have been reasonable. Respectfully, I find no such concession inthe People's brief. Instead, the People state, "[w]hile the issue of [the] defendant's sanity at thetime of the murder is a very close question, it was squarely within the jury's province to resolvequestions of the relative credibility of the expert opinions related thereto." This statement doesnot amount to a concession. It is a candid acknowledgment by the People that the jury's mandateand function is to resolve issues of credibility.
In sum, upon fulfilling my responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight ofthe evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348), andaccording great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear thetestimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004];People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), I will not disturb the instant verdict. Thedefendant's remaining contentions are without merit.