Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v Crossroads Ventures,LLC
2018 NY Slip Op 03579 [161 AD3d 1413]
May 17, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 27, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc.,Appellant-Respondent,
v
Crossroads Ventures, LLC, Respondent-Appellant, and Townof Shandaken Zoning Board of Appeals et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter ofCatskill Heritage Alliance, Inc., Appellant, v Town of Shandaken Zoning Board of Appeals et al.,Respondents. (Proceeding No. 2.)

Braymer Law, PLLC, Glens Falls (Claudia K. Braymer of counsel) and Caffry &Flower, Glens Falls (John W. Caffry of counsel), for appellant-respondent, and appellant.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (John J. Henry of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.

McCabe & Mack, LLP, Poughkeepsie (Daniel C. Stafford of counsel), forrespondents.

[*2] Devine, J. (1) Cross appeal from a judgment of theSupreme Court (Mott, J.), entered October 17, 2016 in Ulster County, which partially grantedpetitioner's application, in proceeding No. 1 pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul adetermination of respondent Town of Shandaken Planning Board issuing permits to respondentCrossroads Ventures, LLC, and (2) appeal from a judgment of said court, entered July 20, 2017in Ulster County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in proceeding No. 2 pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to review a determination of respondent Town of Shandaken Planning Board issuing aspecial use permit to respondent Crossroads Ventures, LLC.

Respondent Crossroads Ventures, LLC has long endeavored to build a vacation resortpartially located in the Town of Shandaken, Ulster County. As zoned by chapter 116 of the Codeof the Town of Shandaken (hereinafter zoning code), a vacation resort is allowed in the area witha special use permit and site plan approval from respondent Town of Shandaken Planning Board."Vacation resort" is not defined in the zoning code and, in 2000, Crossroads requested aninterpretation and definition of the term to determine what uses would be allowed as part of one.Respondent Town of Shandaken Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter ZBA) replied byanalogizing a vacation resort to a "[h]otel or motel or lodge development" where "[a]ll usesintegral to the hotel, motel or lodge development . . . [and] clearly accessory to" it,as well as other uses allowed as of right or by permission in the area, were allowed (Code ofTown of Shandaken § 116-40 [O]). The project thereafter underwent a prolongedassessment under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8), duringwhich a scaled-back, but still quite substantial, plan emerged (Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 161 AD3d 11, 15 [2018]). The project now has a variety of aspects thatinclude two hotels, a conference center, community centers and additional lodging scatteredamong several duplexes and multiple-unit buildings.

In 2013, as the environmental review wended its way toward a conclusion, Crossroadsapplied to the Planning Board for a special use permit and site plan review. The Planning Boardissued the permit and approved the site plan with conditions, prompting petitioner to commenceproceeding No. 1. Following unsuccessful motions by Crossroads and the Planning Board todismiss the petition, Supreme Court issued an October 2016 judgment finding that the PlanningBoard properly determined that non-habitational structures fell within the "clear definition of[permissible] accessory uses" to the resort, but improperly resolved an ambiguity in the zoningcode as to whether the detached duplexes and multiple-unit buildings were permitted uses in thearea. Supreme Court accordingly granted the petition in part, annulled the Planning Board'sdetermination and remitted so that the ZBA could address the propriety of the residentialstructures prior to a new determination by the Planning Board.

Upon remittal, the ZBA interpreted the zoning code and made clear that the detachedresidential units were permitted "lodges." The Planning Board again granted Crossroads'application, issued a special use permit and approved the site plan with conditions. Petitionerthen commenced proceeding No. 2 to challenge the ZBA's determination and the PlanningBoard's new approval which, following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed in a July 2017judgment. Petitioner and Crossroads cross-appeal from the October 2016 judgment, andpetitioner appeals from the July 2017 judgment.

Crossroads first contends that Supreme Court should have granted its motion to dismiss[*3]proceeding No. 1.[FN*] It is the ZBA, not the Planning Board, with theauthority to interpret the zoning code (see Code of Town of Shandaken§ 116-68 [A]; Matter ofWoodland Community Assn. v Planning Bd. of Town of Shandaken, 52 AD3d 991, 993[2008]; Matter of Swantz v Planning Bd.of Vil. of Cobleskill, 34 AD3d 1159, 1160 [2006]). When Crossroads applied to thePlanning Board for a special use permit and site plan review, petitioner argued that many of theproposed structures were prohibited under the zoning code. To the extent that there werepertinent ambiguities in the zoning code, the Planning Board was obliged to request aninterpretation from the ZBA before rendering its determination (see Code of Town ofShandaken § 116-68 [A] [2] [a]; Matter of Woodland Community Assn. vPlanning Bd. of Town of Shandaken, 52 AD3d at 993). The petition in proceeding No. 1alleged that some of the proposed uses were prohibited—a claim that, if the zoning codewas unclear, would need to be first dealt with by the ZBA—and that the Planning Boardlacked authority to approve any application containing them absent a use variance issued by theZBA. Therefore, affording the petition a liberal construction, accepting its allegations as true andproviding petitioner with every favorable inference, it stated a claim (see Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 30 NY3d 572, 582 [2017]).

Turning to the merits of that claim, in light of the ZBA's 2000 interpretation of the zoningcode, the Planning Board rationally determined that the conference center and community centerswere "integral" and "clearly accessory" to the overall project and permitted under the zoning code(Code of Town of Shandaken §§ 116-4 [B]; 116-40 [O] [4], [5]). The 2000ZBA interpretation did not offer an opinion regarding the detached duplexes and multiple-unitbuildings, a problem in that they were not accessory structures due to their status as habitations(see Code of Town of Shandaken § 116-4 [B]) and could be viewed aseither permitted lodges or prohibited new multifamily dwellings under the zoning code(see Code of Town of Shandaken §§ 116-10, 116-40 [A] [1]; [O]). Aninterpretation of the zoning code was needed on that point and, rather than devising its owninterpretation, Supreme Court properly annulled the Planning Board's determination and remittedso that the ZBA could provide one (see Town Law § 267-b; Matter ofWoodland Community Assn. v Planning Bd. of Town of Shandaken, 52 AD3d at 993;Matter of Jordan's Partners v Goehringer, 204 AD2d 453, 454-455 [1994]).

Turning to proceeding No. 2, the ZBA considered, upon remittal, how to view the detachedresidential buildings under the zoning code. Inasmuch as the interpretation that followed wasrendered upon the facts of Crossroads' proposal and was not an "issue . . . of purelegal interpretation," it "is afforded deference and will only be disturbed if irrational orunreasonable" (Matter of LumberjackPass Amusements, LLC v Town of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 145 AD3d1144, 1145 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Blanchfield v Town ofHoosick, 149 AD3d 1380, 1382 [2017]). The zoning code defines multiple dwellings asstructures with "three or more dwelling units," but states that rooms in "[a] boardinghouse,dormitory, motel, inn . . . or other similar building" do not constitute dwelling units(Code of Town of Shandaken § 116-4 [B]). A new multiple dwelling is prohibitedin the project area, but a lodge development is not. A lodge is not defined in the zoning code, butthe ZBA pointed out that a lodge is commonly defined as a transient residence, such as an inn orsimilar building having rooms that are excluded from the zoning code's [*4]definition of a dwelling unit contained in a multiple dwelling. Thepermanence of the residency is key, in other words, and the ZBA therefore defined a "lodge" asincluding structures "containing one or more units of lodging and sleeping accommodations fortransient occupancy in connection with the special permitted use of hotel or lodge developmentand/or vacation resort held under common ownership" so long as the users had a primaryresidence elsewhere. The ZBA observed that the proposed buildings were intended for transientoccupancy—either as a rental or as a timeshare purchase—and explicitly concludedthat they were permitted lodges as a result. The ZBA's interpretation was entirely rational andwill not be disturbed. It follows that the Planning Board, with the 2000 and 2017 ZBAinterpretations of the zoning code in hand, rationally determined "that the proposed project'compli[ed] with any legislatively imposed conditions on an otherwise permitted use' " soas to warrant the issuance of a special use permit and site plan approval (Matter of Kinderhook Dev., LLC v City ofGloversville Planning Bd., 88 AD3d 1207, 1209 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 805[2012], quoting Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town ofHempstead, 98 NY2d 190, 195 [2002]; see Matter of Frigault v Town of Richfield Planning Bd., 128 AD3d1232, 1234 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 911 [2015]).

Petitioner's remaining contentions do not require extended discussion. Assuming withoutdeciding that petitioner was persuasive in arguing that the ZBA violated the Open Meetings Law(see Public Officers Law art 7) in the leadup to issuing its 2017 interpretation, petitionerhas not demonstrated "good cause warranting the exercise of our discretionary power toinvalidate the ZBA's determination" (Matter of Oakwood Prop. Mgt., LLC v Town of Brunswick, 103 AD3d1067, 1070 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 853 [2013]). Lastly, the chair of the ZBA wasnot disqualified from participating in rendering that interpretation due to the fact that heperformed logging and plowing work on the project property that predated the proposed projectby decades and had no connection to the project itself (see Matter of Heustis v Town of Ticonderoga Planning Bd., 11 AD3d868, 869-870 [2004]). Petitioner's remaining contentions have been examined and found tolack merit.

Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgments areaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *:Crossroads' appeal from the finaljudgment in proceeding No. 1 brings up for review the earlier order denying its motion to dismiss(see Matter of Saratoga Lake Protection& Improvement Dist. v Department of Pub. Works of City of Saratoga Springs, 46AD3d 979, 981 n 1 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 706 [2008]).


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