| Matter of Lumberjack Pass Amusements, LLC v Town ofQueensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals |
| 2016 NY Slip Op 08142 [145 AD3d 1144] |
| December 1, 2016 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Lumberjack Pass Amusements, LLC,Respondent, v Town of Queensbury Zoning Board of Appeals et al.,Appellants. |
Meyer & Fuller, PLLC, Lake George (Jeffrey R. Meyer of counsel), for NorthHigh Realty Holdings, Inc., appellant.
Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Leah Everhart ofcounsel), for Town of Queensbury Zoning Board of Appeals and another,appellants.
Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes, PC, Glens Falls (John D. Wright ofcounsel), for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Krogmann, J.), enteredOctober 26, 2015 in Warren County, which granted petitioner's application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment,to annul a determination of respondent Town of Queensbury Zoning Board of Appealsfinding that the use of a premises belonging to respondent North High Realty Holdings,Inc. was permitted under the Code of the Town of Queensbury.
In 2012, respondent North High Realty Holdings, Inc. purchased real property in theTown of Queensbury, Warren County, situated within a commercial intensive zoningdistrict that prohibits single-family residences (see Code of the Town ofQueensbury § 179-3-040 [B] [3]). The property consists of a commercialbuilding and a single-family dwelling that had been permitted to be used as a residencebecause of its status as a lawful preexisting nonconforming use (see Code of theTown of Queensbury § 179-13-010). After purchasing the property, NorthHigh sought a variance to enable it to continue to use the single-family dwelling as aresidence. In response, respondent Town of Queensbury Zoning Administratordetermined that a variance was unnecessary because North High had submitted evidencedemonstrating that the single-family dwelling had been occupied as a residence withoutan interruption of more than 18 [*2]consecutive monthsand, thus, the preexisting nonconforming use had not been discontinued.
Petitioner, the owner of commercial property located adjacent to the subject property,appealed the Zoning Administrator's determination, contending that the preexistingnonconforming use should be deemed abandoned because the evidence submitted to theZoning Administrator showed that the dwelling's use as a residence had beendiscontinued for more than 18 months (see Code of the Town of Queensbury§ 179-13-020). Following public hearings, respondent Town of QueensburyZoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA) ultimately upheld the ZoningAdministrator's determination. Petitioner then commenced this combined CPLR article78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment seeking, among other things, to annulthe ZBA's determination. Supreme Court, finding that the ZBA had applied the wronglegal standard, granted the petition/complaint and declared that the preexistingnonconforming use was discontinued. This appeal by respondents ensued.
We agree with respondents that Supreme Court erred in finding that the ZBA appliedthe incorrect standard and in substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA. It is wellsettled that unless the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation, "[a] zoningboard's interpretation of a local zoning ordinance is afforded deference and will only bedisturbed if irrational or unreasonable" (Matter of Lavender v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town ofBolton, 141 AD3d 970, 972 [2016], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 1051 [2016]; seeMatter of Fruchter v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Hurley, 133 AD3d1174, 1175 [2015]; Matterof Avramis v Sarachan, 97 AD3d 874, 876 [2012], lvs denied 20 NY3d852 [2012]). Here, the issue of whether the preexisting nonconforming use wasdiscontinued is largely a fact-based inquiry, rather than a purely legal interpretation of thezoning law. As such, the ZBA's determination is entitled to deference (compareMatter of Town of Johnsburg v Town of Johnsburg Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 299AD2d 796, 800-801 [2002], with Matter of Winterton Props., LLC v Town of MamakatingZoning Bd. of Appeals, 132 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2015], and Matter of Boni Enters., LLC vZoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Clifton Park, 124 AD3d 1052, 1053[2015]).
Turning to the Town Code, "abandonment" is defined in pertinent part as "[a]n intentto abandon or to relinquish and some overt act, or some failure to act, which carries theimplication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the building or usethat is the subject matter of the abandonment. A nonconforming use that is abandonedfor more than 18 months shall be required to conform to the requirements of this chapter"(Code of the Town of Queensbury § 179-2-010 [C]). In addition to thisgeneral definition, the Town Code specifically provides that "[i]f a nonconforming use isdiscontinued for a period of 18 consecutive months, such use shall be deemed to beabandoned" (Code of the Town of Queensbury § 179-13-020).
It is undisputed that the issue before the ZBA was the application of thediscontinuance provision, and our review of the record confirms that the ZBA recognizedthat this was the issue before it. Although the ZBA also addressed whether there was anabandonment as that term is defined in the Town Code, the record shows that thisoccurred only after the ZBA fully considered the facts in light of the discontinuanceprovision. In this regard, the Zoning Administrator correctly explained to the ZBA thatanything less than a complete cessation of use would not constitute a discontinuance(see Matter of Town of Johnsburg v Town of Johnsburg Zoning Bd. of Appeals,299 AD2d at 799-800). In addition, we reject petitioner's assertion that the Town Coderequires proof that the dwelling was occupied continuously and without any interruptionfor 18 months. Instead, the language of the Town Code unambiguously sets forth that itis the cessation of the preexisting nonconforming use—not the useitself—that must occur continuously and without interruption for 18 months.Further, we note that the ZBA's reading of this language is consistent with thewell-settled principle that an individual can have more than [*3]one residence (see generally Yaniveth R. v LTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186,193 [2016]; Osterweil vBartlett, 21 NY3d 580, 583 [2013]; People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d 378,384-385 [2001]).
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the ZBA's determinationwas irrational or unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, we note that "courts will notweigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the [ZBA] where the evidence is[merely] conflicting and room for choice exists" (Matter of Sullivan v City of Albany Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 20AD3d 665, 666 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvdenied 6 NY3d 701 [2005]; see Matter of Squire v Conway, 256 AD2d 771,772 [1998]). Here, conflicting evidence was put forth at public hearings as to whether thepreexisting nonconforming use had been discontinued and, thus, abandoned.Significantly, evidence was presented indicating that the owner's son stayed at thedwelling with the apparent intent to retain it as a residence with at least some degree ofpermanency, thus evidencing that a complete cessation of the use had not occurred. Thus,in light of the room for choice that exists based upon the conflicting proof, we discern nobasis to disturb the ZBA's determination (see Matter of Bounds v Village of Clifton Springs Zoning Bd. ofAppeals, 137 AD3d 1759, 1760-1761 [2016]).
Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, without costs, petition dismissed, and it is declared that thepreexisting nonconforming use was not discontinued.