Matter of Blanchfield v Town of Hoosick
2017 NY Slip Op 03097 [149 AD3d 1380]
April 20, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 31, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of Karen M. Blanchfield, Doing Business as RoyleBlanche Farms, Appellant, v Town of Hoosick et al., Respondents.

Cooper Erving & Savage LLP, Albany (Carlo A.C. de Oliveira of counsel), forappellant.

Schopf Law, PLLC, Clifton Park (Jonathan G. Schopf of counsel), for respondents.

Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), entered May 27,2016 in Rensselaer County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Town of Hoosick Zoning Board of Appealsdenying petitioner's request for, among other things, a special use permit.

Petitioner is the owner of property in the Town of Hoosick, Rensselaer County on which sheoperates a dog training and handling business. In April 2015, following a noise complaint from aneighbor, the Code Enforcement Officer of respondent Town of Hoosick determined thatpetitioner's use of her property was in violation of the Town's Land Use Law and that a specialuse permit and site plan approval were required. Petitioner was similarly advised by the Town'sZoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA). Petitioner submitted an application for a specialuse permit and for site plan approval and, after meeting with the ZBA over several months, theZBA determined petitioner's applications complete and public hearings were held. Citing thecurrent and foreseeable impact of dog noise on the neighbors, the ZBA denied petitioner'sapplications. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Courtdismissed the petition, and petitioner appeals.

Initially, we note that when petitioner appeared before the ZBA, she did not raise hercontention that the ZBA violated its own rules when it failed to refer her applications to the [*2]Town's Planning Board for a recommendation (see LandUse Law of Town of Hoosick § 7.6.1). Accordingly, that issue may not now beraised in this proceeding (see Matter ofMary T. Probst Family Trust v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Horicon, 79 AD3d1427, 1427-1428 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 708 [2011]; Matter of Showers v Town of PoestenkillZoning Bd. of Appeals, 56 AD3d 1108, 1109 [2008]).

Petitioner claims that Supreme Court erred when it determined that she was required toobtain both a special use permit and site plan approval. First, she bases her claim that no specialuse permit is required on the theory that her business consists of the operation of a boardingkennel and breeding kennel, which uses are permitted by right.[FN1] Petitioner's property is located in a districtdesignated "Agricultural/Residential" (see Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick§§ 2.1.4, 3.2) in which boarding kennels and breeding kennels are permitteduses with site plan approval (see Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick § 3.2).In the Land Use Law, a breeding kennel is defined as "a facility where dogs are bred for sale,with more than nine dogs sold in one year" (Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick ch 13). Aboarding kennel is defined as "a facility that accepts transient dogs and cats for short durationstays" (Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick ch 13). Petitioner's application for a special usepermit described the existing and proposed use as "agriculture, training + show dog handlingschool + referral service." Her application for site plan approval similarly described the intendeduse as "training + handling center for show dogs," as did the short environmental assessmentform that she submitted. Since petitioner's use of the property, as described by her, does not fitwithin the definitions of boarding kennel or breeding kennel, the ZBA properly determined thatshe was required to obtain a special use permit (see Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick§ 3.1).[FN2] "Itis well settled that unless the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation, a zoning board'sinterpretation of a local zoning ordinance is afforded deference and will only be disturbed ifirrational or unreasonable" (Matter ofLumberjack Pass Amusements, LLC v Town of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 145AD3d 1144, 1145 [2016] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).

Next, petitioner asserts that site plan review is not required since the business use of theproperty began in 2006, well before the 2009 enactment of the Land Use Law and the enactment[*3]of the 2014 version of a site plan review local law. We findpetitioner's argument that she is allowed to continue her business as a lawful nonconforming usewithout site plan approval to be without merit (see Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick§ 5.1). In 2001, the Town enacted a local law which provided, as is relevant here,that all changes in use required site plan approval by the Planning Board (see Site PlanReview Law of Town of Hoosick, part II, § 2 [C]). When petitioner began herbusiness in 2006, this constituted a change in use of her residential property and, accordingly, siteplan approval was required at that time. To have a protected interest at the time of enactment ofthe Land Use Law in 2009, petitioner had to have received site plan approval pursuant to the2001 Site Plan Review Law. Since petitioner never applied for or received site plan approval forher business use, such use was not a lawful nonconforming use at the time of the enactment ofthe Land Use Law in 2009 (see GlacialAggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire, 14 NY3d 127, 136 [2010]; Matter of Martinos v Board of ZoningAppeals of Town of Brookhaven, 138 AD3d 859, 860 [2016]). Further, petitioner'sproposal, as reflected in her applications and the petition, is to enlarge and expand such use byemploying trainers, handlers and groomers and by increasing the number of dogs on thepremises. This modification and expansion of the use triggers the need for site plan approval(see Site Plan Review Law of Town of Hoosick § 3.010 [2014]). We findthat Supreme Court did not err when it determined that petitioner needed site plan approval sincethis determination "is largely a fact-based inquiry, rather than a purely legal interpretation of thezoning law" (Matter of Lumberjack Pass Amusements, LLC v Town of Queensbury ZoningBd. of Appeals, 145 AD3d at 1145). However, we disagree with the ZBA's denial of thespecial use permit and site plan approval.

When a zoning law enumerates a use as allowed by special use permit, it " 'istantamount to a legislative finding that the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoningplan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood' " (Matter of Retail Prop. Trust vBoard of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d 190, 195 [2002], quotingMatter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30NY2d 238, 243 [1972]; accord Matter ofFrigault v Town of Richfield Planning Bd., 128 AD3d 1232, 1233 [2015], lvdenied 26 NY3d 911 [2015]). An applicant is required to demonstrate "compliance with theconditions legislatively imposed upon the permitted use" (Matter of PDH Props. v PlanningBd. of Town of Milton, 298 AD2d 684, 685 [2002]), and a special use permit may be deniedonly if substantial evidence in the record corroborates such decision and it is not based ongeneralized community objections (see Matter of Retail Prop. Trust v Board of ZoningAppeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 NY2d at 196).

Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick § 3.1 provides that "[a]ny use not listed inthe schedule may be allowed by [s]pecial [p]ermit pursuant to [c]hapter 7, only if it can meet allapplicable standards." Chapter 7 delegates to the ZBA the authority "to review and act upon allspecial permit uses in accordance with standards and procedures set forth in . . .[c]hapter [7]" (Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick § 7.1). Upon determining that anapplication is complete, the ZBA "shall review the application, taking into consideration thestandards for [s]pecial [p]ermit review outlined in [s]ection 7.2 . . . , and any otherspecial requirements for a particular use contained in this [l]ocal [l]aw" (Land Use Law of Townof Hoosick § 7.4.3).[FN3] In compliance with the general standards setforth in Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick § 6.1, the ZBA is to prescribe "suchappropriate conditions and safeguards as may be required to," [*4]among other things, ensure that "[t]he proposed use will becompatible with the surrounding neighborhood and in harmony with the Comprehensive Plan forthe Town of Hoosick" (Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick §§ 7.3, 7.3.1).

The record shows that the ZBA advised petitioner that the noise from her property should notexceed 80 decibels.[FN4] Atthe public hearing, petitioner explained that she was certified as a nurse to take sound readingsand had done so at the property line over a period of approximately one month at differentintervals of the day. She claimed that the noise from her property had not exceeded 70decibels.[FN5] She alsooffered at least two proposals to address the concerns of the neighbors regarding any noise issue.She proposed a six-foot-high stockade fence and moving the outside pens so that they would beblocked by a building. The nearest neighbor, located across the road from petitioner's property,played a recording at the public hearing that he claimed was a recording that he made of noiseemanating from petitioner's property. He also claimed that the noise was cited by a prospectivepurchaser of his property.[FN6] Another neighbor, who has a horse training andboarding business approximately 500 feet from petitioner's property, claimed that some of hercustomers expressed concerns about the noise from petitioner's property, and she allegedlyprovided copies of emails from those customers.[FN7]

In its determination, the ZBA did not identify any specific shortcomings in petitioner'smitigation measures, but summarily determined that petitioner had not offered measures thatwould sufficiently mitigate the dog noise impact from her business. We view this determinationof the ZBA to be without sufficient support in the record. Petitioner offered scientificmeasurement of the noise level and there was no other objective measure of the noise offered atthe public hearing. The neighbor's recording of the noise is subject to an unreliable interpretationof its level based upon the ability to control the volume of the recording, and reliance on therecording would be unreasonable. Absent reliable proof that rebuts petitioner's offer of hermeasurement of the sound level and her offer of measures to address any noise concerns, there isno basis in the record to determine that petitioner did not meet the conditions imposed by theLand Use Law, and it appears that the ZBA bowed to generalized objections from two neighbors(see Matter of Kinderhook Dev., LLC vCity of Gloversville Planning Bd., 88 AD3d 1207, 1209 [2011], lv denied 18NY3d 805 [2012]). As such, the ZBA's determination is annulled.

Garry, J.P., Lynch, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, onthe law, without costs, petition granted, determination annulled and matter remitted to the ZoningBoard of Appeals of the Town of Hoosick to grant a special use permit and site plan approval topetitioner upon consideration of appropriate conditions and safeguards consistent with therequirements of the local laws of respondent Town of Hoosick.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The petition also refers topetitioner's business as "animal husbandry," a use permitted as of right. The Land Use Lawdefines the term animal husbandry as "the raising of animals and birds for food, wool, breeding,preservation or pleasure" (Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick ch 13). Supreme Court rejectedthis claim and petitioner has not addressed it in her brief. Thus, we treat this argument asabandoned (see Matter of AlbanyAcademies v New York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Assn., 145 AD3d 1258,1260-1261 [2016]; Matter of Salvador v State of New York, 205 AD2d 194, 198 n[1994], appeal dismissed 85 NY2d 857 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 810 [1995]).

Footnote 2:We note that the effect of thisprovision is apparently to allow by special use permit any use not listed in the district schedule ofuse regulations (see Land Use Law of Town of Hoosick § 3.2), and that thiswas the course charted by the Code Enforcement Officer and the ZBA, rather than a use variance(see Land Use Law § 12.4.4 et seq.).

Footnote 3:The reference to section 7.2 ofthe Land Use Law relates to coordination of environmental impact review by the Planning Boardand the ZBA and contains no standards. Instead, sections 7.3 through 7.3.10 set forth theguidelines for the ZBA to consider.

Footnote 4:Land Use Law of Town ofHoosick § 6.1.1 provides, as a general standard, that there may be "[n]o continuoushum, or noise with any noticeable shrillness of a volume of more than 80 decibels, measured atlot lines."

Footnote 5:Although the minutes of thepublic hearing do not reflect this presentation by petitioner, both petitioner's and respondents'briefs make reference to this presentation.

Footnote 6:The neighbor allegedlysubmitted a letter from a realtor regarding the effect of the noise on the sale of his property, but itis not included in the record.

Footnote 7:No such documentation isincluded in the record.


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