| Karimian v Time Equities, Inc. |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 05583 [164 AD3d 486] |
| August 1, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Bijan Karimian, Appellant-Respondent, v TimeEquities, Inc., et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
Law Office of Ethan A. Brecher, LLC, New York, NY, for appellant-respondent.
Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY (Marjorie N. Kaye and Daniel D. Schudroff of counsel),for respondents-appellants.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination and retaliation under ExecutiveLaw § 296 and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107,the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court,Kings County (Ellen M. Spodek, J.), dated December 9, 2015, as granted that branch of thedefendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the causes of actionalleging violations of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 asbarred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the defendants cross-appeal from so much of thesame order as, upon their request to treat those branches of their motion which were to dismissthe causes of action alleging breach of contract and for quantum meruit as seeking summaryjudgment pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) dismissing those causes of action, denied summaryjudgment with respect to those causes of action.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costsor disbursements.
The plaintiff, an Iranian American, was employed by the defendant Time Equities, Inc.(hereinafter Time Equities). In 2010, the plaintiff commenced an action in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendants herein, TimeEquities and individuals affiliated with the firm, alleging discrimination and hostile workenvironment based on race, national origin and gender, and retaliation under Title VII of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC, ch 21, § 2000e et seq. [hereinafter TitleVII]), the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296[hereinafter NYSHRL]), and the New York City Human Rights Law (see AdministrativeCode of City of NY § 8-107 [hereinafter NYCHRL]). The plaintiff also allegedcauses of action to recover damages for breach of contract and for quantum meruit. Thedefendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the District Courtgranted the defendants' motion, dismissed the federal claims, and declined to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims. Thereafter, the District Court denied theplaintiff's motion for reconsideration (see Karimian v Time Equities, Inc., 2013 WL2254557, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 74736 [SD NY, May 22, 2013, No. 10 Civ 3773 (AKH)]). TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit [*2]affirmed the District Court's original order (see Karimian vTime Equities, Inc., 569 Fed Appx 54 [2d Cir 2014]). The Court explained that, "view[ingthe record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was] an overabundance of evidence of. . . legitimate, nonretaliatory, and nondiscriminatory reasons for [terminating theplaintiff's employment,] that is, the company's significant cost-reduc[ing]measures—taken . . . in the wake of the 2008 financial downturn" (id.at 55). The Second Circuit further found that "[n]o reasonable juror could conclude that biasagainst those of Iranian national origin motivated [the] discharge" or that the plaintiff's dischargewas in retaliation for his complaint about a coworker's allegedly discriminatory conduct, or thathe was subjected to a hostile work environment (id.).
In 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Court alleging discriminationand hostile work environment based on race, national origin, and gender, and retaliation underNYSHRL and NYCHRL. The plaintiff also alleged causes of action to recover damages forbreach of contract and for quantum meruit. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 todismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants' motionwhich were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the causes of action under NYSHRL andNYCHRL as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and, upon their request to treat thosebranches of their motion which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of contractand for quantum meruit as seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) dismissingthose causes of action, denied summary judgment with respect to those causes of action on theground that there were issues of fact. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred ingranting dismissal of the causes of action under NYCHRL, and the defendants cross-appeal,contending the court erred in denying summary judgment with respect to the causes of actionalleging breach of contract and for quantum meruit.
A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted againsthim or her on the ground that the cause of action may not be maintained because of collateralestoppel (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). The doctrine of collateral estoppel "precludes a partyfrom relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action orproceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals orcauses of action are the same" (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]).The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when: "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical,(2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full andfair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated wasnecessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" (Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25NY3d 1, 17 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Where a federal court declines toexercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims, collateral estoppel may still bar thoseclaims provided that the federal court decided issues identical to those raised by the plaintiff'sstate claims" (Milione v City Univ. ofN.Y., 153 AD3d 807, 808-809 [2017]; see Clifford v County of Rockland, 140 AD3d 1108, 1110 [2016];Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg,Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d 18, 23 [2014]).
The provisions of NYCHRL must be "construed liberally for the accomplishment of theuniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof," regardless of whether similarly worded federal orNew York State civil and human rights laws have been so construed (Administrative Code ofCity of NY § 8-130 [a]; seeMakinen v City of New York, 30 NY3d 81, 87 [2017]; Albunio v City of New York, 16 NY3d472, 477 [2011]; Singh v CovenantAviation Sec., LLC, 131 AD3d 1158, 1161 [2015]). Accordingly, a cause of actionasserted pursuant to NYCHRL must be analyzed independently from similar or identical causesof action asserted pursuant to Title VII and/or NYSHRL. However, where a prior factualdetermination rendered with regard to a Title VII or NYSHRL cause of action is determinative ofa cause of action asserted pursuant to NYCHRL in a subsequent action, the NYCHRL cause ofaction may be barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153AD3d 807 [2017]; Simmons-Grantv Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 AD3d 134, 139 [2014]; Peterkin v Episcopal Social Servs. of N.Y.,Inc., 24 AD3d 306, 308 [2005]).
Here, the factual determinations made by the federal courts with regard to the causes ofaction alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII weredeterminative of the plaintiff's identical claims asserted in this action pursuant to NYCHRL (see [*3]Milione v City Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3d 807 [2017];Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 AD3d at 139;Peterkin v Episcopal Social Servs. of N.Y., Inc., 24 AD3d at 308). Accordingly, we agreewith the Supreme Court's determination to grant dismissal of those causes of action as barred bythe doctrine of collateral estoppel.
With respect to the defendants' cross appeal, CPLR 3211 (c) provides, "[u]pon the hearing ofa motion made under subdivision (a) or (b), either party may submit any evidence that couldproperly be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Whether or not issue has beenjoined, the court, after adequate notice to the parties, may treat the motion as a motion forsummary judgment." Although the path the defendants took in moving pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) was procedurally questionable, they charted their own course in this instance. There was noneed to give the plaintiff an opportunity to file additional papers because the defendants failed toestablish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by failing to tendersufficient evidence to eliminate any issues of fact with respect to those causes of action.Accordingly, the defendants were properly denied summary judgment, without regard to thesufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
The essential elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract are theexistence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract, the defendant's breachof his or her contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach (see Tri-Star Light. Corp. v Goldstein,151 AD3d 1102, 1105 [2017]; Hampshire Props. v BTA Bldg. & Developing, Inc., 122 AD3d573, 573 [2014]; JP Morgan Chasev J.H. Elec. of N.Y., Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [2010]). Contrary to their contention, thedefendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that they did not breach acontract as alleged by the plaintiff. The evidence submitted by the defendants was not sufficientto establish that the contract was unenforceable as based solely on past consideration and/or thatthe defendants honored their contractual obligations by paying the plaintiff a $14,000 bonus in2008. In light of the defendants' failure to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgmentas a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging breach of contract, that branch of theirmotion which was to dismiss that cause of action was properly denied regardless of thesufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
The elements necessary to establish a cause of action for quantum meruit are the performanceof services in good faith, acceptance of services by the person to whom they are rendered,expectation of compensation therefor, and reasonable value of the services rendered (see Evans-Freke v Showcase Contr.Corp., 85 AD3d 961, 962 [2011]; AHA Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 58 AD3d 6, 19[2008]; Tesser v Allboro Equip. Co., 302 AD2d 589, 590 [2003]). Where there is a bonafide dispute as to the existence of a contract, a plaintiff may proceed upon a theory ofquasi-contract as well as breach of contract, and is not required to elect his or her remedies(see AHA Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 58 AD3d at 20; Hochman v LaRea, 14 AD3d 653,655 [2005]; Zuccarini v Ziff-Davis Media, 306 AD2d 404, 405 [2003]). Contrary to thedefendant's contention, the evidence submitted by them failed to establish as a matter of law thatthe plaintiff could not establish the reasonable value of his services and/or that the plaintiff wascompensated for his services. Accordingly, the defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facieentitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover in quantummeruit, and that branch of their motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of theplaintiff's opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853).Chambers, J.P., Hinds-Radix, Maltese and Iannacci, JJ., concur.