Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of New Windsor
2019 NY Slip Op 03646 [172 AD3d 942]
May 8, 2019
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 3, 2019


[*1]
 Tilcon New York, Inc., Appellant,
v
Town of NewWindsor et al., Respondents.

Couch White, LLP, Albany, NY (Adam J. Schultz and Alita J. Giuda of counsel), forappellant.

Drake Loeb PLLC, New Windsor, NY (Ralph L. Puglielle, Jr., of counsel), for respondentsTown of New Windsor and others.

Young/Sommer LLC, Albany, NY (Kevin M. Young, Allyson M. Phillips, and Joseph F.Castiglione of counsel), for respondent Jointa Lime Company.

In a hybrid action, inter alia, for declaratory relief, and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78, the plaintiff/petitioner appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court,Orange County (Sandra B. Sciortino, J.), dated September 9, 2016. The order and judgmentdenied the plaintiff/petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction, granted those branches of theseparate motions of the defendants/respondents which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) and 7804(f) to dismiss the amended complaint/petition, denied the petition, and dismissed the amendedcomplaint/petition.

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to thedefendants/respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

In 2013, the Town Board of the Town of New Windsor (hereinafter the Town Board) enteredinto a lease with Jointa Lime Company (hereinafter Jointa) relating to property owned by theTown of New Windsor. In October 2015, approximately six months prior to the expiration of thelease, an agent of Jointa sent an email to the Town Attorney expressing a desire to continue torent the premises on a month-to-month basis following expiration of the lease on April 14, 2016.The Town Attorney replied that the town supervisor would accept the month-to-month tenancy,with monthly rent payments based on the pro-rated annual rent, but that the Town reserved theright to terminate Jointa's tenancy on 30 days' notice. Jointa remained in possession of thepremises after the expiration of the lease and the Town accepted monthly rent payments.

In May 2016, the plaintiff/petitioner, Tilcon New York, Inc. (hereinafter Tilcon), a businesscompetitor of Jointa, commenced this hybrid action and CPLR article 78 proceeding against theTown of New Windsor, the Town Board, the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafterZBA), and Jennifer Gallagher in her capacity as Building Inspector (hereinafter collectively theTown defendants) and Jointa. Tilcon set forth nine causes of action, alleging, inter alia, thatJointa's month-to-month holdover tenancy violated Town Law §§ 29 (11) and64 (2), General Municipal Law §§ 51 and 103, and the State EnvironmentalQuality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]).

Tilcon moved to preliminarily enjoin the Town defendants from entering into a new leasewith Jointa and prohibiting any new construction on the premises by Jointa. The Towndefendants moved to dismiss the complaint/petition in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3)on the ground that Tilcon lacked standing, and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5) and (7) and7804 (f). Jointa separately moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (3) and 7804 (f) and to dismiss the sixth cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and(2) and 7804 (f). The Supreme Court denied Tilcon's motion and granted the motions of theTown defendants and Jointa, and directed dismissal of Tilcon's first six causes of action pursuantto CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), and its seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (3). Tilcon appeals. We determine that Tilcon lacked standing to assert any of itscauses of action, and we therefore affirm the order and judgment appealed from on thatbasis.

"Standing requirements 'are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable partof the plaintiff's case' and therefore 'each element must be supported in the same way as any othermatter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof' " (Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. vCommon Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 306 [2009], quoting Lujan vDefenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 561 [1992]; see Society of Plastics Indus. v Countyof Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). Thus, "a court can act only when the rights of theparty requesting relief are affected" and that party has "an actual legal stake in the matter beingadjudicated" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 772; seeMatter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d at304-305; New York State Assn. ofNurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211 [2004]).

Generally, to establish standing to challenge governmental action, a party must show that itwill "suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large"(Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 774), and that "the in-factinjury of which it complains . . . falls within the 'zone of interests,' or concerns,sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted"(id. at 773, quoting Lujan v National Wildlife Federation, 497 US 871, 883[1990]; see Matter of Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 NY2d 401,409-410 [2000]; Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d428, 433 [1990]; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Townof N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 413 [1987]). "Thus, a private citizen who does not showany special rights or interests in the matter in controversy, other than those common to alltaxpayers and citizens, has no standing to sue" (Diederich v Rockland County Police Chiefs' Assn., 33 AD3d 653,654 [2006]). Indeed, even the fact that "an issue may be one of vital public concern does notentitle a party to standing" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at769 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Tilcon's first, third, and fifth causes of action allege violations of Town Law§§ 29 (11) and 64 (2), and its fourth cause of action, which alleges ultra viresaction, avers that the Town failed to comply with statutory requirements for leasing. However,Tilcon failed to describe any injury to itself, either actual or potential, that has resulted from thesealleged violations, much less an injury different from the general injury to the public at large thatresults from the Town's alleged violation of the procedural requirements for leasing real property(see Matter of Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 NY2d at 409-410;Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 773-774; Matter of MobilOil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d at 433; Matter of Sun-Brite CarWash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d at 413).Tilcon's only injury, if any, is increased business competition, which is not an interest that issufficient to confer standing (see Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning &Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d at 415; Matter of Hadland v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Southampton,94 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2012]). With respect to its second cause of action, which allegesviolation of the competitive bidding requirements of General Municipal Law § 103,Tilcon has not identified any injury, other than increased business competition, that it will sufferas a result of the Town's alleged violation of competitive bidding rules, which, in any case, aregenerally inapplicable to leases of public property (see Matter of Citiwide News v New YorkCity Tr. Auth., 62 NY2d 464, 470 [1984]; Matter of B.C.I. Indus. Catering v Town ofHuntington, 250 AD2d 675, 676 [1998]).

Tilcon's seventh cause of action alleged that the May 2, 2016, determination by the ZBA ofan application by Jointa was arbitrary and capricious. However, Tilcon was not a party to thoseproceedings, and the ZBA's determination is not adverse to Tilcon. As to both the ZBA'sdetermination and the Town Board's alleged issuance of permits (the eighth cause of action),Tilcon has failed to demonstrate that it has suffered an injury-in-fact distinct from the public atlarge (see Matter of Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 NY2d at409-410; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 773-774; Matterof Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d at 433; Matter of Sun-BriteCar Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d at413).

Tilcon did not establish standing as to its ninth cause of action, which alleges violations ofSEQRA, because "a generalized 'interest' in the environment [does] not confer standing tochallenge environmental injury" (Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council ofCity of Albany, 13 NY3d at 305, quoting Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 734[1972]; see Matter of Shapiro vTorres, 153 AD3d 835, 836 [2017]). In addition to the requirement of demonstrating aninjury-in-fact distinct from the public at large which falls within SEQRA's zone of interest (see Matter of Brummel v Town of N.Hempstead Town Bd., 145 AD3d 880, 881-882 [2016]), a party seeking to raise aSEQRA challenge " 'must demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmentaland not solely economic in nature' " (Matter of Shapiro v Torres, 153 AD3d at836, quoting Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d at433). Again, Tilcon failed to demonstrate that it has standing because it failed to identify anyenvironmental injury it has suffered or will suffer which differs from the alleged injury to thepublic at large.

Tilcon's sixth cause of action is premised on General Municipal Law § 51,which authorizes taxpayer suits to prevent waste, collusion, fraud, or other illegal acts. To havestanding to commence an action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 51, Tilconwas required to allege that the challenged act constituted a waste of or injury to public funds or,alternatively, that the challenged act was both illegal and "imperil[ed] the public interests or[was] calculated to work public injury or produce some public mischief" (Matter of Korn vGulotta, 72 NY2d 363, 372 [1988]; see Matter of Glass v County of Suffolk, 130 AD3d 726, 727-728[2015]). "A taxpayer suit under General Municipal Law § 51 'lies only when the[governmental] acts complained of are fraudulent, or a waste of public property in the sense thatthey represent a use of public property or funds for entirely illegal purposes' " (Godfrey v Spano, 13 NY3d 358,373 [2009], quoting Mesivta of Forest Hills Inst. v City of New York, 58 NY2d 1014,1016 [1983]; see Klubenspies v Town ofClarkstown, 115 AD3d 817, 818 [2014]; Fauvell v Miglino, 111 AD3d 596, 597 [2013]). The Town'salleged failure to observe the statutes and rules involved in this case "does not constitute thefraud or illegality necessary to support a taxpayer action pursuant to section 51" (Mesivta ofForest Hills Inst. v City of New York, 58 NY2d at 1016).

Contrary to Tilcon's contention, it also failed to establish common-law taxpayer standing.Common-law taxpayer standing exists as "a remedy for taxpayers to challenge importantgovernmental actions, despite such parties being otherwise insufficiently interested for standingpurposes, when 'the failure to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrablebarrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative action' " (Matter of Colella v Board ofAssessors of County of Nassau, 95 NY2d at 410, quoting Boryszewski v Brydges, 37NY2d 361, 364 [1975]; see Fauvell vMiglino, 111 AD3d 596, 597 [2013]; Diederich v Rockland County Police Chiefs'Assn., 33 AD3d at 654). Here, Tilcon failed to demonstrate that the Town's actions were of"appreciable public significance beyond the immediately affected parties" or that the failure toafford it standing would insulate the Town's actions from review (Matter of Colella v Boardof Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 NY2d at 410-411).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the remaining contentions of the Towndefendants and Jointa. Tilcon's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Austin,Cohen and Iannacci, JJ., concur.


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