Matter of Cady v Town of Germantown Planning Bd.
2020 NY Slip Op 03440 [184 AD3d 983]
June 18, 2020
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 5, 2020


[*1]
 In the Matter of Arthur M. Cady et al., Respondents, et al.,Petitioners,
v
Town of Germantown Planning Board et al., Appellants, et al.,Respondents.

Whitbeck Benedict & Smith LLP, Hudson (Corrine R. Smith of counsel), for Town ofGermantown Planning Board, appellant.

Monaco Cooper Lamme & Carr PLLC, Albany (Jacob F. Lamme of counsel), forPrimax Properties, LLC, appellant.

Warren S. Replansky, PC, Rhinebeck (Warren S. Replansky of counsel), forrespondents.

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered February 5,2019, in Columbia County, which granted petitioners' application, in a combined proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination ofrespondent Town of Germantown Planning Board approving the request of respondent PrimaxProperties, LLC for subdivision and site plan approval.

In January 2015, respondent Primax Properties, LLC applied to respondent Town ofGermantown Planning Board for subdivision and site plan approval to subdivide an existing lotof approximately 6.1 acres in the Town of Germantown, Columbia County (hereinafter theproperty) into two lots. Respondents Paul D'Souza and Henrietta D'Souza, who owned theproperty, would retain one lot of approximately 4.7 acres, while the remaining lot ofapproximately 1.4 acres (hereinafter the site) would be conveyed to Primax. Primax would thenconstruct an approximately 9,000-square-foot Dollar General retail store on the site, a permitteduse in the relevant zoning district requiring site plan approval. Petitioners Arthur M. Cady andElizabeth M. Cawley owned certain real property that shared a common boundary with theproperty. The site falls within the Town's scenic viewshed overlay district, which is designed toprotect the Hudson River corridor and the Catskill Mountain viewshed in accordance with theTown's Comprehensive Plan.

Following Primax's application, the Planning Board declared itself lead agency pursuant tothe State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]). ThePlanning Board issued a positive declaration, thus requiring the preparation of an environmentalimpact statement (hereinafter EIS). After Primax submitted three draft EISes, the Planning Boarddetermined that the draft EIS was complete and accepted it for public review. The PlanningBoard subsequently held a public hearing and continued to accept public comments for a monthafterwards. At the Planning Board's request, Primax submitted a proposed final EIS (hereinafterFEIS). The Planning Board then held an internal meeting and voted to accept the FEIS as written.After the Planning Board revised its draft SEQRA findings statement, it unanimously voted toadopt it. Among other things, the proposed revised findings statement indicated that, although theproposed 71-foot-wide building and accompanying signage would be visible from surroundinglocations, the building and signage were "not expected to present a significant visual impact" onthe viewshed. The Planning Board subsequently held a public hearing and opened a publiccomment period on the Planning Board's SEQRA findings statement. Despite predominantlynegative public comments, the Planning Board unanimously adopted a resolution conditionallyapproving the site plan and subdivision. The resolution incorporated the Planning Board'sSEQRA findings statement and further noted that the project complied with all standards forsubdivision and site plan approval, as well as applicable zoning and design standards.

Thereafter, petitioners commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action fordeclaratory judgment setting forth 12 causes of action generally involving alleged SEQRAviolations. Petitioners argued, as relevant here, that the Planning Board failed to take the requisitehard look at the visual and environmental impact of the project and acted outside of its authorityby approving the building design with a 71-foot façade without submitting the matter tothe Germantown Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter ZBA) for a determination as to whetheran area variance was necessary. The D'Souzas filed a pro se answer and Primax filed a verifiedanswer, each asserting that petitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court found that Cady andCawley had standing insofar as the close proximity of their adjacent property placed them at riskof having their view of the scenic landscape corrupted by the project.[FN1] The court then vacated the Planning Board'sresolution, finding, among other things, that, although the Planning Board did take a hard look atthe project's environmental impacts, it exceeded its authority under the Town zoning code byfailing to refer the matter to the ZBA. The court therefore granted the petition and referred thematter to the ZBA for a determination of whether the proposed building's 71-foot façadeconforms with the Town zoning code. Primax and the Planning Board (hereinafter collectivelyreferred to as respondents) appeal.

We find without merit respondents' argument that Cady and Cawley lack standing. Cady andCawley's residence is directly adjacent to the proposed construction site, and the proposed retailstore would be directly across the woods from their property. The store's main parking lot, whichis located behind the store, is in the line of sight of Cady and Cawley's property. As a result, thestore is likely to obstruct or interfere with the scenic views within the scenic viewshed overlaydistrict from Cady and Cawley's property. Cady and Cawley have standing because they havedemonstrated that they would suffer an "injury in fact—i.e., actual harm by the actionchallenged that differs from that suffered by the public at large—and that such injury fallswithin the zone of interests, or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutoryprovision under which the agency has acted" (Matter of Saratoga Lake Protection & Improvement Dist. v Departmentof Pub. Works of City of Saratoga Springs, 46 AD3d 979, 981 [2007] [internalquotation marks, brackets and citation omitted], lv denied 10 NY3d 706 [2008]; see Matter of Ziemba v City of Troy,37 AD3d 68, 70-73 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 806 [2007]).

Turning to the merits, respondents contend that Supreme Court improperly found that thePlanning Board exceeded its authority in declining to refer the project to the ZBA. In reviewing azoning ordinance, a court must "read all of its parts together, construe any unambiguous languagecontained therein in such a fashion as to give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Oakwood Prop. Mgt., LLC vTown of Brunswick, 103 AD3d 1067, 1071 [2013] [internal quotation marks, bracketsand citations omitted], lv denied 21 NY3d 853 [2013]; see Matter of Casey v Town of AriettaZoning Bd. of Appeals, 169 AD3d 1231, 1233 [2019]). Additionally, a local planningboard generally lacks authority to interpret provisions of the local zoning code; such authority isgenerally reserved for a zoning board of appeals (see Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v Crossroads Ventures,LLC, 161 AD3d 1413, 1415-1416 [2018]; Matter of East Moriches Prop. Owners' Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. of Townof Brookhaven, 66 AD3d 895, 897 [2009]). A planning board, however, will not berequired to refer a matter to a zoning board for a superfluous interpretation of an unambiguousprovision contained in the zoning code (see Matter of Micklas v Town of Halfmoon Planning Bd., 170 AD3d1483, 1487 [2019]; Matter of East Moriches Prop. Owners' Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. ofTown of Brookhaven, 66 AD3d at 897).

As relevant here, the Town zoning code states that "the length of any façade shouldgenerally not exceed 50 feet maximum (horizontal dimension)" (Zoning and SubdivisionLaw for the Town of Germantown, art VII, § A [4] [d] [emphasis added]). Insofaras the subject provision lacks any compulsory language,[FN2] this provision is deliberately phrased as aguideline, rather than as a prohibition; in other words, there was no requirement for a referral tothe ZBA to determine the plain language of the statute. Based on the foregoing, Supreme Courterred in finding that the Planning Board exceeded its authority insofar as its approval of the siteplan was rational and based simply upon an unambiguous reading of the Town zoning code(see generally Matter of Micklas v Town of Halfmoon Planning Bd., 170 AD3d at 1487;Matter of East Moriches Prop. Owners' Assn., Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town ofBrookhaven, 66 AD3d at 897; compare Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v Crossroads Ventures,LLC, 161 AD3d 1413, 1415-1416 [2018]).

Petitioners argue, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that the Planning Board failed tosatisfy SEQRA's "hard look" requirement as to the visual impact of the 71-foot façade.This argument lacks merit. Although the façade did exceed the Town zoning code's50-foot guideline, the Planning Board took various actions to ensure that Primax minimized thefaçade's visual and environmental disruption, including, in preparation for the second draftEIS, requiring Primax to alter the façade to include a chamfered front to reduce the visualimpact. Primax complied with this requirement. As such, our review of the record reveals that thePlanning Board underwent a nearly four-year process that involved in-depth environmentalimpact reports, multiple draft EISes and public hearings, which formed the basis of the FEIS andSEQRA findings statement. Accordingly, we find that the Planning Board complied with itsprocedural and substantive requirements under SEQRA (see Matter of Cade v Stapf, 91 AD3d 1229, 1230-1232 [2012]; Matter of North Country Citizens forResponsible Growth, Inc. v Town of Potsdam Planning Bd., 39 AD3d 1098, 1103-1104[2007]).

Lynch, J.P., Devine and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Supreme Court found that theremaining petitioners lacked standing.

Footnote 2:Although the Town zoning codeexpressly states that "[t]he word 'shall' is mandatory unless otherwise indicated" (Zoning andSubdivision Law for the Town of Germantown, art X, § B [1]), and other provisionsof the zoning code use the word "shall," this provision relating to the length of any façadedoes not.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.