| People v Rivera |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 00218 [201 AD3d 1132] |
| January 13, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Calvin Rivera, Appellant. |
Veronica Reed, Schenectady, for appellant.
Craig P. Carriero, District Attorney, Malone (Jennifer M. Hollis of counsel), forrespondent.
Reynolds Fitzgerald, J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County(Richards, J.), rendered October 11, 2017, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thecrime of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree, and (2) by permission, froman order of said court (Champagne, J.), entered June 19, 2019, which denied defendant's motionpursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.
Defendant was charged in a sealed indictment with one count of promoting prisoncontraband in the first degree. The indictment was unsealed at defendant's arraignment in July2017, whereupon defendant was offered the opportunity to plead guilty to the reduced charge ofattempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree with the understanding that he wouldbe sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of 1
When defendant appeared for sentencing in September 2017, defendant renewed his requestthat the contemplated prison term run concurrently with his undischarged sentence, and thematter was adjourned for approximately three weeks to permit the parties to ascertain whether aconcurrent prison term was permissible. After defense counsel agreed that a consecutive term ofimprisonment was required and defendant indicated that he was ready to proceed, County Courtsentenced defendant as a second felony offender to the agreed-upon prison term of1
In January 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 seeking to vacatethe judgment of conviction alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due tocounsel's failure to, among other things, move for dismissal of the indictment due topreindictment delay. County Court (Champagne, J.) denied the motion without a hearing.Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the order denyinghis CPL article 440 motion.
We affirm. Defendant's challenge to the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal lacksmerit. County Court (Richards, J.) explained the separate and distinct nature of the right to appealand expressly delineated the rights that survived such waiver (see People v Mirel, 194 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2021]; People v Pribble, 190 AD3d 1194,1195 [2021]). Additionally, defendant executed a written waiver in open court and assured thecourt that he had read the waiver[*2], understood its contents andhad no questions relative thereto (see People v Pribble, 190 AD3d at 1195; People v Wickwire, 166 AD3d1170, 1171 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1211 [2019]). As such, we are satisfied thatdefendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.[FN*]
Any assertion that defendant was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial is precluded bydefendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Votaw, 190 AD3d 1162, 1164 [2021], lvdenied 36 NY3d 1101 [2021]). Defendant's related claim—that his constitutional rightto a speedy trial was violated—"survives both his guilty plea and appeal waiver" (People v McCorkle, 67 AD3d1249, 1250 [2009]; see People vAcevedo, 179 AD3d 1397, 1399 [2020]) but is unpreserved for our review due todefendant's failure to raise this before County Court in the first instance (see People vVotaw, 190 AD3d at 1164; People vGrays, 179 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2020]; People v Gerald, 153 AD3d 1029, 1030 [2017]; People v Evans, 156 AD3d 1246,1247 [2017]; People v Bennett, 143AD3d 1008, 1010 [2016]). Were we to address this claim in the context of defendant's CPL440.10 motion before County Court (Champagne, J.) (see People v Young, 190 AD3d 1087, 1093 [2021], lvdenied 36 NY3d 1102 [2021]), we would not be persuaded, upon due consideration of therelevant factors (see People vChaney, 197 AD3d 1359, 1360 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1059 [2021]; People v Lende, 190 AD3d 1110,1110-1111 [2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1121 [2021]), that defendant's rights in this regardwere violated. Notably, the roughly 12-month delay at issue here was not unreasonable, and "wehave found similar—or even longer—periods of delay to pass constitutionalmuster" (People v Chaney, 197 AD3d at 1361, citing People v Lende, 190 AD3dat 1111 [alleged 15-month delay], People v Pitt, 43 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2007], lv denied 9NY3d 1008 [2007] [almost 18-month delay], and People v Arrington, 31 AD3d 801, 802 [2006], lv denied 7NY3d 865 [2006] [almost 16-month delay]).
Defendant next contends that he received the ineffective assistance based upon counsel'sfailure to file a written motion seeking the deferral of the applicable surcharge and fees followingsentencing, as well as counsel's subsequent failure to submit an affidavit in support of defendant'spro se CPL 440.10 motion. "The alleged failure of defense counsel to pursue a postjudgmentmotion does not impact the voluntariness of the plea and, therefore, such challenge is precludedby the waiver of the right to appeal" (People v Archer, 171 AD3d 1404, 1405 [2019] [citations omitted],lv denied 33 NY3d 1066 [2019]). In any event, "counsel cannot be faulted for failing topursue or, in this case, support a motion that had little chance of success" (People v Pittman, 166 AD3d 1243,1246 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1176 [2019]; see People v Rosario, 157 AD3d 988, 993 [2018], lv denied31 NY3d 1121 [2018]). Defendant's remaining [*3]arguments, tothe extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
Garry, P.J., Clark, Aarons and Colangelo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and orderare affirmed.
Footnote *:Defendant's presentassertion—that the validity of the waiver was undermined by his belief that the sentence tobe imposed could run concurrently with, rather than consecutively to, the sentence he then wasserving—is belied by the plea colloquy, wherein County Court very clearly adviseddefendant that the sentence to be imposed "ha[d] to be served consecutively" to the prison termdefendant then was serving—a point that was reiterated at the time of sentencing.