| People v Robbins |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 03549 [206 AD3d 1069] |
| June 2, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jodi Robbins, Appellant. |
Mayersak and Weiss, Ithaca (Madeline E. Weiss of counsel), for appellant.
Matthew Van Houten, District Attorney, Ithaca (Daniel W. Johnson of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Rowley,J.), rendered August 12, 2020, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminalcontempt in the first degree and harassment in the second degree.
In January 2019, defendant sent menacing text messages to the victim and later confrontedher in an aggressive manner outside of Kelly's Dockside, the restaurant in the City of Ithaca,Tompkins County where they both worked. A temporary order of protection was soon issued infavor of the victim. The order of protection remained in effect on June 8, 2019, when defendantappeared at the restaurant while the victim was working. Defendant lingered at the restaurant forseveral hours despite efforts to remove her and became increasingly belligerent, making rudecomments about the victim to both the victim and the victim's customers. The victim eventuallystepped outside and called 911 to request assistance. When the victim returned, defendant askedher if she "want[ed] to go," approached her and, according to the victim and two coworkers whowitnessed the incident, grabbed the victim by her hair and pulled her backward. Defendant waspromptly restrained by the restaurant's owner, while the victim left to call 911 a second time.Responding officers took defendant into custody upon their arrival.
As a result of the June 2019 incident, defendant was charged in a July 2019 indictment withcriminal contempt in the first degree and harassment in the second degree. The People declaredreadiness for trial in July 2019 and voluntarily made disclosure under CPL former article 240, butthe trial itself was adjourned from the fall of 2019 to January 6, 2020. On January 1, 2020, thediscovery provisions of CPL article 245 and a variety of other criminal justice reforms enacted bythe Legislature took effect (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part LLL,§§ 2, 3). The People questioned whether they had to comply with thoseprovisions, but nevertheless filed a new statement of readiness for trial on January 3, 2020,accompanied by a certification that they had met their disclosure obligations under CPL 245.20(see CPL 30.30 [5]; 245.50).
At the trial that commenced on January 6, 2020, defendant complained that the People hadnot, notwithstanding their certification, complied with CPL 245.20 in various respects. The trialproceeded with proof that included testimony from the victim and the two coworkers regardingtheir accounts of the June 2019 incident. Defendant testified in her own defense andacknowledged that she was at the restaurant, that she had consumed seven or eight alcoholicdrinks over the course of the day and that she was harassing the victim, but denied that she hadsubjected the victim to physical contact (see Penal Law §§ 215.51 [b][v]; 240.26 [1]). The jury found defendant guilty as charged.
Defendant moved to set aside the jury verdict after learning that one of the coworkers whotestified had an out-of-state criminal [*2]record of which neithershe nor the People were aware at trial. County Court denied the motion. The court thereaftersentenced defendant, a second felony offender, to a prison term of 1
Defendant initially argues that the statement of trial readiness and certificate of compliancefiled by the People were invalid because the People did not satisfy their discovery obligationsunder CPL article 245. Although "the now-abrogated CPL article 240 [applied to] casescommenced prior to the effective date of the new legislation" (People v Sweet, 200 AD3d 1315,1319 n 3 [2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 930 [2022]), the provisions of CPL article 245 andrelated reforms to CPL 30.30 and other statutes took effect on January 1, 2020, and "proceduralchanges are, in the absence of words of exclusion, deemed applicable to subsequent proceedingsin pending actions" (Simonson v International Bank, 14 NY2d 281, 289 [1964] [internalquotation marks, emphasis and citation omitted]; see Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous.& Community Renewal, 35 NY3d 332, 370 [2020]; People v McFadden, 189 AD3d2086, 2087 [2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1099 [2021]). The relevant provisions ofCPL 30.30 and CPL article 245 constituted such changes and, as such, applied to proceedingstaken in this matter after January 1, 2020 (see People v Hewitt, 201 AD3d 1041, 1042-1043 [2022], lvdenied 38 NY3d 928 [2022]).
CPL 245.20 (1) directs a prosecutor to automatically "disclose to the defendant, and permitthe defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relateto the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutionor persons under the prosecution's direction or control," then goes on to give specific examples ofinformation and evidence that must be disclosed. A prosecutor's notice of readiness for trial must"be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosurerequirements of [CPL] 245.20" (CPL 30.30 [5], as added by L 2019, ch 59, § 1, partKKK, § 1), and "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of[CPL 30.30] until it has filed a proper certificate" of compliance (CPL 245.50 [3], as added by L2019, ch 59, § 1, part LLL, § 2). The People stated their readiness fortrial and issued a certification of good faith compliance on January 3, 2020. County Courtthereafter proceeded, as required, to make an "inquiry on the record as to [the People's] actualreadiness" and afford defendant "an opportunity to be heard on the record as to whether thedisclosure requirements have been met" (CPL 30.30 [5]; see William C. Donnino, SuppPractice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 30.30, 2021 Pocket Partat 101; William C. Donnino, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book11A, CPL 245.10, 2021 Pocket [*3]Part at 28-29).
County Court's inquiry did not, contrary to defendant's contention, reveal that the Peoplefailed to meet their disclosure obligations under CPL 245.20. First, although the People did notdisclose contact information for the victim's mother and an investigator in the District Attorney'soffice, disclosure was not required absent any showing that those individuals had relevantevidence or information of which the People were aware (see CPL 245.20 [1] [c], [d]).The People further complied with their obligation to provide information regarding the twocoworkers who testified to their observations of the June 2019 incident and, although defendantcomplained of the timeliness of that disclosure, she was well aware of her coworkers' existence,while the People only learned of that fact in December 2019. The People further complied withtheir continuing duty to disclose in the midst of trial by alerting defendant to their discovery thatone of those coworkers went by a different last name and then conducting a criminal historycheck using that name (see CPL 245.60). Defendant therefore failed to demonstrate thatany disclosure violation had occurred and, by extension, failed to establish either that thePeople's certificate of readiness was invalid or that any other discovery sanction was warranted(see e.g. People v Brown, 28 NY3d392, 399-400 [2016]; Matter ofPeople ex rel. LaBrew v Vance, 192 AD3d 645, 645 [2021]).
We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant's claim of a Brady violation. Defendantspecifically faults the People's failure to disclose that one of the coworkers had a prior criminalrecord outside of New York, a fact that defendant uncovered after the jury rendered a verdict andthat could have been used to impeach the coworker's credibility on the stand. The People,however, made "a diligent, good faith effort to" discover that record by running a check of thecoworker's criminal history after learning that she used a different last name (CPL 245.20 [2];see CPL 245.20 [1] [k]; 245.55 [1]). The check did not turn up the prior criminal historyof the coworker from another state and, "as the People were unaware of the record of thewitness'[s] conviction[s] before or at the time of trial, their failure to disclose [those convictions]did not violate Brady" (People v Forbes, 190 AD2d 1005, 1006 [1993], lvdenied 81 NY2d 970 [1993]; accord People v Ingraham, 274 AD2d 828, 829 [2000]).Any error was harmless, in any event, as our review of the record reveals "overwhelming proof ofdefendant's guilt" such "that there is no reasonable possibility that this error contributed to theverdict" (People v Ingraham, 274 AD2d at 828).
County Court also did not, contrary to defendant's assertion, abuse its discretion in denyingher motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. "In order to prevailupon such a motion, it must appear that the newly discovered evidence would not merelyimpeach or contradict [*4]the proof at trial" (People v Bowers, 4 AD3d 558,560 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 796 [2004]; see People v Hicks, 6 NY3d 737, 739 [2005]; People v Kachadourian, 184 AD3d1021, 1030 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1113 [2020]). The newly discoveredevidence here was the prior criminal history of the coworker, which would have been useful onlyfor impeaching the coworker's credibility as a witness and was therefore not "new evidence of thesort warranting the granting of a new trial" (People v Salemi, 309 NY 208, 221 [1955],cert denied 350 US 950 [1956]).
Although defendant's remaining contentions have been examined and are meritless, we arenevertheless obliged to remit for resentencing. The sentencing transcript reflects that CountyCourt imposed a single sentence upon defendant and "failed to pronounce sentence separately oneach of the two counts [of] which [she was convicted], as required by CPL 380.20" (People v Volfson, 69 AD3d 1123,1125 [2010]; see People v Sturgis, 69 NY2d 816, 817-818 [1987]). As a result, the mattermust be remitted so that County Court can pronounce sentence on each count (see People v Disotell, 123 AD3d1230, 1232 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1162 [2015]; People v Volfson, 69AD3d at 1125).
Clark, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and McShan, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment ismodified, on the law, by vacating the sentence imposed; matter remitted to the County Court ofTompkins County for resentencing; and, as so modified, affirmed.