People v Hill
2022 NY Slip Op 05626 [209 AD3d 1262]
October 7, 2022
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 30, 2022


[*1](October 7, 2022)
 The People of the State of New York,Appellant,
v
Patrick A. Hill, Respondent.

Kristyna S. Mills, District Attorney, Watertown (Morgan R. Mayer of counsel), forappellant.

D.J. & J.A. Cirando, PLLC, Syracuse (John A. Cirando of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Jefferson County Court (David A. Renzi, J.), enteredAugust 25, 2021. The order granted the motion of defendant to dismiss the supersedingindictment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is reversed on the law, themotion is denied, the superseding indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted toJefferson County Court for further proceedings on the superseding indictment.

Memorandum: The People appeal from an order that granted defendant's motion todismiss the superseding indictment on speedy trial grounds. By indictment issued inMarch 2019, a grand jury charged defendant with a series of crimes, and on March 28,2019, the People announced readiness thereon. The People, with leave of County Court,obtained a superseding indictment by presenting the matter to another grand jury inSeptember 2019, and they announced readiness with respect to the supersedingindictment on October 26, 2019. The People announced readiness on several additionaloccasions and the matter was placed on the trial calendar on several dates, although itwas not the first case scheduled to be tried on any of those dates. The matter was thenscheduled for trial on August 9, 2021, as the fourth case to be tried. In the week beforethat date, all three preceding cases were settled by pleas of guilty. Although at a pretrialconference on July 28, 2021, the People had again indicated that they were ready fortrial, at a pretrial calendar call on August 4, 2021, the trial prosecutor indicated that, withthe approval of the District Attorney, she had not contacted the witnesses for this trialbecause they expected the three preceding matters to be tried, and they did not wish toput the child victims through the emotional trauma of preparing for trial. The trialprosecutor further indicated that they had not subpoenaed or interviewed those witnesseson any of the earlier dates when the matter was scheduled for trial. Finally, the trialprosecutor stated that "we feel it is unfair for [the teenage victims] to be thrown into ajury trial with four days notice."

The court struck the matter from the trial calendar and indicated that it wouldentertain a speedy trial motion. Defendant moved the next day to dismiss the supersedingindictment on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. The court granted themotion and dismissed the superseding indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. Wereverse.

Initially, we note that defendant did not contend in his motion that any of the timeprior to his arraignment on the superseding indictment should be chargeable to thePeople. Therefore, he failed to preserve any challenge to the People's readiness prior toOctober 26, 2019 (see People vPellis, 159 AD3d 1347, 1348 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1151[2018]). In any event, the court did not conclude that any time prior to that point waschargeable to the People.

Next, we note that the Governor's COVID-19 executive orders tolled the speedy trialtime limits applicable to criminal proceedings from March 20, 2020, until October 4,2020 (see People v Pagan,75 Misc 3d 11, 12 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2022]). [*2]Thus, that time period is properly excluded from the timechargeable to the People.

Contrary to the People's contention, the exclusion in CPL 30.30 (4) (g) for"exceptional circumstances" does not apply. As we have previously stated, an "analysisof cases where 'exceptional circumstances' have been found reveals two common factors:(1) that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the control of the District Attorney'soffice; and (2) that it prevented the prosecution from being ready for trial" (People vLaBounty, 104 AD2d 202, 204 [4th Dept 1984]; see generally People v Barnett, 158 AD3d 1279, 1280-1281[4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1078 [2018]). Here, the determination not toprepare the victims to testify at trial was solely within the control of the DistrictAttorney's Office. Thus, the time after August 4, 2021, when the People indicated thatthey were not prepared to try the case, is chargeable to them.

Nevertheless, with respect to the time between October 26, 2019, and August 4,2021, the court concluded that the People's statements of readiness during that periodwere illusory because they had not subpoenaed their witnesses for the earlier trial dates.That was error.

"The statutory period is calculated by 'computing the time elapsed between the filingof the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtractingany periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding tothe result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the Peopleand are ineligible for an exclusion' " (Barnett, 158 AD3d at 1280,quoting People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]). There are two elements toreadiness for trial, i.e., (1) " 'a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in opencourt, . . . or a written notice of readiness' "; and (2) "the Peoplemust in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness" (People vChavis, 91 NY2d 500, 505 [1998]; see People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337[1985]), thus "[a] statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually readyis illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock" (People vEngland, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994], rearg denied 84 NY2d 846 [1994]). Where,as here, the People declare readiness but then withdraw that declaration, the defendant"bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating, based on the People's proffered reasons andother relevant circumstances, that the prior statement of readiness was illusory" (People v Brown, 28 NY3d392, 400 [2016]).

We conclude that the court erred in determining that defendant met that burden. Priorto August 4, 2021, no adjournment was caused by the People's failure to have theirwitnesses ready for trial. Rather, the matter was adjourned on those occasions due toother, older matters proceeding to trial before this case was reached. "The People are notrequired to contact their witnesses on every adjourned date . . . , nor do theyhave to be able to produce their witnesses instantaneously in order for a statement ofreadiness to be valid" (People v Camillo, 279 AD2d 326, 326 [1st Dept 2001];see People v Robinson, 171 AD2d 475, 476-478 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied78 NY2d 973 [1991]). To the contrary, " '[p]ostreadiness delay may becharge[able] to the People when the delay is attributable to their inaction and directlyimplicates their ability to proceed to trial' " (People v Fulmer, 87 AD3d 1385, 1385 [4th Dept 2011],lv denied 18 NY3d 994 [2012], quoting People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795,799 [1998]; see People vPratt, 186 AD3d 1055, 1057 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 975[2020]). Here, although the time after the People withdrew their statement of readinesswas properly charged to them, there was no prior delay attributable to the People'sinaction. Consequently, the prior statements of readiness were not illusory (see generally People v Rice,172 AD3d 1616, 1618-1619 [3d Dept 2019]).

Finally, we admonish the prosecutor that she must obey an order of the court to havea case ready for trial. Regardless of the prosecutor's feelings concerning the orderscheduling the trial for August 9, 2021, or its possible impact on the witnesses, it was avalid order of the court, and with certain exceptions that are not relevant here, "a courtorder must be obeyed" (People v Williamson, 136 AD2d 497, 497 [1st Dept1988]; see generally Matter of Balter v Regan, 63 NY2d 630, 631 [1984], certdenied 469 US 934 [1984]).

All concur except NeMoyer, J., who dissents and votes to affirm in the followingmemorandum.

NeMoyer, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent because, in my view, County Courtproperly determined that the People's statement of readiness was illusory and thus theorder dismissing the superseding indictment should be affirmed. Delay is attributable tothe People "when the delay is attributable to their inaction and directly implicates theirability to proceed to trial" (People v [*3]Carter,91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]). Here, the People were admittedly unable to proceed to trialdue to their own failure to fully prepare their witnesses, and thus the People's owninaction rendered them unready when the trial was ultimately scheduled. Although Iagree with the majority that the People are not required to contact their witnesses onevery adjourned date and do not have to be able to produce their witnessesinstantaneously in order for a statement of readiness to be valid (see People vCamillo, 279 AD2d 326, 326 [1st Dept 2001]), this is not a case where a previouslyready witness later became unavailable or could not be located for reasons beyond thePeople's control. Instead, on the day they declared that they were ready for trial, thePeople knew they had not fully prepared their witnesses, they did not remedy thatdeficiency before thereafter declaring that they were unready, and, according to thePeople, they lacked the time or ability to satisfactorily prepare their witnesses once thetrial was scheduled. Under these circumstances, although the People were not required toconstantly contact their witnesses so as to keep the witnesses ready for trial, here thePeople, by their choice, never fully prepared their witnesses for trial and thus, by theirown admission, were never actually ready to proceed on any day before declaring thatthey were unready. Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, Centra, Peradotto and NeMoyer,JJ.


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