Matter of McKenzie v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. ofAlbany
2012 NY Slip Op 07258 [100 AD3d 1096]
November 1, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012


In the Matter of Shunn McKenzie, Petitioner, v Board of Educationof the City School District of Albany, Respondent.

—[*1]Trevor W. Hannigan, Albany, for petitioner.

Girvin & Ferlazzo, PC, Albany (Robert F. Manfredo of counsel), for respondent.

Kavanagh, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order ofthe Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent whichterminated petitioner's employment.

Petitioner was employed as a custodian for the City School District of Albany when, in 2009,police responded to his home in connection with a domestic violence complaint. After petitionerwas placed under arrest, the police found on his person 3½ grams of crack cocaine. As aresult of the circumstances which led to his arrest, and the seizure of illegal drugs from hisperson, petitioner was charged by the school district with engaging in "conduct unbecoming a[s]chool [d]istrict employee and misconduct." A hearing was scheduled and, pursuant to CivilService Law § 75, petitioner was advised in writing of the identity of the Hearing Officerwho was appointed to preside over the proceedings. After the hearing, a report was issued inwhich the Hearing Officer found petitioner guilty of misconduct and recommended his dismissalas a school district employee. Respondent adopted the Hearing Officer's recommendation byresolution and petitioner's employment was terminated. Petitioner then commenced this CPLRarticle 78 proceeding.[*2]

Petitioner initially argues that the Hearing Officer'sappointment was invalid because respondent failed to provide him with the official notice of theHearing Officer's designation. Civil Service Law § 75 (2) requires that a hearing uponcharges of misconduct "shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove theperson against whom such charges are preferred, or by a deputy or other person designated bysuch officer or body in writing for that purpose" (see Matter of Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 92 AD3d 1093, 1094 [2012], appeal dismissed and lv dismissed 19NY3d 917 [2012]). We have held that "the requirements of Civil Service Law § 75 (2) aresatisfied by a written record of such designation, such as . . . a letter to the hearingofficer advising him or her that the official designation has taken place" (Matter of Arthur v Soares, 95 AD3d1619, 1620 [2012]; see Matter ofStafford v Board of Educ. of Mohonasen Cent. School Dist., 61 AD3d 1259, 1260[2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]). Here, petitioner was provided a copy of theDecember 3, 2010 letter from respondent's interim superintendent informing the Hearing Officerthat he had been appointed by respondent to preside over the hearing pursuant to Civil ServiceLaw § 75. This letter, along with other exhibits, including respondent's December 2, 2010resolution appointing the Hearing Officer, constituted a written record sufficiently documentingthe validity of the Hearing Officer's appointment and satisfied the relevant provisions of CivilService Law § 75 (2) (see Matter of Stafford v Board of Educ. of Mohonasen Cent.School Dist., 61 AD3d at 1260).

Nor are we persuaded by petitioner's claim that he was denied due process because he did notreceive adequate notice of the charges that had been filed against him. Due process requires that"a notice of charges must reasonably apprise the accused of the claim being made so that anadequate defense may be mounted," and any disciplinary determination must address theaccusations as set forth in this statement of charges (Matter of Benson v Board of Educ. ofWashingtonville Cent. School Dist., 183 AD2d 996, 997 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d756 [1992]; see Matter of Brown v Saranac Lake Cent. School Dist., 273 AD2d 785, 785[2000]). The written notice charging petitioner with misconduct stated that the allegations werebased on circumstances that resulted in his arrest and the seizure by the police of crack cocainefrom his person at the time of his arrest. While evidence was presented at the hearing regardingpetitioner's past criminal record and other employment issues, that evidence was relevant todetermine the penalty to be imposed if petitioner was found guilty of the charges filed againsthim.

Respondent's determination that petitioner was guilty of misconduct is also supported bysubstantial evidence (see Matter ofGibson v Board of Educ. for the City School Dist. of Albany, 96 AD3d 1120, 1121[2012]; Matter of James v Hoosick FallsCent. School Dist., 93 AD3d 1131, 1133 [2012]). Contrary to petitioner's contention,hearsay evidence is admissible in such administrative proceedings (see Matter of James vHoosick Falls Cent. School Dist., 93 AD3d at 1133). Moreover, even without such evidence,petitioner's handwritten letter to the school district in which he admitted that he possessed crackcocaine at the time of his arrest, his plea of guilty to aggravated harassment in the second degreein connection with the domestic violence incident and his testimony at the hearing confirmingthat he possessed and used crack cocaine provided substantial evidence to support the findingthat he engaged in misconduct while an employee of the school district.

Finally, we do not find that the penalty imposed—termination—is "sodisproportionate to the offense . . . as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Correll v Bucci, 19 AD3d919, 921 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Gibson v[*3]Board of Educ. for the City School Dist. of Albany, 96AD3d at 1120). There is no dispute that petitioner possessed and used cocaine while employedby the school district. While he denied at the hearing ever using cocaine while actually workingas a custodian, it is self-evident that allowing someone addicted to such an illegal substance tohave daily contact with students is incompatible with their best interests. Petitioner's possessionand use of crack cocaine, coupled with the other incidents of misconduct that occurred during the10-year period he was employed by the school district, including numerous arrests for drugrelated offenses,[FN*]provided ample justification for the decision that he be terminated.

Mercure, J.P., Spain and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote *: While petitioner entered andsuccessfully completed a drug rehabilitation program after his arrest, evidence was presented thathe was again charged with possession of illegal drugs. When questioned about the circumstancessurrounding this subsequent arrest at the hearing, petitioner invoked his Fifth Amendment rightagainst self-incrimination.


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