| Matter of Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v New York StateDept. of Envtl. Conservation |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05384 [119 AD3d 1172] |
| July 17, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 In the Matter of Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc.,Appellant, v New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Respondent,et al., Respondents. |
Nolan & Heller, LLP, Albany (Carl G. Dworkin of counsel), for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb of counsel),for New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, respondent.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Cahill, J.), entered June 7,2013 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted amotion by respondent Department of Environmental Conservation to dismiss thepetition.
In August 2012, respondent Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafterDEC) issued a Freshwater Wetlands permit (see ECL art 24) to respondent StacyCappon relating to property that she owned with her husband, respondent Brian Cappon,in the Town of West Monroe, Oswego County. In December 2012, petitioner, anot-for-profit corporation, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challengingDEC's approval of the permit. DEC subsequently moved to dismiss the petition asuntimely because the proceeding was not commenced within 30 days of the issuance ofthe permit (see ECL 24-0705 [6]). In opposition, petitioner argued that DECshould be equitably estopped from raising timeliness grounds based on representationsallegedly made by Kenneth Lynch—a DEC regional director—to SamuelSage—petitioner's president—regarding the applicable statute oflimitations.[FN1]Supreme Court found, among other things, that equitable estoppel could not be invoked,granted DEC's motion and dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals and weaffirm.
We reject petitioner's contention that, in order to prevent injustice, DEC should beequitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because there was "aneffective tolling of the statute of limitations" by Lynch's alleged representations to Sage.It is axiomatic that the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot generally be invoked againstgovernmental agencies in the exercise of their governmental function (see Matter ofE.F.S. Ventures Corp. v Foster, 71 NY2d 359, 370 [1988]; Matter of ParkviewAssoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274, 282 [1988]; Matter of DaleviewNursing Home v Axelrod, 62 NY2d 30, 33 [1984]; Matter of Dear v New York State& Local Retirement Sys., 115 AD3d 1141, 1143 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 905 [2014]; Matter of Grella v Hevesi, 38 AD3d 113, 117 [2007]).However, estoppel may apply in certain "exceptional cases in which there has been ashowing of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or similar affirmative misconduct, alongwith reasonable reliance thereon" (Stone Bridge Farms, Inc. v County of Columbia, 88 AD3d1209, 1212 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Town of Copake v 13Lackawanna Props., LLC, 99 AD3d 1061, 1064 [2012], lv denied 20NY3d 857 [2013]; see Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 62 NY2d at33; Bender v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 NY2d 662, 668[1976]; Matter of Village ofFleischmanns [Delaware Natl. Bank of Delhi], 77 AD3d 1146, 1148 [2010]; see also Matter of Oakwood Prop.Mgt., LLC v Town of Brunswick, 103 AD3d 1067, 1069 [2013], lvdenied 21 NY3d 853 [2013]).
Here, less than 30 days after the permit was issued, Sage spoke with Lynch regardingpetitioner's plans to challenge the permit. According to Sage, Lynch explained that hewas not adequately familiar with the permit and needed to review the matter. Sage"believe[d]" that it was during this conversation that Lynch told him that petitioner didnot need to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding within 30 days of the issuance ofthe permit because petitioner had four months to bring a challenge, which would giveLynch time to review it. Although Lynch acknowledged having spoken to Sage about thepermit, he denied telling Sage that the applicable statute of limitations was four monthsor that the limitations period would be extended. Indeed, Lynch averred that he had noauthority to waive or extend the applicable statute of limitations on behalf of DEC, andthe statement that petitioner attributes to Lynch was, at best, akin to erroneous advice thatdoes not rise to the level necessary to implicate the exception where estoppel may beinvoked against a governmental agency (see Matter of Village of Fleischmanns[Delaware Natl. Bank of Delhi], 77 AD3d at 1148; Matter of Amsterdam NursingHome Corp. [1992] v Daines, 68 AD3d 1591, 1592 [2009]; see also Academy St. Assoc., Inc. vSpitzer, 44 AD3d 592, 593 [2007]).
Moreover, considering petitioner's acknowledgment that it was, at the very least,aware of the likelihood that a 30-day statute of limitations applied,[FN2] petitioner could not have[*2]reasonably relied on the alleged representation madeby Lynch, despite the longstanding working relationship between Sage and Lynch(see Stone Bridge Farms, Inc. v County of Columbia, 88 AD3d at 1213; Matter of Dagvadorj vDeFleur, 70 AD3d 1275, 1280 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 712 [2010]).To the extent not specifically addressed herein, petitioner's remaining contentions havebeen considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Peters, P.J., Rose, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1:Petitioner also arguedthat the 30-day statute of limitations was not applicable, but has not raised that issue onappeal.
Footnote 2:Petitioner's counselaverred that he advised Sage that there "was probably a 30-day time limit" andrecommended that a CPLR article 78 petition be filed within 30 days.