| People v Carrillo |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50680(U) [75 Misc 3d 1227(A)] |
| Decided on July 27, 2022 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County |
| Licitra, J. |
| As corrected in part through July 29, 2022; it willnot be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on July 27, 2022
The People of theState of New York against Carrillo, Defendant. |
Docket No. CR-014274-21BX
For the People: Darcel Clark, District Attorney of Bronx County (by ADA LaToyaStephens)
For Ms. Carrillo: The Legal Aid Society (by Leanne Fornelli)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
In this case, when the People purported to certify their discovery compliance, they had notactually produced at least five police reports and the body-worn camera footage for four policeofficers. As a result, their certificate of compliance was not proper and did not meet therequirements necessary to stop the speedy-trial clock. The defense attorney notified the People ofthe missing discovery, but the People did not actually produce it until three monthslater—over 140 days after arraignments.
The defense has now moved to dismiss the case. They argue the People's failure to properlycertify discovery compliance meant the People failed to validly state ready for trial within 90days of arraignments. The People oppose, arguing they demonstrated "good faith" and"substantial compliance" with their automatic discovery obligations.
The defense's motion is GRANTED.
I. ThePeople's statement of readiness was invalid because they failed to actually produce automaticdiscovery before certifying compliance.
The statute's plain text is clear. A "proper" certificate of compliance ("COC") is necessary tostop the speedy-trial clock. (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). The statute defines a "proper" COC in"subdivision one" of C.P.L. § 245.50. (Id.). Specifically, it defines a proper COC asone that is filed "[w]hen the prosecution has provided the discovery required bysubdivision one of section 245.20," except for materials that are lost, destroyed, or under aprotective order. (C.P.L. § 245.50[1] [emphasis added]). Indeed, that is also what the statutedirects the People to do in their certificate of compliance. They mustcertify that they have complied—that "the prosecutor has disclosedand made available all known material and information subject to discovery." (Id.[emphases added]). It is only after filing this proper COC that the People may validly state readyfor trial. (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). Alongside this plain text, the Appellate Division has held thata COC "[can]not be deemed complete" for speedy-trial purposes until discovery identified in theCOC is "actually produced" to the defense. (People ex rel. Ferro v. [*2]Brann, 197AD3d 787, 787-88 [2d Dep't 2021]).
Here, the People filed a certificate of compliance even though they had not, in fact, providedthe discovery required by C.P.L. § 245.20[1]. When they filed their COC, they had notprovided:
• Body-worn camera footage for police officer AboNiang;
• Body-worn camera footage for police officer JoaquinCruz;
• Body-worn camera footage for police officer JulioAlvarez;
• Body-worn camera footage for police officer JosephCordones;
• A police "roll call"report;
• A police report entitled the "Prisoner MovementSlip";
• A police arrestphoto;
• A police report entitled "Warrant Inquiry SearchResults"; and
• Police property vouchers.
All these documents were clearly "discovery required by subdivision oneof section 245.20." (See C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). They were all police materials createdfor this case, and so they were in the People's control and related to the subject matter of the case.(See C.P.L. § 245.20[1], [2] [deeming documents with police to be in thepossession, custody, or control of the People]).
The People concede that they did not disclose all the various missing police reports (ofwhich there were at least five) when they filed their COC. (Pr. Resp. at 6-8). That alone meanstheir COC was not proper. The People filed it even though they had not provided thediscovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20. (See C.P.L. §§245.50[3], [1] [defining a proper COC as one filed "[w]hen the prosecution has providedthe discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20"] [emphasis added]). A COC that isnot proper cannot support a valid statement of readiness. (Id.).
The body-worn camera footage requires some further discussion. The People assert that theydisclosed the body-worn camera footage with their COC. The defense asserts they did not receivethe missing videos. The People's COC lists "Body-worn camera footage." (Def. Mot. Ex. A).However, the People provide no evidence—like the body-worn camera auditlog—to substantiate their claim that they actually produced the missing videos with theirCOC.
This issue falls squarely within the Appellate Division's decision in Ferro. (197AD3d at 787-88; see also People v. Francis, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50655[U], at *2-*4[Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [analyzing Ferro]). In Ferro, the People sent andresent over 900 files of discoverable material after defense "counsel claimed that she had notoriginally received that material." (Pr. Mem. of Law at 22, People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann,A.D. Docket No. 2021-05850 [Aug. 18, 2021]). The Appellate Division held that the COC"could not be deemed complete until all of the material and information identified in thecertificate as subject to discovery and electronically shared with the defendant was actuallyproduced to the defendant." (Ferro, 197 AD3d at 787-88). This Court followsFerro and concludes that the People's failure to actually produce the body-camera videoshere was yet another reason the COC was not proper.
The Court notes that the discovery statute's requirements are not inflexible. If the People everface logistical hurdles in meeting their statutory mandates, the discovery law provides themnumerous opportunities to petition a court for relief. For instance, they may ask a court to [*3]modify the discovery periods for "good cause." (C.P.L. §245.70[2]). Or they may ask a court for permission to state ready on an improper COC because of"special circumstances." (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). But here, out of all the statute's numerousopportunities, the People sought none.
II. The People's interpretation of the discovery statute is incorrect.
In their responses, the People make various standardized arguments that this Court and manyothers around the city have rejected on several occasions. (See generally People v.Vargas, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22227 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [collecting cases]).
First, the People disregard the discovery statute's plain text and argue that it only requiresthem to "substantially" and in "good faith" comply with automatic discovery. "Substantialcompliance" is not the statute's standard. To the contrary, C.P.L. § 245.50[1] requires thatthe People file a COC "[w]hen the prosecution has provided the discovery required bysubdivision one of section 245.20." Moreover, "a 'good faith' certification of 'due diligence' doesnot make a COC proper if another necessary condition is not met—like if the People failedto 'provide[] the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20.'" (Vargas, 2022NY Slip Op. 22227, at *2-*3 [quoting C.P.L. § 245.50[1]]; see Ferro, 197 AD3d at788 [noting that a COC was not proper, despite the People's contention of "good faith," becausediscoverable items in the People's control were not "actually produced" to the defense]).
Second, the People conflate C.P.L. § 245.80 discovery sanctions with an analysis abouttheir trial readiness under C.P.L. § 30.30. "Dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 is nota sanction" pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.80. (People v. Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212[A], at *6 [Crim. Ct., NYCounty 2022); People v. Darren, 75Misc 3d 1208[A], at *5 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022] [same]). Where the People do notcomply with their discovery obligations, they do not do what is necessary to stop the speedy-trialclock. "Prejudice," which is a consideration for § 245.80 sanctions, "is not a factor" in a§ 30.30 analysis. (People v.Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563, 574 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2020]). "[T]he People'sobligation to provide discovery, and to certify compliance with that obligation, is not relieved byan absence of prejudice to the defendant." (Id.). "Therefore, while a defendant must showsome prejudice in order to obtain a [pre-30.30] sanction against the People under C.P.L. 245.80,the burden is not lifted from the People to comply with their obligation in the first instance."(Id.; see also Hon. Barry Kamins, Bail and Discovery Reform: The ThirdRound, N.Y.L.J. [June 6, 2022] ["One must distinguish this discretionary type of dismissal[in C.P.L. § 245.80], however, from a dismissal under C.P.L. § 30.30, which ismandatory when based on a failure of the prosecutor to file a valid certificate ofcompliance."]).
Third, the People misread the adverse-consequence bar as applying to speedy-trialdeterminations. The question here is whether a COC was "proper" as that term is defined byC.P.L. § 245.50[3]—i.e., whether it properly constituted what was necessaryto stop the speedy-trial clock. Critically, that section says that it operates "[n]otwithstanding theprovisions of any other law." (C.P.L. § 245.50[3]). The adverse-consequence bar is plainly aprovision of another law. (See People v.Formicola, 74 Misc 3d 559, 564-65 [Just Ct, Monroe County 2022] ["The key phrase insaid statute is 'Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.'"]). Therefore, this bar does notapply to the question of whether a COC was sufficient to meet the requirement [*4]necessary to stop the speedy-trial clock. (See also Darren,75 Misc 3d 1208[A], at *6 [finding COC and readiness invalid "is not an 'adverse consequence'"as contemplated by statute]; People v.Aquino, 72 Misc 3d 518, 526-27 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2021] [same]; People v. Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d266, 272 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2021] [same]).
Notably, earlier this year, the Legislature rejected amendments to the discovery statute thatwould have incorporated the exact interpretations that the People advance here. (See Gov.Kathy Hochul, Public Safety Package [2022]).[FN1]One amendment would have changed the requirement that a COC only be filed "[w]hen theprosecution has provided the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20" to arequirement that a COC only be filed "[w]hen the prosecution has substantially complied withtheir discovery obligations." (Id.). Another amendment would have added a clause intothe adverse-consequence bar, reading: "and a certificate of compliance filed in good faith andreasonable under the circumstances shall not be an impediment to filing a statement of readinesspursuant to subdivision three of section 245.50." (Id.).
The Legislature rejected these amendments, which affirms that the current construction urged by the People is incorrect. (See, e.g., Amer. Airlines, Inc. v. StateComm. for Human Rights, 29 AD2d 178 [1st Dep't 1968] ["In addition, the rejection by theLegislature of the amendments . . . sought by the Commission . . . is significant circumstanceagainst the construction sought by [them]."]). The Court will not now override the Legislature bymisreading those rejected amendments into the statute.
III. Even if the Court only analyzed the People's failures for "good faith" or "duediligence," it would not find them here.
Even if the Court applied the People's standard and simply analyzed their efforts for "goodfaith" or "due diligence," it would not find them here. The defense notified the People of theirmissing discovery—including the missing body-worn camera footage—by email inNovember of 2021. (Def. Reply Ex. A). The People did not produce it until February of 2022,three months later. (Pr. Resp. at 6-8).
The People provide three sentences describing their purported "diligent, good-faith efforts"to obtain and disclose discovery in this case. (See Pr. Resp. at 10). It is reproduced in fulland verbatim below:
A. Diligent, Good Faith Efforts
In order to obtain all discoverable material in this case, the People: called andemailed the arresting officer. The people emailed the precinct discovery liaison , as well as, theGiglio Unit/Law Department within The Bronx DA's Office. The People maintain they [*5]have made diligent good faith efforts to obtain any-and-allpaperwork throughout the course of this case.
(Id.).
The People do not explain, for instance: when they made these communications; how manytimes they communicated with each party; whether they ever reviewed their files to identifymissing materials; or whether and when they followed up about missing materials. In fact, thePeople do not explain at all why they failed to produce any of the police reports or videos forthree months after the defense attorney's notification. The People also do not explain whythey never petitioned a court for any of the numerous opportunities for relief that the discoverystatute provides. "Where the People do not seek any of [the statute's] numerous opportunities forrelief, they cannot be said to have exercised due diligence before filing their COC." (People v. Spaulding, 75 Misc 3d1219[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]).
In sum, the People failed to provide the Court with "the necessary factual basis" to make afinding of "good faith" or "due diligence." (People v. McKinney, 71 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Crim. Ct., KingsCounty 2021]). Accordingly, the Court does not find that they made such efforts here. Indeed, thePeople did precisely the opposite of what their COC claimed to certify. They "file[d] a certificateof compliance in which they claim[ed] to have exercised due diligence and turned over all knownmaterial and information, while at the same time not actually" exercising due diligence or turningover "all known material and information." (See Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 271; see alsoAdrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574 [noting the same]).
The Court holds that the People's COC and statement of readiness were not valid. As aresult, the C.P.L. § 30.30 clock ran from arraignments on September 22, 2021, to when thedefense requested this motion schedule on January 6, 2022. That is 106 days, more than the90-day speedy-trial limit. (C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]). Accordingly, the defense's C.P.L. §30.30 motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The defense's remaining arguments are moot.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: July 27, 2022
Bronx, NY
Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C.
Footnote 1:The proposal is publiclyavailable at https://www.scribd.com/document/565309809/Public-Safety-03-15-FINAL.