[*1]
People v Darren
2022 NY Slip Op 50415(U) [75 Misc 3d 1208(A)]
Decided on May 19, 2022
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York County
Rosenthal, J.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on May 19, 2022
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County


The People of theState of New York

against

Danks Darren, Defendant.




Docket No. CR-026055-21NY



For defendant: Anna Dean, Neighborhood Defenders Service

For thePeople: Alvin L. Bragg Jr., District Attorney, New York County, by Assistant District AttorneyJames Williams


Robert Rosenthal, J.

By motion filed March 21, 2022, defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrumentpursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b). The People filed a response on April 22, 2022. The defendantreplied on April 25, 2022. On April 29, 2022, the court, after a review of the motion papers,exhibits, and the court file, on the record in open court, granted defendant's motion to dismiss.This Decision and Order provides the court's reasoning.


Relevant Facts and Procedural History

OnNovember 10, 2021, defendant was arraigned on an accusatory instrument charging him withassault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]) and assault in the third degree (PenalLaw § 120.00 [2]), class A misdemeanors, attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law§ 110/120.00 [1])), a class B misdemeanor, and harassment in the second degree (PenalLaw § 240.26 [1])), a violation. The case was adjourned to December 13, 2021, forconversion of the criminal complaint to an information.

On December 13, 2021, the complaint was deemed an information, and the case was [*2]adjourned to January 24, 2022, for trial.

The People were not ready for trial on January 24, 2022. The case was adjourned to March 3,2022, for trial.

On February 4, 2022 — eighty-six days after defendant's arraignment — thePeople filed a certificate of compliance ("COC"), certificate of readiness ("COR"), automaticdiscovery form ("ADF"), and list of discovery and Rosario materials, off-calendar. Thelist of discovery and Rosario materials included Garrett and Gigliodisclosures and disclosure advisory forms ("DAF") for three testifying officers, two of whichare at issue in this motion. The DAF for Officer Bryan Gray provided that the New York CityPolice Department ("NYPD") found substantiated misconduct on three occasions andunsubstantiated misconduct on one occasion. The DAF for Officer Frank Contaldi provided thatthe NYPD found substantiated misconduct on one occasion.

On February 18, 2022, the attorneys had a phone conversation during which defense counselrequested the following: (1) underlying paperwork for both substantiated and unsubstantiatedNYPD findings noticed in the DAFs, and (2) notes taken by Officer Contaldi. The Peopleresponded that they would not provide the requested NYPD misconduct paperwork because itwas their position that this was not discoverable material under CPL 245.20.

On February 25, 2022, the People disclosed the requested police notes, which were in factOfficer Gray's notes, as well as a four-page "health pedigree information" record from theveterans' residence where the alleged incident took place.

At the next scheduled court appearance, on March 3, 2022, defendant requested a motionschedule. On March 21, 2022, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL30.30 for failure to file a valid COC within the statutory 90-day period.


Discussion

Defendant is accused of a misdemeanoroffense punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months. Accordingly, thePeople must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action, lessany excludable time (CPL 30.30 [1] [b], [4]). Computation for speedy trial purposes commenceson the day after arraignment (People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 [1987]). Once a defendanthas alleged an unexcused delay greater than the statutory allowance, the burden shifts to thePeople to demonstrate that specific periods of delay should be excluded (People v Santos,68 NY2d 859 [1986]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 [1980]).

Defendant argues that more than 90 days of includable time have elapsed since thecommencement of the criminal action because the People's COCs were invalid. Specifically,defendant contends that the People have not disclosed discoverable NYPD disciplinary recordsfor the two testifying officers, as well as information concerning the complainant's prior bad acts.Defendant argues also that the People did not disclose hand-written police notes and recordsfrom the veterans' residence facility until more than 90 days had elapsed after [*3]arraignment.

In response, the People claim that NYPD disciplinary records are not discoverable, as theyare "collateral" and would be too difficult to produce. The People argue also that the contents ofthe police notes were known to the defendant, as they were essentially information containedelsewhere in the provided discovery. The veterans' residence records, the People assert, wereprepared by the Veterans House, which is not under the custody and control of the DistrictAttorney's Office. The People did, however, belatedly disclose a copy of these records that hadbeen in NYPD possession since the alleged incident, as well as the originals, which the Peoplelater obtained from the veterans' residence. The People did not specifically address defendant'sargument concerning complainant's prior bad acts, but stated that they have complied with therequirements of CPL 245.20(1)(k).

Pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1), the People must automatically disclose to defendant "all itemsand information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody orcontrol of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control." Allinformation and items "related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New Yorkstate or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of theprosecution" (CPL 245.20 [2]). CPL 245.20 (2) further directs the People to make a diligent,good faith effort to ascertain the existence of such information, and when it exists, make itavailable for discovery, even if the material is not within their possession, custody, or control.

Once the People have satisfied their automatic discovery requirements, they must file andserve a COC pursuant to CPL 245.50. The COC shall identify the items provided and shall statethat, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence ofmaterial and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made availableall known material and information subject to discovery" (CPL 245.50 [1]). The filing of a COCcannot be deemed complete "until all of the material and information identified in the certificateas subject to discovery . . . was actually produced to the defendant, pursuant to CPL 245.50 (1)and (3)" (People ex rel. Ferro vBrann, 197 AD3d 787, 787 [2d Dept 2021], citing People v Aquino, 72 Misc 3d 518, 523 [Crim Ct, NY County2021]).

The discovery statute must be read in conjunction with CPL 30.30. The People cannot bedeemed ready for trial until a proper COC is filed with the court and served upon the defense(CPL 30.30 [5] ["[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by acertification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20"]).Pursuant to CPL 245.50 (3), "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes ofsection 30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to subdivision one ofthis section."


Police Officers' Disciplinary Records

At issue arerecords of substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct concerning the People'stestifying officers. Rather than disclose those records, the People provided their own DAFs, inwhich they summarized the allegations against the officers. The DAF for Officer Gray notesthree allegations substantiated by the NYPD, and one [*4]unsubstantiated allegation. One of the substantiated allegationsagainst Officer Gray is that he encouraged another NYPD officer to "use a ruse" to get anotherofficer to commit misconduct involving computer use. The substantiated allegation summarizedin the DAF concerning Officer Contaldi involves his improper use of the NYPD computerdatabase for purposes unrelated to official business, in particular, to aid another officer who wasunder investigation — for sale of drugs to a man who overdosed and died — andwho subsequently pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to prison.

Defendant argues that the People's failure to disclose the NYPD investigatory paperworkrelated to substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations against the testifying officers underminedthe validity of their purported COCs and CORs.

The People's arguments in opposition are not particular to the facts of this case. Rather, inthe same generic fashion as has been offered to this court time and again, the People claim thatthey need not disclose underlying disciplinary records because: 1) they concern a "collateralissue"; 2) they are not related to the subject matter of the case; and 3) disclosure "would imposean insurmountable burden on police departments, prosecutors, and the criminal justice system."The People argue also that even if their refusal to disclose is deemed a discovery violation,dismissal is not appropriate, as the failure to disclose caused no prejudice.

As in each of the prior cases in which the People have presented the same generic claims,their arguments are unavailing. Indeed, this court has rejected them on several occasions (see People v Soto, 72 Misc 3d1153 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]; People v Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214[A] [Crim Ct, NY County2021]). Other judges in this courthouse have likewise rejected the same arguments, holding thatCPL 245.20 (1)(k)(iv) requires disclosure of records underlying substantiated andunsubstantiated disciplinary allegations of misconduct before a valid COC can be filed (see People v Edwards, 74 Misc 3d433 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]; People v Barralaga, 73 Misc 3d 510 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]; People v Kelly, 71 Misc 3d1202[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]); People v Ahmed Mohammed,CR-026662-21NY [Crim Ct, NY County, Apr. 28, 2022]; People v Abdul Salaam,CR-019124-21NY [Crim Ct, NY County, Apr. 19, 2022]; People v Eric Morton,CR-003860-21NY [Crim Ct, NY County, Aug. 25, 2021]). Courts of other jurisdictions havehanded down the same ruling (People vPerez, 71 Misc 3d 1214[A] [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2021]; People v Herrera, 71 Misc 3d1205[A] [Dist Ct, Nassau County 2021]; People v Cooper, 71 Misc 3d 559 [County Ct, Erie County 2021];People v McKinney, 71 Misc 3d1221[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2021]; People v Porter, 71 Misc 3d 187 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2020];People v Randolph, 69 Misc 3d770 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2020]; People v Rosario, 70 Misc 3d 753 [County Ct, Albany County2020]). Significantly, in Matter ofJayson C (200 AD3d 447, 449 [1st Dept 2021]), the First Department held, on EqualProtection grounds, that respondents in juvenile proceedings are entitled to the sameimpeachment material as defendants in criminal cases, and that a mere summary of substantiatedallegations is insufficient to comply with CPL 245.20 (1)(k)(iv), "which broadly requiresdisclosure of all impeachment evidence."

Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20 (1)(k)(iv) requires the People to disclose:

[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known to police or otherlaw enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to. . . impeachthe credibility of a testifying prosecution witness. . . . Information under this subdivision shall bedisclosed whether or not such information is recorded in tangibleform.

The plain meaning of "all evidence and information. . . that tends to. . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness . . . [w]hether or not . . . in tangibleform" encompasses all allegations, as well as the files, records, and other materials on whichsubstantiated and unsubstantiated disciplinary findings against the People's officer witness arebased (see People v Kelly; People v Perez; People v Herrera; People vCooper; People v McKinney; People v Porter; People v Randolph;People v Rosario).

The ability to test — to confront — an adverse witness' credibility throughimpeachment is a fundamental right. Several courts considering the scope of CPL 245.20 (1)(k)have found that there can be a good faith basis to cross-examine police witnesses aboutsubstantiated allegations that are clearly supported by facts — and even as tounsubstantiated allegations when sufficient evidence is available (see People v Kelly, 71 Misc 3d1202[A]; People v Kayjon Yizar, Ind No. 2105/19 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2021];People v Randolph, 69 Misc 3d770). Indeed, underlying disciplinary records may well be necessary to establish a good faithbasis for cross-examination about specific disciplinary matters.

Impeachment evidence and information concerns the credibility of the officer witness— the trustworthiness of the witness, whether the witness is believable or whether thewitness' history of behavior and actions undermine that witness' claims. The Court of Appealshas repeatedly made clear that impeachment concerns the characteristics of the witness, not thelimited subject matter of the crime charged. In People v Walker (83 NY2d 455 [1994]),for instance, the Court recognized impeachment questioning that "demonstrates an untruthfulbent" or "reveals a willingness or disposition . . . voluntarily to place the advancement of individual self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." The Court restated thatprinciple in People v Smith (27NY3d 652, 661 [2016]) and again in People v Rouse (34 NY3d 269 [2019]), where impeachment of atestifying officer was at issue. Limiting CPL article 245 discovery requirements to only evidenceand information related to the subject matter — the particular offense charged — ofa given case, as the People argue, would undermine that principle.[FN1]

The incongruity of such a ruling would be particularly striking in this case, where thePeople's DAFs refer to such egregious conduct by the testifying officers, their own actions, aswell as their efforts to lure other officers to commit improper conduct, and efforts to abet anotherofficer engaged in his own criminal conduct that ended with a manslaughter plea and a prisonsentence. The evidence of the willingness and disposition of the testifying officers to favor theirown self-interests bears directly on their credibility, sincerity, and general honesty. Inquiry intothat conduct would certainly "tend to impeach" their credibility and is critical tocross-examination, whatever the subject matter of the case may be. None of that improperconduct, however, is related to the particular crime charged here. It is even conceivable that in nocase would evidence and information concerning these officers' misconduct be disclosed, if— as the People argue — discovery requirements were limited to that which isrelated to the particular crime charged in any given case. Such a constricted reading wouldcritically undermine a defendant's right to impeach the People's witnesses, so consistentlyarticulated by the Court of Appeals, as well as by article 245 (see People v Edwards, 74Misc 3d at 440-441; contra People v Flores, 74 Misc 3d 1222 [A][Sup Ct, Nassau County2022]; People v Hutchins, 2022 NY Slip Op 50327 [U], WL 1219631 [Sup Ct, NYCounty 2022]).[FN2]

The People claim that disclosure of these disciplinary records would impose an impossibleburden on their office given the size of the NYPD and the number of disciplinary complaints andproceedings conducted, and how far back in time they would have to search. These arguments areinapposite in this case, which, like most cases in courts of criminal jurisdiction, involves alimited number of police witnesses (two) and a small number of disciplinary findings (five), allof which occurred in 2020. The People's failure to describe any specific efforts or difficulty inobtaining records in this case evidences the minimal burden that might be caused by disclosingdisciplinary records here.[FN3]

The People's claim that their COC should be deemed valid because their failure to [*5]disclose the underling materials did not cause prejudice to thedefendant is also unavailing. Prejudice is not a factor concerning the validity of a COC (People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563,574 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]). To file a valid COC, the People must be able to state that"after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence ofmaterial and information subject to discovery, they have disclosed and made available all knownmaterial and information subject to discovery" (CPL 245.50 [1]). This is not the case here.

Finally, the People's contention that dismissal would be an extreme and unwarrantedsanction misconstrues the law. Dismissal pursuant to CPL 30.30 is not a sanction. Pursuant toCPL 245.50 (3), the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of CPL 30.30until a proper COC has been filed (seePeople v Lobato, 66 Misc 3d 1230[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020] ["discoverycompliance is a condition precedent to a valid announcement of readiness for trial, absent'exceptional circumstances' on a particular case"]). The People have not complied with theirdiscovery obligations. Thus, they have not filed a valid COC, and thus have not properlyanswered ready for trial. That is, the People did not do what was necessary, pursuant to CPL 245and CPL 30.30 to stop the speedy trial clock (see People v Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d 266, 272 [Crim Ct, BronxCounty 2021] [deeming COC invalid and charging the People with speedy trial time "is not an'adverse consequence' as contemplated by CPL 245.80"]). Accordingly, the time in which theywere required to answer ready expired.

Concerning the disciplinary materials, this is not a circumstance in which the People madegood faith efforts to ascertain their existence and disclose them, or one in which the People faceddifficulty in meeting their obligation. To the contrary, given the summaries included in theDAFs, it is reasonable to assume that the People are in actual possession of the documents atissue. Thus, the People's refusal to disclose is merely an expression of policy and desire, ratherthan anything related to the facts of this case. But determining what should be discoverable is notthe People's province. Pursuant to article 245, the People's responsibility is solely to disclose "allmaterial and information" that "tends to impeach" the officer witness. They have not done thatwith regard to the disciplinary materials. Accordingly, the People have not filed a valid certificateof compliance or, in turn, a certificate of readiness.


Police Officer Notes and Veterans' ResidencePaperwork

Defendant argues that the People's purported COC of February 4, 2022,was invalid for failure to disclose handwritten police notes and four pages of veterans' residencedocuments. That material was in the People's possession from the outset, though none wasdisclosed prior to February 4, 2022. For that reason as well, the People did not satisfy their initialdiscovery requirements and thus did not file a valid COC.[FN4]


The Complaining Witness' Prior Bad Acts

Theofficers' body-worn camera recordings reveal a history between the responding [*6]police officers and the complaining witness. One officer is recordedsaying "I get it, we know he [complainant] is a problem" and "if [complainant] attacks you, runaway." Another officer states "Calvin [complainant] is a victim? Ok, change of pace." And athird officer asks, "Calvin [complainant], why are we here all the time, bro?" Defendant notesthat at least two other officers "express incredulousness that the complainant is not being chargedas the aggressor in the instant case" during the body-worn camera recordings. These commentssuggest significant contact between the complainant and the police that may be discoverable asevidence and information concerning the complainant's prior bad acts. CPL 245.20 (1)(k)(iii)requires disclosure of "all evidence and information" that "tends to support a potential defense toan offense charged, and (iv) "impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness." It does not appearthat the People made any good faith or diligent effort to ascertain or disclose any "evidence andinformation" concerning the complaining witness' prior bad acts.[FN5]If the NYPD and prosecution possess such evidence and information, whether or not "in tangibleform," it must be disclosed prior to the prosecution filing a valid COC.


Conclusion

The People have not shown any periodsof excludable delay pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4). The total includable time between thecommencement of the criminal action and March 3, 3022, when the instant motion schedule wasset, amounts to 113 days. For those reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatoryinstrument pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b) is granted.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the court.

DATED: May 19, 2022
_________________
Robert Rosenthal
Judge of theCriminal Court

Footnotes


Footnote 1:People v Garrett (23 NY3d 878,891 [2014]) and its progeny (People vKnight, 69 Misc 3d 546 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020], People v Sanchez,CR-004739-20NY [Crim Ct, NY County, Feb 10, 2021], and People v Perez, 73 Misc 3d 171 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]), onwhich the People rely, limited disclosure to impeachment material related to the subject of theunderlying case. Garrett was decided before the enactment of CPL 245.20 (1)(k)(iv),requiring disclosure of "all evidence and information, including that which is known to police orother law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness " (CPL 245.20 [1][k][iv]). Thus,Garrett is not applicable here.

Footnote 2:The conclusion in Florezthat disclosure of material and information underlying substantiated and unsubstantiateddisciplinary allegations is not required is based entirely on cases decided prior to the enactmentof CPL article 245, which significantly expanded the People's discovery obligations.

Footnote 3:CPL article 245 provides forrelief where discovery disclosure is difficult or untenable. For example, CPL 245.10 (1)(a) allowsfor extension of time to provide initial discovery where materials are exceptionally voluminous.In some circumstances, CPL 245.50 (3) allows for trial readiness when discoverable evidence isunavailable. CPL 245.70 (2) allows for modification of discovery periods for good cause shown.CPL 245.70 (1) allows for protective orders that might deny, restrict, condition, or deferdisclosure of any discovery. Also, CPL 30.30 (4)(g) allows for exclusion of time chargeable tothe People for delay "occasioned by exceptional circumstances." The People here sought no suchrelief.

Footnote 4:The People ultimately providedthat material. However, the People's purported COC was filed on the 86th day after arraignment,thus their belated disclosure was too late to prevent the remaining speedy trial time fromexpiring.

Footnote 5:The People disclosed thecomplaining witness' record of judgment of convictions — two drug possessionconvictions from 1998 and 2000. The officers' comments at the scene suggest more recentcontact with police.




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