| Matter of Saratoga County Economic Opportunity Council, Inc.v Village of Ballston Spa Zoning Bd. of Appeals |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 08177 [112 AD3d 1035] |
| December 5, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Saratoga County Economic OpportunityCouncil, Inc., Respondent, v Village of Ballston Spa Zoning Board of Appeals,Appellant. |
—[*1] Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Mark Schachner ofcounsel), for respondent.
Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Chauvin, J.), enteredJanuary 7, 2013 in Saratoga County, which granted petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent findingthat petitioner was not excepted from certain zoning requirements.
Petitioner is a not-for-profit organization that provides a variety of programs andservices, many federally funded, in Saratoga County, mostly to low-income residents.Petitioner contracted to purchase property located in the Central Business District Zoneof the Village of Ballston Spa, Saratoga County. Petitioner then applied to the VillageCode Enforcement Officer, Randy Lloyd, for an interpretation of whether the services itplanned to provide at that property were permitted by the Village's zoning ordinance.Lloyd concluded that petitioner's proposed uses were not permitted uses in, and did notfall within the exception for "[v]ital human services" under the zoning ordinancegoverning, that business district. At a public hearing on petitioner's appeal to respondent,numerous individuals expressed opinions for and against the proposed uses as vitalhuman services. Respondent agreed with Lloyd, finding the proposed uses are notpermitted as vital human services. Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78proceeding challenging respondent's interpretation. [*2]Supreme Court granted the relief requested, in part,determining that petitioner's proposed use of the property fell within the exception to thezoning ordinance. Respondent appeals.
The subject property, located at 31-39 Bath Street in the Village of Ballston Spa, issituated in the Central Business District Zone. The Village's zoning ordinance provides,in part:
" '§ 205-57 Retail Use in the Central Business District Zone'"
"a. Any change of use on the ground floor of a structure located within the CentralBusiness District Zone shall be used only for retail space with the following exceptions:
"1. Vital human services
"2. Offices by special permit
"3. Churches and houses of religious worship
"4. Libraries
"5. Museums
"6. Hotels
"7. Banks and financial institutions
"8. Parking garages" (Local Law No. 3 [2007] of Village of Ballston Spa, § I,adding art X, § 205-57 of Code of Village of Ballston Spa [emphasis added]). Thephrase "Vital human services" is defined in the ordinance as "any health relatedservices such as doctors, dentists, physical therapists, hair and skin care and othernecessary human services" (as added by Local Law No. 3 [2007] of Village ofBallston Spa, § II [emphases added]). Petitioner contended, and Supreme Courtagreed, that it provided such "[v]ital human services" and, as such, respondent erred ininterpreting the zoning ordinance so as to preclude petitioner's proposed uses on theground floor of the subject property. On respondent's appeal,[FN*]we agree with Supreme Court's determination and affirm.
"When a reviewing court is confronted with an allegedly ambiguous zoning law, itgenerally will grant great deference to [a zoning board of appeals'] interpretationthereof—disturbing such interpretation only if it is irrational and unreasonable"(Matter of Subdivisions, Inc. vTown of Sullivan, 92 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 811[2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). By the same token, zoningrestrictions are in derogation of the common law and, as such, are strictly construedagainst the regulating municipality and "any ambiguity in the language employed must beresolved in favor of the property owner [or, here, the contract vendee]" (Matter ofBonded Concrete v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of [*3]Saugerties, 268 AD2d 771, 774 [2000], lvdenied 94 NY2d 764 [2000]). Where the dispute presents a question of pure legalinterpretation of an unambiguous provision or phrase in a zoning ordinance, "deferenceis not required" (Matter of Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 92 AD3d at1185; see Matter of Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of Am. v City of New York,82 NY2d 35, 42 [1993]; Matterof Avramis v Sarachan, 97 AD3d 874, 876 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d852 [2012]).
Here, to the extent that "[v]ital human services," which include "any health relatedservices" and "other necessary human services," is a somewhat ambiguous phrase, it willbe construed in petitioner's favor. A statute such as a zoning ordinance must be"construed as a whole, reading all of its parts together," all of which should beharmonized to ascertain legislative intent, and it should be given its plain meaning,avoiding a construction that renders superfluous any language in the ordinance (Matter of Erin Estates, Inc. vMcCracken, 84 AD3d 1487, 1489 [2011]; see Friedman v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 9 NY3d105, 115 [2007]). Neither "health related services," which is unambiguous, nor"other necessary human services," which is somewhat vague, is defined in the legislationand, thus, we look to the plain meaning of those terms. While the ordinance generallycontemplates "retail space" on the ground floor for any changed use in the CentralBusiness District Zone, it specifically exempts certain enumerated uses—including"[v]ital human services"—many of which are not retail or commercial. Several ofthe exempted uses—e.g., museums, libraries, churches and houses of religiousworship—may also be used by not-for-profit entities such as petitioner. Thus, theopinions expressed at the hearing before respondent that appear to have influenced itsinterpretation—that the excepted use must be a property-tax paying, for-profitbusiness—are incorrect. In that regard, the focus must be on the proposeduses and not on the entity or person who owns or occupies the land (seeMatter of Dexter v Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 NY2d 102, 105 [1975]). Further,respondent may not insert conditions or criteria into a zoning ordinance governingallowable uses in a zoned district that are not contained in the statutory languageadopted.
Notably, there has been no dispute as to the services provided by petitioner andproposed for this ground floor location, or that they are "health related." Petitioneroffered uncontroverted proof that it offers government funded programs, including directservices for: (1) "Women, Infants and Children (WIC)," a nutrition program designed tosafeguard the health of low income women and their children who are at nutritional risk,to improve the health of pregnant and breast-feeding women, new mothers and theirinfants, and offering height, weight and anemia testing for children; (2) Head Start,which, among myriad other beneficial services, offers medical, dental, health,developmental and behavioral screening for children, as well as disability services forchildren; (3) a Community Services Department that offers crisis intervention and fulfillsthe emergency needs of families and individuals, as well as a food pantry and rural fooddelivery for the elderly and homebound disabled individuals; and (4) a Weatherizationprogram, which assists families by offering health and safety services such as carbonmonoxide/smoke detector installation, proper venting for appliances, and furnacecleaning.
The foregoing compellingly establishes that petitioner's proposed uses qualify as"[v]ital human services" in that they are "health related" and "necessary human services"comparable to that offered by medical professionals and facilities and by social servicesagencies, under the plain meaning and common understanding of those terms. Indeed, thehealth and safety-related, necessary and vital nature of the services and programs thatpetitioner offers has never been controverted. Consequently, we agree with SupremeCourt that respondent's interpretation of the [*4]zoningprovision as not allowing petitioner's proposed uses was irrational and unreasonable, andits determination was properly annulled (see Matter of Atkinson v Wilt, 94 AD3d 1218, 1220[2012]).
Stein, J.P., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: We are not persuaded,however, by petitioner's claim that this controversy was rendered moot by its purchase ofthe subject property and relocation of its staff and reported provision of services fromthis site. Petitioner's actions, taken at its own peril, do not prevent this Court "fromrendering a decision that would effectively determine an actual controversy" (Matterof Dreikausen v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 98 NY2d 165, 172[2002]), i.e., whether the proposed uses are allowed.