Clark v Aquino
2014 NY Slip Op 00006 [113 AD3d 1076]
January 3, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


Nancy E. Clark, Appellant,
v
Tiffany Aquino,Respondent.

—[*1]Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.

Mura & Storm, PLLC, Buffalo (Kris E. Lawrence of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy J. Walker, A.J.),entered November 9, 2012 in a personal injury action. The order, among other things,granted the cross motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversedon the law without costs, the cross motion is denied and the complaint is reinstated.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sheallegedly sustained when the vehicle she was driving was struck by a vehicle operated bydefendant. In her bill of particulars, plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the accident, shesustained a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use, significantlimitation of use, and 90/180-day categories set forth in Insurance Law § 5102 (d).We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's cross motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did notsustain a qualifying injury under any of those categories.

With respect to plaintiff's alleged preexisting condition, defendant failed to meet herinitial burden by submitting persuasive evidence establishing that plaintiff's " 'allegedinjuries sustained in the accident were preexisting' . . . or, if they were, thatthey were not exacerbated by the accident" (Schreiber v Krehbiel, 64 AD3d 1244, 1245 [2009]; see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d566, 580 [2005]). Defendant's own expert physician concluded that plaintiff hadsustained a cervical strain as a result of the accident and that she was "free of ongoingneck pain" prior to the accident, and the medical records support those conclusions (see Fanti v McLaren, 110AD3d 1493, 1494 [2013]; Verkey v Hebard, 99 AD3d 1205, 1206 [2012]; Ashquabe v McConnell, 46AD3d 1419, 1419 [2007]).

Defendant also failed to establish that she is entitled to summary judgment on theground that plaintiff ceased treatment for her injuries, thereby "interrupt[ing] the chain ofcausation between the accident and claimed injur[ies]" (Pommells, 4 NY3d at572). Here, plaintiff provided a "reasonable explanation" for the "cessation of alltreatment" (id. at 574). She was discharged from two different courses ofphysical therapy after her treatment providers noted that she had maximized her potentialon those courses and recommended that she should continue [*2]with home exercises. Plaintiff was also discharged from acourse of chiropractic treatment, which had provided her with only temporary relief.Plaintiff also established that further physical therapy would have been palliative and notbeneficial absent periodic Botox injections, the risks of which were discussed with her,along with the lack of any guarantee of success (see id. at 576-577; see Paz v Wydrzynski, 41AD3d 453, 453-454 [2007]). "A plaintiff need not incur the additional expense ofconsultation, treatment or therapy, merely to establish the seriousness or causal relationof his [or her] injury" (Pommells, 4 NY3d at 577).

With respect to the category of permanent consequential limitation of use, weconclude that defendant failed to eliminate all issues of fact whether plaintiff's injuriesare permanent (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562[1980]). Indeed, the record establishes that the symptoms of plaintiff's alleged permanentconsequential limitation of use have been of lengthy duration and "that no change in hercondition [is] expected" (Hawkins v Foshee, 245 AD2d 1091, 1091 [1997]; see Stearns v O'Brien, 77AD3d 1383, 1383-1384 [2010]; Thomas v Hulslander, 233 AD2d 567, 567[1996]).

We further conclude that defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishingthat plaintiff did not sustain a significant limitation of use (see Toure v Avis Rent ACar Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 353 [2002]). Specifically, defendant failed to refute theallegation in the bill of particulars that plaintiff suffers from cervical dystonia (seeBowen v Dunn, 306 AD2d 929, 929 [2003]; Aleksiejuk v Pell, 300 AD2d1066, 1066-1067 [2002]). Furthermore, defendant's own submissions raise an issue offact with respect to the category of significant limitation of use because they contain "anexpert's designation of a numeric percentage" of plaintiff's significant restrictions in herrange of motion in her cervical area (Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 217 [2011]), and "recite thetests used to ascertain the degree of plaintiff's loss of range of motion" (Weaver v Town of Penfield,68 AD3d 1782, 1785 [2009]). The medical records submitted by defendant also"relate the range of motion losses to . . . objective findings of injur[ies]"caused by the accident (id.), including muscle spasms that were noted by medicalproviders (see Harrity vLeone, 93 AD3d 1204, 1206 [2012]). Moreover, conflicting opinions of theparties' experts raise issues of fact with respect to significant limitation of use (see Fonseca v Cronk, 104AD3d 1154, 1155 [2013]), including whether a postaccident MRI revealsaccident-related disc herniations (see Durham v New York E. Travel, 2 AD3d 1113,1114-1115 [2003]). It is undisputed that, at a minimum, plaintiff suffered a cervicalsprain or strain in the accident, and that her medical records demonstrate that shecontinuously complained of chronic neck and shoulder pain that restricted her activities(see Hawkins, 245 AD2d at 1091; see generally Toure, 98 NY2d at 352,355).

Finally, there is an issue of fact with respect to the 90/180-day category inasmuch asplaintiff testified that she was unable to perform substantially all of her customary dailyactivities during the requisite time period (see Hartley v White, 63 AD3d 1689, 1690 [2009]; Cummings v Riedy, 4 AD3d811, 813 [2004]; Calucci v Baker, 299 AD2d 897, 898 [2002]), and hermedical records during the requisite time period corroborate her testimony (cf. Womack v Wilhelm, 96AD3d 1308, 1311 [2012]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto, Carni, Sconiersand Whalen, JJ.


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