Matter of Kaseem R.
2014 NY Slip Op 00363 [113 AD3d 779]
January 22, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 5, 2014


In the Matter of Kaseem R., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[*1]Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Raymond E. Rogers ofcounsel), for appellant.

Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (MordecaiNewman of counsel; Christina Chung on the brief), for respondent.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, KaseemR. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.),dated January 18, 2013, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court datedSeptember 14, 2012, finding that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by anadult, would constitute the crime of assault in the second degree, adjudged him to be ajuvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed theappellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.

The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant onprobation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period ofplacement has expired (seeMatter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2010]). However, since there maybe collateral consequences of the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so muchof the order of disposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent has not beenrendered academic (see Family Ct Act § 783; Matter of DorothyD., 49 NY2d 212 [1980]; Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068).

The appellant was alleged to have intentionally caused a school administrator tosuffer physical injury by kicking her. At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, theFamily Court found that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that theappellant intended to cause the complainant to suffer physical injury and that thecomplainant suffered physical injury. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Racheal M., 108AD3d 770, 771 [2013];Matter of Ashley P., 74 AD3d 1075 [2010]; cf. People v Contes, 60NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond areasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts that, if committed by an adult, wouldconstitute the crime [*2]of assault in the second degree(see Penal Law § 120.05 [10]; Matter of Imani Mc., 78 AD3d 705, 706 [2010]; Matterof Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility toconduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59AD3d 617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear thetestimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at1068-1069; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Uponreviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinationwas not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2];Matter of Darnell C., 66AD3d 771, 772 [2009]; cf.People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition in ajuvenile delinquency proceeding, and its determination is accorded great deference(see Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d at 771; Matter of Paul T., 107 AD3d 726, 727 [2013]). Here, inlight of the seriousness of the appellant's conduct, as well as his refusal to takeresponsibility for it and his need for monitoring, the Family Court did not improvidentlyexercise its discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent (seeFamily Ct Act § 352.2), rather than directing an adjournment in contemplation ofdismissal (see Matter ofChakelton M., 111 AD3d 732 [2013]; Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3dat 771-772; Matter of LeightonF., 108 AD3d 669, 670 [2013]; cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107 AD3d 805, 807 [2013]).Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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